Our #7 has been under constant attack since he has joined the blaugrana side because the goals have not been flowing for him as with his previous teams. With arguably the world’s best midfield behind him, everyone expected Spain’s top hit man to be even more prolific. Following the World Cup, the media, fans, his ex-teammates, his friends and family all placed bets that Villa would achieve one of his lifelong goals to be Pichichi of the league he didn’t dare leave, the league he loves so much – La Liga.

Before he joined Barça, Villa equated himself with the goal. And if you watched or read any interviews asking others such as Xavi, Casillas, Pique, and Iniesta how they would describe Villa, they all answered with one word: goals. Few knew - and few know - that for Barça, the job Villa was signed to do was not so simple. It seems that only two men really knew what el Guaje was in for: Pep Guardiola and Johan Cruyff.

Cruyff knew with Barça’s system already set to revolve around the world’s best player in Messi, Pep would assign Villa to the left. In his weekly column for El Periodico published on March 28 2011, Cruyff wrote in defense of Villa:

Just as Xavi is not in the field only to give assists, Villa plays not only to score. As they are two of Barça. Xavi was needed to be champions of Europe and the World, and reached 100 to receive the praise of all. With him, the selection is a bit of Barça. And a bit of Barcelona is a lot. Xavi brings style, balance and ball control; Villa, depth. His problem, not yours, is the burden up front, is that of a forward. And for that there is no field, there is no coach – the striker stands alone on goal. The error of appreciation is enormous.

Villa is no less dangerous at five games without scoring for Barcelona. Or does any less of a good job for taking three caps to overcome Raúl for the record. The strikers are selfish. The team can win, but they will not sleep easy if they do not meet with a goal.

But if he is already the top scorer in the history of selection, if the percentage of goals per match is high, it is because he does much more than wait for the ball and push it. Villa is synonymous with depth. It means being always ready to open passing lanes, to draw defenders and thus freeing space for others.

Will he always score? No. This failure is part of football. For me, whether a forward plays badly or not has nothing to do with the goal. Or just by moving near the penalty area and marking more numbers than any other. Playing good or bad depends on whether he does or does not do a number of details that mean just as much as a goal. In his case, we are talking about depth.

Cruyff emphasizes that Villa is used to allow Barça to play with its signature philosophy and style. Furthermore, time and time again, Guardiola has also defended Villa and reiterated his confidence in el Guaje, saying that he is “indisputable.” More tellingly, in his October 24th press conference, Pep said: ”Thanks to Villa, we can play as well as we do. We do not find many like him. I would like to have more players like Villa by my side in my career. He has adapted and has the humility to do it… few would have the modesty to sacrifice themselves like that.”

And that’s what Villa is for at Barça: sacrifice. Guardiola knows well that he is not using Villa optimally – but Villa is being used to help Barça in the best way possible.  In a team sport, sacrifice is a necessity and in this team, Villa is a necessity.

Wasted

Guardiola doesn’t fully utilize Villa’s excellent control with long balls and his searing directness in counterattacks. Longs balls are not Barça’s style – though some variability now and then really can’t hurt. However on the second point, the counterattacks, the team really needs to work on. When space is cleared for once, Barça’s counterattacks are miserably slow. Too many players pass sideways even when there is space ahead, throwing the advantage of counterattacking in the bin. But returning to the main point, it is clear that unlike with Messi, the team does not play to Villa’s strengths – Villa is made to play to make the team stronger.

Football Without the Ball

David Villa is one of the world’s best players with his off-the-ball movement and with his ability to desmarque  – to lose his markers, draw defenders, and wreak havoc in the back line with his tireless and intelligent runs.  Especially against teams that park the bus, Villa creates space so that the team, so that Messi and Cesc – or whoever is allowed to play centrally – can score.  Maintaining the width of the pitch like he does requires strict discipline and patience – the latter of which, many have failed reciprocate with Villa.

Taking on a lot more defensive duty and constantly pressuring, Villa became a more complete player but ceded his role as being the focal point through which goals are scored. And nominally known as a striker (and I say nominally, because at Barça he is really a winger), the primary thing people expect of him is goals, and lots of them. Failing to realize that his off-the-ball movement and link-up play up front is what helps create Barça’s goals, many continue to question Villa’s place on this team.

Moreover, Villa always expects himself to score more because that is what he truly loves to do. He achieves this mainly by cutting in from the left, connecting with his teammates, and playing clever one-twos. He also by making runs across the backline waiting for thru-balls. The second strategy has drawn criticism due to the number of offsides he has accumulated – last season. This season, he is in fact onsides a lot more, but the reputation has stuck so that for any 50/50 situation, the linesmen would now raise the flag.

Not Only Barça’s Rivals Are Denied Possession…

Perhaps compelled to fit into the Barça way of passing and eager to prove he’s compatible with Messi, Villa sometimes hesitates, overthinks, and is less bold than his former self. However this is a psychological matter – maybe one of confidence – rather than a matter of ability. He needs to feel that he won’t be reprimanded for not passing and for taking shots. In this team known for possession, he is afraid of losing balls. But look at Messi and you’ll see that he loses plenty – it’s only natural with forwards because they are the ones responsible for taking those risks. Villa needs to know that he is allowed to take those chances too. David Villa has shown and he is continuing to show with Spain, that he has plenty of technique and ability with the ball. With his national side, he still plays on the left but he is given much much more freedom to float between lines and move around. As a result, he receives the ball a lot more and scores at a much higher rate. It’s simple in this respect: in order to put the ball in the back of the net – you need the ball.

1-on-1s is not one of his strengths, but he rarely gets the opportunity to make those individual on-the-ball plays on a team of players who all love to play with the ball – Messi, Iniesta, Thiago, and especially now Fabregas. Often flailing his arms and screaming in frustration in attempt to receive the ball, the amount of ball this footballer sees is minimal. Even Guardiola has recognized that Villa’s runs too often go ignored. Why is this though?

Ignoring any biases players may have with each other and strictly tactically – the space in the middle has now opened up because of Villa and Pedro on the flanks; Messi is free to face the goal. And since it is obviously easier to score right in front of the goal rather than having to come in from an angle, the midfielder would opt to pass to the centrally located false-nine. Also, it must be noted that because Dani Alves is so much better at pushing up and playing the ball in from the right than any left-back at Barça is capable of replicating on the left (with absolutely no disrespect to Abidal), there is simply more action and goal scoring opportunities on that other band.

Behind the Numbers

Any player in Villa’s position, with his job and on this team, will have difficulty scoring as regularly as they may have on other teams.  Too often is the work behind the goals ignored.  Too often are people blinded by the score-line and statistics – the number of goals, assists, shots, etc. The work Villa does (and Pedro too) is immeasurable – often unnoticed and off the screen because it is accomplished without the football. However that work has a very tangible effect on the game and on the success that Barça has achieved.

Not many players of Villa’s quality – top scorer of a Euro and World Cup winning national team – will be able to fulfill that job description with as much grace and professionalism as he has. In addition to what he adds in the locker room (I hear from Pep that he’s a real joker), let’s not forget all the goals he has scored for Barça. David Villa is already a part of Barça history and I say he has done and is doing enough to merit a place in its future. El Guaje is here because more than he loves goals, he loves the team and he loves the game.

This piece was not written as an excuse for any lack of goals; on the contrary, this piece was written in condemnation of people who mistake goals as the sole means to victory and the end to the game. This piece was written to remind spectators, especially culés, that football is més que the numbers, and that there is much more to see behind those statistics. It was written with the hope that they will see the game… and the most beautiful game there is: Barça’s game.

Sources:

The original El Periodico column is no longer available but the quotes can be found on these other news sites:

(1) http://www.lne.es/deportes/2011/03/29/cruyff-dice-villa-goleador/1052716.html
(2) http://www.goal.com/en/news/12/spain/2011/03/28/2414742/johan-cruyff-barcelonas-david-villa-is-more-than-just-a
(3) http://futbol.azumare.com/pep-guardiola-elogio-al-asturiano-david-villa
(4) http://www.fcbarcelona.com/football/first-team/detail/article/guardiola-eager-to-see-how-his-squad-will-react-in-granada

When you play a match, it is statistically proven that players actually have the ball 3 minutes on average. The best players – the Zidanes, Ronaldinhos, Gerrards – will have the ball maybe 4 minutes. Lesser players – defenders – probably 2 minutes. So, the most important thing is: what do you do those 87 minutes when you do not have the ball…. That is what determines whether you’re a good player or not.

-Johan Cruyff

One of the qualities that makes great artists great, is their ability to see and render the spaces between objects. In a still life of a bowl of fruit, a glass of water, a table cloth and wall paper, they not only see each individual entity but also see the relationship between them.

Great artists not only draw or paint what’s physically present, but what’s not there. The geometry between edges. The background. In art these are known as negative spaces.

One of the qualities that makes football so beautiful, that can give it an aesthetic dimension that far surpasses its rudiments of eleven players, a ball and the pitch is that it is a game of negative space. If the ball is the point of reference and the focus of attention it is the parts of the game taking place in more distant regions of activity that sculpt a match. It is not only the players that matter, but how they interrelate on the pitch. So much joy comes from what happens in those spaces that aren’t dictated by the ball, that aren’t occupied by anyone at all.

In their last match Barcelona comfortably beat Zaragoza 4-0 at Camp Nou. Though the victory was far from a surprise and Zaragoza is far from a formidable side (particularly defensively), the Blaugrana played very well. In fact it was one of their better recent performances.

What the team did very well this match that it hasn’t done well over the past few matches was to use space to make the pitch functionally “large.” Much of this was due to the role that Barça’s two advanced flank players assumed.

Both Sanchez and Cuenca had interesting matches. Neither notably altered the match through their direct play on the ball or their individual quality. Sanchez was clearly off form. He’s played little football this season overall due to injury. And he’s particularly played limited minutes within the Barcelona system. And that was clearly apparent in the Zaragoza match. Cuenca individually played well – but he wasn’t incorporated into the match as much as he could have been by his teammates.

Nonetheless, together, they exerted significant influence over the outcome through their tactical play. In this regard, the Zaragoza match was a stark example of how a player can be decisive, even in attack, without touching the ball. It shed’s light on Cruyff’s maxim about what makes a player “good” in any particular match.

Tactical Analysis:

The image below typifies much of Zaragoza’s approach to the match.

Zaragoza Defending Deep and Narrow to Overplay Middle. Cuenca Maintaining Width

Zaragoza is playing very narrow and compact – much as Sevilla, Viktoria Plzen (Camp Nou leg), and L’Hospitalet have done this season to thwart Barcelona from translating dominance in possession into scoring.

All ten of the Zaragoza outfield players are stationed between the width of the eighteen yard box. Zaragoza are particularly concerned about defending “positive space” – that is the player with the ball and the immediate space around him.

For much of the match Zaragoza sought to defend the ball with two to three players (one man on the ball and the nearby defenders forming a “wall” to the goal or cutting off passing angles to disrupt the short passing game).

Zaragoza have formed a cluster of four players around the ball. Behind them there are four more Zaragoa defenders. There are seeking to form a dense column of defense between the ball and the goal to prevent Barça from playing the ball through the middle.

They’ve accomplished this objective effectively – Zaragoza have numerical superiority in this region of danger 8 vs. 4. In the central space their ten defenders occupy they outnumber Barça 10 vs. 5 – they can literally double mark every Barça player stationed towards the middle of the pitch.

The key to this sequence is what’s happening in the space Zaragoza is choosing not to defend. Notice how Isaac Cuenca is stationed extremely wide at the touchline. Zaragoza is pressuring Xavi who has the ball. They have Xavi and Alves outnumbered 4 vs. 2. A wall of three players cuts off Fabrgas from Xavi – there is no pathway for a pass. Towards the middle Messi is triple marked.

Rather than running to the ball Cuenca stays wide however. He doesn’t creep into towards the ball. Critically, he remains positioned to in a way that ensures that Xavi has a strong passing angle. If he edges forward or moves backwards – that passing angle deteriorates. Cuenca appears to be just standing there – but what he is doing is orchestrating negative space perfectly.

Watch how radical a simple ball from Xavi to Cuenca impacts Zaragoza’s defensive shape:

Simple Ball Played Wide from Xavi to Cuenca Breaks Zaragoza's Shape

There is no ideal way to play the game. In seeking to overplay the center to take away Barça’s greatest strength, Zaragoza has had to leave the flanks relatively open. Once the ball is circulated wide they have to completely reconfigure their shape. Notice how disorganized they’ve become. Xavi and Alves – once facing a 2 vs. 4 situation are now each single marked. Messi once triple marked is now 1 vs. 1 with his defender as the Zaragoza backline is forced to drop a few steps deeper. Most importantly, notice what’s happened with Fabregas. Before he was stationed in space that was cut off from the other players. Now he is free, finding a center space between the Zaragoza defenders.

Comparing the two images above demonstrates why spacing the pitch wide is so critical. It makes the pitch large and forces the defense to zone more area. This in turn opens up more space in the interior. And it’s this interior space Fabregas has so deftly moved into, putting himself into a very dangerous position.

All of this came from one simple ball from Xavi to a completely wide open Cuenca.

Cuenca then easily splits the two defenders seeking to close him down with a short pass to the now wide open Fabregas.

Fabregas Receives Ball in Dangerous Space

Commentators often make remarks about Barcelona’s “useless” passing. Indirect play, short passes, etc. Many of these remarks are made because too much attention is paid to the positive space around the ball.

This sequence started with Xavi under pressure and completely cut off from Fabregas – he had no passing angle to get Cesc the ball. With one short pass what Barcelona has done is to sculpt a passing angle to Fabregas. By staying wide Cuenca is able to make the pass that Xavi could not.

This sequence ends with Barcelona generating a dangerous scoring opportunity. Fabregas shortly goes on to play the ball back to Alves and link up with him for an incisive 1-2 towards goal.

Overall, Cuenca had a better game than Sanchez as the Barcelona left wing looked significantly off game form due to lack of minutes. Nonetheless, Sanchez’s tactical impact was similarly significant as demonstrated by the sequence below which demonstrates how dynamic Barcelona’s play was along both flanks.

Staying wide, Cuenca receives a long pass from played quickly by Keita from the Barcelona half.

From Wide Position Cuenca Receives Pass and Runs at Defenders Drawing Messi's Defender

Rather than immediately pass the ball, Cuenca takes a few dribbles to run at the defense. While again this appears to be a simple action, what it does is to draw Messi’s defender away from him. For much of the match Zaragoza attempted to defend Messi with three defenders. Through use of width and direct play, Barcelona have created a situation where Messi is unmarked.

Messi receives the ball open in space from Cuenca, who continues his run centrally.

Messi Receives Ball in Space Opened Up By Original Play to the Flanks

Notice how the Zaragoza defense reacts to Messi have the ball free in space. The entire defense collapses centrally. Zaragoza becomes extremely narrow with their entire backline and holding midfielders attempting to clot the middle and prevent Barcelona from playing in this space.

Over the past month or so we’ve seen this kind of situation develop again and again for Barcelona. Messi makes a run, the defense narrows and collapses to the middle. The Barcelona attackers gather to the middle to link up and play the ball short and fast (likely back to Messi on a 1-2). Messi then has to thread a pass through a high density of defenders – a pass which has to be made perfectly or the play is broken up.

What made the game against Zaragoz different is Sanchez’s positioning. The left defensive back has pinched in to the middle. However, Sanchez, maintaining tactical discipline, stays very wide. He’s hardly moved in at all despite all of the action and movement to the middle. Sanchez instead is orchestrating space that’s being ignored and where no visible activity is taking place.

Rather than being forced to play a low probability pass through tight space Messi has another option – an outlet in Sanchez.

Sanchez Stays Wide to Act as Outlet and Draw Defenders Away from Middle

The ball played to the open wide player again causes the Zaragoza defense to lose shape and become more disorganized. Zaragoza throughout looked to defend the ball with at least two players – one to pressure and one to cover. With Sanchez free to move onto the simple ball from Messi two defenders have to move towards him. This in turn takes two defenders who were in the middle away from that vital space. Additionally, the entire backline starts to drop deeper.

Notice how Messi initially passes the ball and delays his run. He knows that this pass will force the defense deeper. As the defenders speed up to retreat, Messi slows down momentarily to develop the space around him. This is a perfect example of why he is so effective as a false 9.

Sanchez, then takes a few quick dribbles to run at the defenders. His goal isn’t to beat them per se. Instead, it is to further draw the two defenders towards him.

Sanchez Runs at Defenders Opening Up Xavi - Messi Now Marked 1 vs. 1

Through the wide player receiving the ball in space and running at the defenders Xavi is now open in space. It wasn’t even much of a run – but it’s often the subtle factors which define how space is used.

Also – notice what’s happened with Messi. He is now single marked. That is one of the major outcomes of this sequence for Barça. All match Zaragoza attempted to mark Messi with multiple defenders – and here he is at running into the 18 yard box single marked. This is a significant tactical “victory” for Barcelona.

In the image above, once he’s drawn the defender away from Xavi, Sanchez passes the ball the now open playmaker. Seeing this, Messi accelerates his run and Xavi is now able to make a relatively simple pass for Messi to run onto inside of the 18 yard box.

Messi 1 vs. 1 in the Box Receives Pass from Xavi to Create Dangerous Opportunity

Zaragoza outnumber Barça 6 vs. 3 around the ball. But by shaping negative space Barcelona has created a situation where Messi is 1 vs. 1 with the defender inside of the box. Barça have forced the opposition into the exact situation their entire defensive tactical system was designed to stop.

If Messi had initially tried to play the ball through the middle rather than having the option to go wide to Sanchez it is unlikely this would have happened. There was such a density of defenders that a perfect pass would have been required to play the ball through the middle. But by opening up space Barcelona has achieved exactly what is hopes to – Messi in the box with the ball single marked.

Ultimately Xavi’s pass was slightly wide and Messi lost his footing. Nonetheless the sequence created twp dangerous opportunities. First it gave Messi a chance in a dangerous space. Second, the defender had to play the ball out to dispossess Messi setting up a corner. It was that corner which Puyol made a great run from deep and got a free header on goal – a chance he usually buries for a score.

Conclusion

The team that controls the ball largely controls the game. But controlling the ball involves much more than possessing it. Barcelona is at its best when it’s able to use the ball to control space on the pitch.

Doing so however requires Barça to not only arrange space around the ball but to enlarge the pitch, to force the defense to play in spaces where it doesn’t want to. To execute in this fashion requires Barça to sculpt space across the pitch by using the flanks dynamically. As we’ve seen, this kind of play doesn’t need to be complicated – often simple balls can creates dramatic impacts, particularly because so much of the defensive focus of the opposition has to be central.

Over the past month or so when Barcelona struggled somewhat they didn’t use space across the pitch effectively. They became too focused on the positive space around the ball. It was good to see them getting back to a more tactically balanced way of playing against Zaragoza.

I am Zlatan. Who the hell are you?

So, Milan, we meet again.

Last year, we played them in the Gamper, beating them on penalties, in what was a strange sequence of events which cumulated in record signing Zlatan Ibrahimovic leaving with the Milanese club. Just over a year later and we’re squaring up again.

It’d be easy to make this whole preview about Ibra, Mino Raiola, mental institutions, philosophers and that whole transfer snafu, but it’s always more productive to talk about the actual football (and I just told a story the last time I did a preview).

So, uh, the tactical attempt makes a comeback. I know Milan a bit because I’ve always liked them since the Shevchenko days, mostly because my sister was a Juve supporter, but Pirlo (#dathair)-Kaka-Seedorf-Maldini was too hard to resist. (SHEVA!!!!). Though, Udinese’s been my team since last year, and I’m bandwagoning hard on Roma this year for obvious reasons.

My allegiances aside, I’ll be looking to give you guys some sort of idea of how they’ll play. I’m no expert, so apologies for the people who know this already and were hoping for Euler-esque insight.

Players To Watch

Besides the obvious players in Pato, Ibra, Robinho (if he’s fit), and Cassano, here are some players to keep an eye on:

Alberto Aquilani: Liverpool and Roma fans will recognize this man. (Well, maybe not the Liverpool fans…) The main source of creatively in the midfield, Aquilani will be looking to pull the strings. He’s not quick, but makes up for his lack of pace with his vision.

Kevin Prince Boateng: Jnice’s homeboy, the Ghana international is very fast and a decent dribbler, though his technical skills aren’t anything to write home about. Very hardworking, so he’ll be running for 90 minutes. Is a bit selfish, though, so if a good scoring lane opens itself to him, he’ll go for it rather than pass the ball. But his main attributes are his dynamism and working rate.

Mark van Bommel: A former player of ours, signed for Milan from Bayern this summer. I say watch out for him, but really I mean beware. I don’t want to say he’s dirty — okay, he’s dirty — but he gets the job done. A pure destroyer, look for him to be on Xavi especially. (*says a quick prayer for Xavi’s tendons*)

Thiago Silva: Strong defender, good in the air, with a great positional sense. He’s like Puyol/Mascherano type of defender in that they come, they see, and they conquer. Technically ability is above average, and is very good on the ball. Long balls to Ibra is something to look out for. Is usually the first to put out the fire. Didn’t have a great game against Lazio on Friday, but there is no doubt he’s a world class defender, the best in Serie A last season IMO.

Basic Overview

As we all know, formations are arbitrary and don’t really stay that way. But for simplicity sake, we assign numbers to positions and formations to explain things better.

Milan play a 4-3-1-2. Boateng is the ’1′ behind the ’2′ of Pato and Ibrahimovic. van Bommel, Ambrosini, and Aquilani form the ’3′, with Antonini*, Thiago Silva, Nesta and Abate at the back. Boeteng, Aquilani, Ambrosini, and van Bommel form something like a diamond shape in the midfield, while Pato plays just off Ibrahimovic on the right. For a visual representation:

Milan's base formation

Gennaro Gattuso and Philippe Mexes are suspended and won’t feature. *We could see Taiwo or Zambrotta there instead. Both were injured, it seems, and were unavailable for Milan against Lazio.  Also, I’m too lazy go and change the formations just for one player. Sub in Taiwo for Antonini and you get the same idea.

[Update] Robinho and Ibrahimovic are both injured for this game and are unavailable. As the only forwards available, Pato and Cassano will start.

Full Milan Squad:

GOALKEEPERS – Abbiati, Amelia, Rome.

DEFENDERS – Abate, Antonini, Bonera, Nesta, Taiwo, Thiago Silva, Zambrotta, Yepes.

Midfield – Ambrosini, Aquilani, Boateng, Emanuelson, Nocerino, Seedorf, Van Bommel.

FORWARDS – Cassano, Pato.

Milan in attack

When in possession of the ball, Milan primarily attack through the right. Pato has the freedom to either cut inside, or take on the defender. Abate pushes up from the right back position, like Alves, to overlap/support. Boateng also stays near the center-right position.

Milan heavily rely on their forwards for creativity, but have added Aquilani to help take the load of them and have some creativity in the midfield. Expect Aquilani to see the ball quite a bit, looking to either spread play, or play balls into space.

Ambrosini comes over to cover for Abate pushing up. van Bommel also plays a bit deeper, just in front the CB pairing (think Busi in front of our CBs). Antonini is the ‘stay-at-home’ left back, but does move further forward to support Aquilani. Thiago Silva and Nesta stay behind. In the end it looks something like so:

Milan in attack. Ambrosini covers Abate who pushes up.

Though it doesn’t look like it in the picture above (I tried to show it as best I could while also staying true to reality), there is actually a lot of space behind Ambrosini. Why is this relevant? I’ll get to that in a bit.

Milan in defense

The above is all well and good if Milan have the ball, but it’s safe to say we’ll be having it most of the time.

Milan are a 4-4-1-1 in defense. Aquilani and Boateng move back, and Pato plays just behind Ibrahimovic, forming the ’1′s. See below:

Milan in defense. Aquilani and Boateng move back.

In both defense and attack, Milan are very, very narrow. What does that mean? It means that there are a lot of players squeezed close to each other. They aren’t spread out wide, and there is not a lot of space between them.

Why is this relevant? Ambrosini, Aquilani and van Bommel don’t have much pace. Neither does Nesta, for that matter. If Ambrosini loses the ball while Milan are in attack, or the ball is played over to whoever we have on the left, both Ambrosini and van Bommel will struggle to keep up with that player, even moreso when we have additional players supporting the one on the ball.

This is where the loss of Alexis really, really hurts. He’s the perfect player to play this Milan as he exploits almost all their vulnerabilities to a tee. In a scenerio where Abate loses the ball, just for an example, if the ball is played to Alexis, he has Ambrosini to beat and then is in acres of space to take on Nesta and go for goal, or cross the ball. van Bommel could come over, but will probably have Iniesta and Messi to track as well. What Ambrosini could do is just tactical foul: block Alexis completely, but then he runs the risk of getting yellows and being sent off.

We don’t have Alexis though, and that, well, sucks. But the great thing about this Barca team is that we have other options.

To Summarize:

Milan’s main two vulnerabilities are:

- Lack of pace in midfield: once they lose the ball, they struggle to make up distance. Good tacklers of the ball, but with the quick feet of our players, they may be forced to tactical foul.

- Very narrow formation: makes them susceptible to width. Combined with the above means wingers with great ball control and pace are terrible for them.

Now to the Barcelona side of things

Considering only our midfield and Messi can score goals (last 9 goals have been scored by Messi, Fabregas, Thiago and Xavi), it seems like all our forward line (read: Pedro and Villa) will be doing is flailing their arms around and being offside.

To some people, Villa in particular will be the place where attacks go to die. Xavi plays a ball over the top for Villa from deep? In the minds of cules (read: mine) it’ll go something like so:

A wild GOALSCORING CHANCE has appeared!

What will DAVID VILLA do?

–> SLOT THE BALL PAST THE GOALKEEPER
–> DRIFT INTO AN OFFSIDE POSITION
–> HIT THE POST
–> ROUND THE GOALKEEPER AND SLOT THE BALL INTO OPEN NET

DAVID VILLA used DRIFT INTO AN OFFSIDE POSITION!

It’s super effective! DAVID VILLA is flagged offside. GOALSCORING CHANCE took 99% damage!

GOALSCORING CHANCE has disappeared!

Flawless Victory!

…Except it won’t really go that way.

All jokes and sarcasm aside, Villa does represent a real danger to defenses; it’s just not on the wing. He can maintain decent width, but he’s a passable dribbler at most. Taking on defenders isn’t his strong suit, and he doesn’t have much pace either, so running with the ball is not really an option either.

What Villa is, is a finisher, so getting the ball into space and having a clear shot at goal is where he really excels. Which is why his skill set is great for a team that’s not Milan, and why I think he shouldn’t start.

Who do I propose to start?

- Afellay. I know, I know. He’s just coming back from injury, didn’t really have a preseason, and is not match fit. But this is a game Ibi will really excel in. Got oodles of pace, good 1v1 dribbler, and his crossing ability is probably the best on the team IMO.

- Abidal at CB. I know, I know. We’ll miss him at left-back. But we really need pace in the center of our defense. Pato is quick, very quick. With Adriano, who is no slouch in the speed department himself, also there to double up, we can neutralize Pato quite well.

- Mascherano at CB. No duh, right? Ideally, I would have wanted Pique here, but Mascherano is a very good alternate to mark Ibra. Close marking plus strong tackling prowess is a good combo to have.

Proposed XI

VV
Alves – Mascherano – Abidal – Adriano
Xavi – Busi – Iniesta
Pedro – Messi – Afellay

Our Starting Eleven

We have all the tools to cause Milan some serious, serious problems. One large advantage we have is Camp Nou. It is a very very big pitch, and with Milan staying narrow, we’ll have a lot of space on the flanks to exploit. This space coupled with the lack of pace of key defenders, means things could get very ugly for them if we play our cards right.

With Afellay’s lack of match fitness, we’ll most likely see him start on the bench to come on in the second half (hopefully). I don’t want to see Iniesta at LW, as it makes us more narrow which plays into Milan’s hands, but the Villa complexity is an interesting one. I’d bank on Villa regardless of the trade-offs he brings.

Puyol has also gotten the green light and could get some minutes. Puyi for Adriano, pushing Abidal to left-back, could happen, though we’d miss Abidal’s pace in the middle. Besides, I like complementing pairs at the center of defense (Puyol-Masche is too similar).

3 Things that journalists (read: me) wish would happen during the match:

- Ibra and Villa have a b*tchfight offside. ‘You’re only here because I left!’ screams the Swede. Inzaghi tries to join in from the stands, but is held back by security.

- Gattuso makes a surprise reappearance and somehow gets into an actual fight with Mascherano. Afterwards, they express their mutual respect for each other while snarling.

- Fabregas stays on the bench the whole game. Still manages to score.

Official prediction: Hard to say. Depends on how we are on the day. I’m gonna say we will be on like Tron, so Barcelona 3-0 Milan.

Englishman Martin Atkinson will be the referee for CL match (*van Bommel does a happy dance*).

Game is on Sportsnet in Canada, FSC and ESPN3 in US (I think. I check around, but it’s not on ESPN or ESPN2).

(For those who didn’t get the reference in the first image’s caption, I give you this. Language warning!

I've created a monster

A few points need to be made before we dig in. First, I am not possessed by the tactical expertise of say a Euler, so this will not be quite as in depth as one of his posts, and it may also contain some minor issues, and for those I apologize. Second, and more importantly, there is one man in charge of the squad for this team, and that is Pep Guardiola. The moves to focus on promoting new players (Thiago and Fontas), add wing depth up front (Sanchez), and bringing Fabregas back as a backup for Xavi, Iniesta, and even at DM, are his moves. Admittedly, we also have to assume that the Angel deal fell apart or never occurred because of Pep’s hand, not Rosell’s. This should also be of some great comfort to fans who fear that Pep is always going to leave next year. Either Pep is the great benevolent one, building his dream team as one of the most talented club football sides in history and leaving it for Luis Enrique in a few months, or he’s here to stay barring unforeseen circumstances. You may decide how the team-building bodes for his future with the club for yourselves.

Since the beginning of Mr. Guardiola’s reign he has reshaped the squad in his image of what it should be, one that is free flowing in attack, carries all the possession, and makes onslaughts look easy (incidentally, I see Villa-Boas making this exact same transition at Chelsea so long as he’s given enough time). And looking back the evolution is stunning.

Essentially, this is Pep’s survival of the fittest. Regardless of whether he knew all these pieces were necessary at the beginning or if it dawned on him at some point in between, he’s doing a good job of cobbling it and his tenure is rife with examples. I’m personally unsure if he ever really wanted a true 9 in the lineup, but it now appears to be done for the rest of his coaching career here. Even with Eto’o and Ibrahimovic, they were asked to also take up more outside positions over time, and the Eto’o/Ibrahimovic transfer sagas proved to be a worthless distraction for the club, but it may have finally pushed the 9 out in favor of the false 9 of Messi (and I hardly doubt anyone can complain with those results). The closest thing to a 9 on the team now is Villa and I am sure it will stay that way for the foreseeable future.

The signing of Alves is another example, though the player hasn’t changed, his role has, moving higher up every season, until 2010-11 when he was 3rd in La Liga in assists. Pep wanted that roving RB and he got the best one available, who is now the best one in the world. Additionally, he has used the DM position, specifically with Busquets, to turn into a third centerback or sweeper during matches, allowing both wing backs to move forward, turning the formation into an adjusted 3-4-3.

The youth movement has also become part of Guardiola’s MO managing the club. Pep of course managed Barça B before he came to the A side, and this has informed his promotion and transfer policies ever since. When a B player has become ready and an opening happens at the top, the team has opted for going within the organization instead of without. Gone were the older players in favor of Pedro, Busquets, Jeffren, and Pique, who were all deemed ready to contribute depth. Obviously, not every transfer has followed this trend (read: Alves, Keita, Villa, Ibrahimovic, and Adirano), but viable youth options did not exist for those positions either. Thiago’s and Fontas’s promotions this summer only serve to reinforce this idea. With possible big name targets available elsewhere, the club went with proven youth to provide depth and coverage in two areas where it was needed.

Even when a transfer has been necessary, the most recent ones have been for youngsters like Cesc Fabregas (who like Pique grew up in La Masia, left, and was brought back), Alexis Sanchez, Ibrahim Afellay, and even an ancient-seeming Mascherano who is somehow only 27 now. This does not include the obviously large number of youth players who have appeared in non-promoted backup roles such as Sergi Roberto, Bartra, Muniesa, dos Santos the younger, etc. Should Pep stick around, expect more promotions in the offing in lieu of purchases.

These examples all inform our idea of the current squad, and here we come to the formations and tactics we might see this year. The current first-team players first year players are: Valdes, Pinto, Pique, Puyol, Fontas, Alves, Abidal, Adriano, Maxwell, Busquets, Mascherano, Keita, Fabregas, Thiago, Xavi, Iniesta, Sanchez, Afellay, Messi, Villa, and Pedro. Outside of GK, only Alves, Maxwell, and maybe Messi play one static position, whereas the others are versatile, playing in multiple positions and areas. This is the key to the smaller squad that Pep carried last year (though this is up 1 players from the primary 20 he started with last August) and the reason the team has avoided adding another defender. Viewing the squad as a series of evolutionary steps to true versatility is the better way to look at it, instead of one-off moves meant to fill a hole or two for the interim.

Starting with what is typically thought of as the “strongest” formation for the squad, or what it would have been last year. I use the scare quotes because I feel this year’s strongest squad will be vastly different with the addition of Sanchez and the injury history of Puyol, but we’ll get there eventually.

"Traditional" 4-3-3

Now, the most routine complaint this offseason has been the lack of another defender after Milito left, but it’s one I feel that would be a luxury, not a necessity. Quite simply, the 5 “defensive” outfield positions are occupied by 10 or 11 players (depending on how you view Fabregas as a DM), almost all of whom play multiple positions well. Abidal has served admirably as both a roving LB and a CB, Masch as a CB and DM, Adriano as LB and RB, Fontas as a CB and LB for the B side, Puyol as a RB and either CB, Busquets as a DM or CB, and Pique at either CB position. The following formation represents one where Puyol, Pique, Abidal, and Xavi are all injured, and while it’s not perfect, it’s also not leaving super gaping holes either that some are claiming (seeing as something similar gave up 2 goals to one of the best offensive sides in the world a few days ago).

An injured defense

A similarly bad scenario was lived out on Sunday during the first leg of the Supercopa. The starting backline included Alves, Mascherano, Abidal, and Adriano, with Keita at the DM. Though Keita was abysmal in his position (and awfully out of play there), the others filled in admirably. And while I saw some complaints of “centerback-sized holes” being covered by last second stops (namely by Mascherano), I don’t see these same comments when Pique or Puyol are doing the last second stopping, which is nothing if not routine in Barça’s system. Other more nuanced considerations have to be made when looking at the CB as well, such as finding a cheap, experienced CB who would be willing to play very few games during a season as anything more than a last gasp option. I don’t see one and honestly believe that Bartra will be the next defender the team gets, by promoting him from the B side.

Then of course we have Fabregas. So much has been made about this transfer, both tactically, philosophically, monetarily, and the like, but in simple football terms it is about midfield versatility. Cesc has traditionally occupied the attacking/playmaking midfield roles at Arsenal, meaning he may fill in for either Xavi or Iniesta if need be, and I believe we would see little in the way of a drop in productivity. He has shown a proclivity to do this before, if you’ll remember back to his play during the 2010 World Cup final. He combined with Iniesta magnificently, eventually doing so for the winner (on the same side of this coin, Thiago provides the same versatility for the club, it’s hard to overstate the value these two provide in this regard). A few will wonder about the necessity here, what with Thiago coming on recently and all that, but Xavi’s continuing achilles issues scare me, as does his age, and not long ago we knew Iniesta as “Mr. Glass,” so… It also behooves us to look to the bridge Fabregas provides between Xavi, Iniesta, and Thiago, a sort of “midfield continuum” as Sid Lowe words it.

Those ideas however, are somewhat obvious. The more nuanced approach is that Cesc can play as a deep mid in defense. As Kevin recently noted, Fabregas started out as a DM in the youth system, and while he’s not the large (Busquets) or hulking (Mascherano) type we are accustomed too, he could still work well back there in my opinion. The midfield would be more compacted to be sure, and Abidal would have to be cutoff from coming forward so as to provide backline support, but I don’t see this as too far-fetched, or even that bad of an option against certain sides that are not great on counter attacks.

Cesc as DM, compact MF

Even a lineup without Messi, an almost unthinkable proposition, is still formidable. Villa would likely slot into the middle of the forward trident, and play a more forward-looking role, instead of Messi who tracks back and takes the ball in midfield, he would play higher up and allow the wings and the attacking mid to provide the offensive link up. Villa played a similar role for the Spanish National Team during the 2010 World Cup when Torres wasn’t on the field. As I recall, he did so to some level of success. This formation would also see the wings push out a little wider and the midfield spread out slightly more. In all, missing Messi would hurt badly, but this lineup and alignment shows a lot of strength.

Messi out, Villa higher

These aren’t even the most interesting lineups that could be brought out. And the intrigue isn’t what matters the most, though I’m sure Mr. Guardiola will test that theory during some random Copa game. What matters is that the team has options in each third, a number of them. And even options at each separate position present themselves. Though they aren’t perfect and you wouldn’t want some of them as your first choice, they are versatile and they work in a pinch. During Pep’s tenure, the team has suffered injuries large and small and has found a plug in every instance, even when you might not have liked it very much. It has happened for 3 straight years, and I don’t doubt it will happen again during this season.

Image: Miguel Ruiz – FCB

In fact it seems that we often cherish something for its aesthetic qualities precisely because we know it’s ephemeral, that it doesn’t have adequate defenses to resist, that it’s lovely because it isn’t resilient enough to stay for very long.  Japanese cherry blossoms.  An aria sung.  Landscapes painted on scrolls bleached by the sun.  The colors of Holi washing away in the rain.

Football itself shares this bias.  In the unresolvable debate in its soul between romanticism and pragmatism, there’s a notion that the beautiful game simply isn’t robust enough to survive outside of a few flickering moments of brilliance.  The Netherlands 1974.  Brazil 1982.  These are fundamental touchstones for belief in the game.  Ephemeral beauty that ultimately couldn’t survive the pragmatic world it was faced with.

Guardiola’s Barcelona continues to prove all of this wrong. It continues its alchemy of mixing romanticism and pragmatism to produce a kind of aesthetic that is equal parts beauty and strength.

A new kind of wonder all over again.  That’s what we’re watching.

I try my best to be objective about the game.  To be dispassionate as I can.  It’s part of what I have to do for my writing here.  And I do that by using an analytical framework to watch and to try to understand the game.  Those are my tools, my point of view.  It’s in my nature.

And honestly, before this tie, objectively, I did not think this team was going to win.

I watched them play in person against Manchester United on the summer tour — they weren’t even remotely close to match form or fitness.

Then they had those other mediocre-to-disastrous pre-season games topped off by the 1-4 drubbing at the hand of Chivas.  The squad was not even close to match ready.  Sure those Barça squads were filled with youth players — but that also meant that the first team wasn’t available, wasn’t working within the system, that they weren’t even engaged in the process of getting ready through the experience of match play together.

In the first leg of the SuperCopa all of those issues came to the fore.  Barça were overwhelmed by a much more prepared, more match fit Madrid team.  A team which had clearly prioritized winning the SuperCopa as a way to start its season, and draw a stark contrast to the 5-0 victory Barça secured to start the Clasicos last year.  But in the end this Barça team was robust enough to survive and secure the result they needed at the Bernabeau.  But it literally took everything the group had, all of the resources that could be drawn upon from its experiences as champions.

Even after that first leg — objectively speaking — I didn’t know if they could win this second match. There would be accumulated fatigue.  The team was short due to injuries.  Objectively it just would not be possible to secure needed fitness or form in three days time.

But in the end the heart is such a funny object.  Strange and wondrous.  Who can understand it?  And make no mistake about it, this was a performance that came straight from the heart.   Yet another victory from Guardiola’s Barcelona that demonstrated that what’s beautiful in football doesn’t have to be fragile or mercurial — that in fact being tenacious and robust makes the whole of the project even more wondrous and joyful.

It’s football that makes you believe again.  In a whole new way.

The Two Best Seats at Camp Nou From Which to Watch the Genius At Work

Match Analysis

In order to fully appreciate the dynamics of this match and how play changed from the first leg it’s important to the relatively unorthodox manner in which Madrid implement their pressure defense.  As discussed in detail here at Barcelona Football Blog last season, Madrid press in a very interesting fashion.  One of the central tenets of strong defending is staying compact.  This is especially true to pressing.  In order to press effectively you need to make the field as small as possible.  To make the field as small as possible it’s important to stay compact.

Arrigo Sacchi famously made it a point to demand that his team leave no more than 25 meters between their forward and back lines.  The goal was to squeeze the opposition to one-quarter of the entire pitch.  With the liberalization of the off side trap however it’s likely impossible for any team to stay as compact as Sacchi wanted.

Nonetheless staying compact remains critical to the best pressing sides in the world.

When Madrid press they don’t stay nearly as compact as other sides that successfully press.  Staying compact means that you must play a high line.  Playing a high line involves significant risk for being beat over the top or through transition play.  Mourinho is attempting to have his side press, but to also decrease the risk associated with playing his back line high.

In the first leg of the Super Copa, based on average position, Madrid had approximately 50 M between their front line and back line.  For comparison, Barcelona had approximately 40M between its front line and back line.

How is Madrid simultaneously doing both of these things — pressuring the ball effectively without keeping its back line very high?  They are utilizing pace.  This is the most interesting tactical defensive innovation Mourinho has implemented while at Madrid.  Their team has tremendous athleticism distributed across the pitch.  Rather than depending on “hunting in packs” by staying compact Madrid initiates its pressure by having a select number of defenders run at the ball at pace.  When the ball is passed, they utilize pace to close down the receiver.  Because they have so much athleticism across the pitch they attempt to launch defensive attacks from numerous positions.

This is not to say Madrid’s defensive formation is loose.  For example, they become very compact on the press when the ball is played to the touchline.   It’s just that their formation is not as compact as one would anticipate given how effective their pressing is.  They are using velocity to make the pitch small.

Madrid Pressing Through Pace and Man Marking 1 vs. 1 But Not Staying Compact

The still shot above from leg 2 typifies how Madrid presses.  Notice how Madrid has numerical equivalence with Barcelona in the Barcelona defensive half (this is a major tactical adjustment Mourinho has made in response to the changes Guardiola made between the Copa Del Rey and Champions League Semi — fully explaining this adjustment will require a separate post however).

There is one marker on every Barcelona player at the back.  Once Barcelona attempt to advance the ball the Madrid defenders runs to close down the ball at speed.  Each marker follows the players without the ball to make ready pressure if a pass is made.  When the new Barça player receives the ball a new defensive attack is launched.

This defensive system takes advantage of two Barcelona characteristics:  1) Barça players tend to play passes to feet when they are building play out of the back; 2)  Barcelona players tend not attempt to beat defenders 1 vs. 1 off the dribble (more on this later in the explanation of goal one but a full explanation is out of the scope of this review)

However, all tactical systems have their trade offs.  And if you press the way Madrid does that means there has to be space in the interior of the defense.  What Madrid is gambling is that they can repossess the ball faster than you can find that interior space.

The way to beat this system is very clear.  Circulate the ball faster than they can run.  This requires quick decision making, rapid passing, and strong off the ball movement.  Barça’s problem in the first leg of the Super Copa was that all three of those facets of their game were off form.  The major problems were:  1)  they lacked the fitness required to move off the ball to probe interior space; 2) because neither Xavi nor Busquets and Pique didn’t start they lost the central axis of play.  The decision making was slower and the touch and passing not as deft or controlled.

The Class

Barcelona’s Adjustments

Addressing the Madrid Press

In this match, Barcelona made critical adjustments to counteract the way Madrid pressed.  Their ball circulation was much more rapid, with Xavi and Busquets back their central passing axis was much improved and their ability to build from the back markedly better.  This was supported by Pique’s presence in the back.  In addition, their off the ball movement was somewhat better, especially in the first half (but due to lack of fitness the off the ball movement still wasn’t good and it decayed severely in the second half which is why the team struggled so much later on).  Barça also attempted to play longer balls over the top more often (as opposed to leg one where the long balls were more like desperation heaves).

Finally, once it’s understood how Madrid’s system of pressure defense operates, it becomes very clear that one of the best ways to cause the Madrid system of man marking pressure based on team pace is to drop players who have the ability to beat players off the dribble deeper on the pitch.  If the Barça player can beat the man marking him 1 vs. 1, then the Madrid defense can become very vulnerable as interior space will open up quickly.  This is especially true if you can do this in midfield because Madrid was not keeping its back line very compact.  Space could be found between those lines.  And this is exactly how Barcelona scored its lightning first goal.

The play starts simply enough.  Pique plays the ball to Xavi who plays a simple ball to Messi.  The key issue here was Messi’s positioning.  He stations himself out on the flank in midfield.  Because C. Ronaldo is marking Alves on the press there is space behind him.  Carvalho, who was marking Messi for much of the match, steps out and  picks up Messi and marks him out along the toucline.  Coentrao drops deep and central into the space Carvalho has vacated, functionally playing the CB position now.  However, Messi beats Carvalho off the dribble and this creates a cascade of problems for Madrid.

Messi Beats Carvalho off the Dribble

In the still shot above notice what’s happened once Messi beats Carvalho off the dribble.  He has created a 2 vs. 1 situation for Khedira.  Pedro has intelligently dropped into that same space.  Messi was Carvalho’s responsibility.  As Khedira attempts to slide over to cover, he is caught wrong-footed and Messi easily blows by him.

The other key issue in the still shot above is that Xabi Alonso was responsible for man marking Iniesta.  When Messi breaks containment off Carvalho, Alonso starts drifting to the middle anticipating a Messi run through that region.

Messi's Run Breaks Madrid's Defensive System and Iniesta is Left Free

In the still shot above Messi has beat Khedira.  The key issue to note here is the positioning of the Madrid center backs.  Notice how much space Messi is about to move into.  This is because Pepe and Coentrao are staying deep rather than stepping up or staying as compact as they could.  They are too far away from where Messi has received the ball to step out on him. Rather than “hunting in a pack” to pressure Messi it’s only the defender assigned to mark him applying pressure 1 vs. 1.  The other defenders move away from Messi to deeper positions rather than towards him to press.

Once Messi beats Carvalho the deep Madrid backs start to move deeper rather than moving forward to close down and pressure alongside Khedira  (or to facilitate the off side trap).  Instead Khedira is left to pressure 1 vs. 1.  This open space forces Alonso to disregard Iniesta and commit to this area.  Iniesta reading the play makes a tremendous run.

The entire Madrid defensive system has collapsed because Messi beat Coentrao in a 1 vs. 1 situation.  They have a 6 vs. 3 numerical advantage around the ball and get carved open.

Rather than making the run that Alonso and the center defenders are waiting for however, Messi unleashes a brilliant through ball between the center backs for Iniesta to run onto (notice how it was not a ball to feet pass that caused the Madrid defense so much trouble).

Madrid Not Compact - Messi Opens Space in the Middle and Threads Through Ball In

In the still shot above, Iniesta has lost all of the defenders and timed his run brilliantly. Iniesta then goes on to show terrific composure and coolly beats Casillas with a lovely chip after dinking him.  Madrid has a 6 vs. 3 numerical advantage around the ball, and still get carved open in moments.  This is the risk they run by pressing in this fashion and not staying compact.  Defending the interior space can rapidly become a problem.

Overall, Barcelona’s off the ball movement simply wasn’t rapid and crisp enough to allow them to take advantage of the Madrid defensive system.  They simply did not have the fitness to do so.  In turn they struggled to maintain coherent possession a problem which would become a mounting problem as the game progressed.

All this said — the Madrid pressure defending was outstanding all evening.  Credit to them for their work rate and coordinated, system-based defending.

However, in the end Barcelona controlled 60% of possession in this second leg.  Not their usual domination of the ball but an improvement.  While the statistics varied in the first leg, Barcelona only had roughly 53% of the possession at the Bernabeu.

The Return of One Touch Play:  Barcelona’s Second Goal

In the first leg of the SuperCopa, Barça’s touch and weighting of passes were off all evening long.  In leg two, both were improved, though still far from where they will be once they regain match form. However, Barcelona’s second goal was just remarkable for the quality of its one touch play.

The goal, of course, was an utter work of genius between two players who are so skilled on the ball it is hard to get over.  The goal was scored off a corner that was created when Pedro beat Ramos off the flank.  Messi is positioned at the 18 yard line.  Xavi directs the corner and it deflects off Benzema toward Messi.  In theory this is not supposed to be a dangerous area to receive a corner.  It should be straight forward to close the man down, given how tight space is.

However, this is Messi and what he did was just genius.  Too much attention is being placed on this goal to how it ended.  What not being paid enough attention to is how it started.  Messi is being marked by Carvalho on this corner.  That’s how worried Madrid was about Messi.  They placed one of their CB out to the 18 yard line to defend him.  Xavi’s corner bounced once and starts rising as it approaches Messi.  That is a very difficult ball to even control off a corner when you are closely marked.

Not only does Messi control it but he beats Carvalho in an instant.  Messi intentionally one touch passes the ball off the bounce to Pique.  Just think about that.  He doesn’t even settle the ball with his chest.  He passes it perfectly to Pique.  And like that Carvalho is beat.  He turns to locate the ball and Messi instantly starts his run to goal.

Pique then makes a play that perhaps no other CB in the world can make.  First, once he sees the ball directed to Messi at the 18 yard line he comes backwards towards Messi.  He knows Madrid is going to run the off side trap from the corner and he beats them into an area of space in the crowded box.

Pique Steps into Space as Messi One Touch Passes Him the Ball WIth Chest

In the still shot above just look at how much space Pique has found inside the box on a corner.  That is a remarkable reading of space on the play.  He’s actively making himself a point of reference for Messi to play the ball off of.  Though I’m not sure I would guess this is a play Pep designed for this situation.  And it worked perfectly.

Pique receives the ball and then one touches the ball on a back heel pass to Messi, who is in stride on his run.  Just phenomenal skill from Pique there.  C. Ronaldo and Khedira attempt to catch Messi but his acceleration is just too much and he coolly beat Casillas yet again.

Overall, one of the key factors that won this trophy for Barcelona was their skill and tremendous execution on goal.  Here is a comparison of all shots on goal over the tie between the two teams.

Comparison of Shots on Goal: Barcelona's Clinical Finishing (via Opta Sports)

Barcelona Concede off Set Pieces

I’m not going to spend too much time analyzing these goals.  To be honest, both were the result of awful set piece defending.  On the first goal Barça did not close down Benzema as he collected a deflected corner.  Benzema made an outstanding cross to C. Ronaldo.  The goal may have been offside (it appeared Ramos got a touch putting Ronaldo into an off side position).  However, that is irrelevant.  The fact is Barça did not execute its off side trap properly off the corner.

The second goal was even worse.  Kaka put in an awful corner directly to Adriano, who proceeded to shank the clearance.  The Barça defenders then engaged in a comedy of clearance errors until the ball rolled to Benzema, who finished well.

Both of those conceded goals were filled with errors.  With more practice and drilling they are unlikely to occur later on in the season.

Nonetheless — credit to Madrid for taking advantage of the opportunities when presented.  Both C. Ronaldo and Benzema finished nicely.  And ultimately Madrid won the corners through their consistently high tempo direct play.

Barcelona’s Pressing is Improved but The Team Tires: The Back Line Saves the Match — The Story of the Second Half

One of the major problems for Barça in Leg 1 was their inability to press effectively due to limited fitness and stress from not retaining possession.  In this match, the pressing was better but still far from where it is when Barça are in full fitness and sharp.  But with the improved coordination and work rate their pressing was better.

A major key to all of this was the return to Sergio Busquets.  Busquets was still off form — but his presence defensively was enormous (as was his calm ball circulation).  Perhaps the biggest impact his return had was to help neutralize Mesut Oezil.  Oezil had a wonderful game in leg 1 — by far his best match against Barça.  Oezil is a very interesting player.  He has phenomenal vision and is a wonderful passer (especially off crosses from the flanks).

However, while he has good touch – he does not have great touch.  And while he has good close control of the ball it is not great either.  He’s not a player that is going to beat players off the dribble in tight space.  In fact much of his game is predicated on roaming laterally from touch line to touch line to find space.

As such, Oezil has often struggled with facing a team that presses vigorously (the Germany vs. Spain match in the 2010 WC exemplified this).

In this second leg Busquets supported by the overall Barça pressing did a marvelous job once again marking Oezil out of the game.

However, as the match proceeded Barça’s ability to press and engage in off the ball movement fell off significantly due to limited fitness.  As the second half went on there was a marked change in Barça’s play. In turn they got caught in a vicious cycle of losing the ball and then not being able to repossess it through pressing.  Madrid — who were also tiring — took the initiative and put Barça on the back foot again in the second half.

The team just couldn’t press with the vigor they usually do.  They don’t have the fitness.  In this regard while the actual way Madrid scored was due to an comical mistake, they were dictating play towards the middle to end of the second half and it looked like it was only a matter of time before they scored.

That Madrid did not take control of this game and put it way in the second half with the Barça press tiring is a testament to how brilliantly the back line played.  After a very poor game in leg one the defensive back four were outstanding in open play.

Defending Deep with a Disciplined Line: Mascherano Anchoring the Back

The Barça back line did what it rarely every has to do or is designed to do — absorb relentless pressure while defending deep.  That the back line could execute what was required to keep the team ahead or level was a testament to their determination, intelligence and hard work.

Cules will have differing opinions on who played the best — but Dani Alves and Javier Mascherano were both utterly brilliant this game.  Alves is often thought of as a poor defender.  But what his critics often confound is his position on the pitch with his defensive skill set.  In the Barça system his function is to get as forward as he can.  Pep is willing to risk players getting behind Alves — when they do that it is not a defensive lapse on Dani’s part.  It’s just a component of tactical risk.

In both legs of the SuperCopa, Alves was brilliant.  Guardiola likely adjusted how he wanted Dani to play and had him prioritize defending C. Ronaldo.  And in both games Alves had the Madrid attacker in his pocket. Over and over he made key tackles and interventions to neutralize Madrid’s chief goal scoring threat.

C. Ronaldo is known for his pace.  But in these two games we saw what a great athlete Alves is.  Over and over C. Ronaldo attempted to beat Alves on the flank through pace and couldn’t do it.  This was a major reason why Madrid had difficulty scoring from open play in these games.  Their biggest scoring threat was caged in by the Barça RB.

What can you say about Javier Mascherano?  He is a wonderful example of how it’s so easy in football to confuse a player’s role and his skill set.  In Liverpool he was confined to an extremely narrow, tactical role. He was a specialist player operating in Benitez’s highly autocratic system.  It seemed very odd that Guardiola was so interested in bringing to Barça a player who seemed limited to a “destroyer.”

But Pep knew better.  He saw that Mascherano’s skill set was far richer than his role allowed at Liverpool.  And since coming to Barcelona he’s been something of a revelation.

Over these past two games he has been an absolute rock.  He has played at a world class CB level.  And with Mascherano it all starts with his intelligence and defensive reading of the game.  The only other player on Barcelona who has similar talents is Puyol.  With every passing game at CB, Mascherano is looking more and more like the heir apparent to Puyol’s position on the team.

In the SuperCopa, Masch made one critical intervention after another after another.  For a player who was supposed to be a yellow and red card magnet outside of the rough EPL it’s particularly amazing to watch his dexterity and intelligence on challenges.  His ability to read a game is remarkable, and he used that ability to it’s fullest to anchor a back line that had to be perfect to see this team through.

Abidal had an absolutely terrible match in leg one. He was off form and repeatedly made clumsy mistakes.  Tonight he was back to looking like himself.  Calm and collected on the ball and very solid at the back.  He still is coming into form — he should have stepped up much more quickly on the off side trap on the first goal.  He and Pique both should have cleared the ball on the second.  But overall a terrific performance.

Similarly Pique was very good.  He’s still recovering from a knock and has missed significant training time but he played well at the back.  And his assist to Messi was an outrageous piece of skill from a center back.  Piquenbauer indeed.

Keita came on as a late sub for Busquets.  While he wasn’t involved very much, he also didn’t make any mistakes in a position he’s still adjusting to.

Finally, Victor Valdes was again just superb.  Time and time again he was pressured and challenged.  And Madrid just could not beat him from open play.  He was magnificent.  Once again he proved how unique he is.  Not only was his contribution saving shots fundamental but he was critical to building play from the back with his ball skills and distribution.

Guardiola Changes the Dynamics of the Match:  The Composed Play and Positional Intelligence of Cesc Fabregas and the Brilliance of Messi

Pep has done just a phenomenal job preparing his club for what turned out to be a vicious war when they were not close to being in the form Madrid were in.  One thing he probably should have done however was to bring in fresh legs sooner as the team was fading in the second half.  Now his hands were absolutely tied in many ways due to injury.  Sanchez would have been perfect to bring in for this match – but he picked up a knock.  Same for Afellay.

Villa and Pedro faded significantly during the second half due to fatigue.  Bringing on Adriano as a winger for Villa was a creative move.

But the area where Barcelona was really suffering was in the center of the pitch.  They lost control of the middle as the second half went on.  This was in part due to fatigue from Xavi, Iniesta and Messi (notice how infrequently Messi dropped deep to pick up the ball).

At the same time this was far too heated a game to bring in a youngster like Thiago.  He would have been overwhelmed.  It’s the kind of experience that can ruin a young player’s confidence and development.  It’s just beyond the scope of what they can do.

So once Madrid leveled the score Guardiola brought on the weapon he’s wanted so badly since he took over as manager.  And we saw tonight in very clear, stark terms why Pep wanted Cesc Fabregas so badly.

In a dying game where Madrid had all of the momentum and Barça were fading badly due to fatigue, Fabregas changed the dynamics of the match.  After conceding the equalizer, the entire team took on new determination.  But determination only gets you so far in the face of exhaustion.

Fabregas came in for Pedro and Pep moved Iniesta nominally to the wing (Iniesta of course pinched in to midfield a great deal).  And once he came on to the pitch he added significant composure and energy back into midfield play.  He was composed on the ball and did a wonderful job directing play.  He looked extremely comfortable right away.  In addition he played very well defensively making several strong interventions.

Fabregas and Xavi played as a very fluid two man central midfield with Xavi moving to the center right and slightly deeper and Fabregas largely towards the middle and moving into an advanced position.  Here’s an example of how Barça lined up:

Fabregas' Positioning Relative to Xavi

Fabregas played as a trequarista more than even as a central midfielder at Arsenal.  Even in the youth ranks at La Masia he was a player who looked to get forward and score.  Those traits were enhanced when he went to Arsenal and yesterday Fabregas made several intelligent runs forward — it seemed clear that he knew that he would have to provide a threat as the man with fresh legs.

Fabregas Makes Forward Run Opening Space for Messi Between the Lines

In the still shot above Alves has played the ball off to Adriano on the right wing.  Xavi is trailing the play towards the right.  Iniesta is behind in midfield.

Fabregas is making a direct run to goal and he is the most advanced Barcelona attacker.  This is something we rarely see from a Barça midfielder, and it’s a good example for how Fabregas will diversify play tactically for Barça.

The key to understanding the immense value of Fabregas making runs like this lies in Messi’s positioning in the above still shot.  With attacks engineered off the flanks Messi frequently slows down.  Often he does not make aggressive, direct runs to goal.  Instead he chooses to find space between the line for the pull back or delayed ball.  This is what he’s doing in the still shot above.

However, look at how space is being created for Messi.  It’s Fabregas’ run that is driving two defenders towards their own goal and away from Messi leaving him unmarked in space.  This is the potential interplay we are going to see from Cesc and Messi.  It is brilliant positional football.

Fabregas would go on to be integral to Barça’s final goal — the one that sealed the victory.  Much is being made of the fact that Fabregas made one of the passes before Messi’s otherworldly strike.  This is is missing the larger point.  What was so impressive about Fabregas’ play on that goal wasn’t his pass — it was his positional intelligence.

The goal scoring play started harmlessly enough.  Xavi plays a corner short, gets the ball back and plays it to Adriano, who then plays it to Alves, who plays it back out to Mascherano (stationed just inside of the midfield line in the center circle).  In other words, in the 87th minute of a 2-2 match Barça turn a corner kick into a ball played back to their CB standing at midfield.  They are playing the ball backward, and still transform the situation into a goal.

Xavi Plays Corner Backwards as Fabregas is Initially Double Marked in Middle

The screen shot above marks the start of the play as Xavi pulls the ball back towards Adriano.  The key thing here to notice is Fabregas’ initial positioning.  He’s toward the middle of the pitch and is double marked.

Fabregas Drifts Wide to Find Space as the Ball Continues Backwards

Above, as the ball is played backward, notice how Fabregas changes his position.  He is moving away from the center where he was double marked and is drifting out to the wing into the space vacated by Adriano who has pulled in to the middle to receive the ball from Xavi.  As Fabregas drifts outwards Xavi drifts into the middle between the lines.  Messi is walking back from an offside position stationing himself in the channel between CB and FB.

Two sources of movement: The ball played backwards vertically and Barça’s attacking central midfielder drifting horizontally into space.

What starts out as harmless, typical Barcelona “negative” and “boring passing backwards” rapidly turns into catastrophe for Madrid.

When Mascherano receives the ball at the midfield circle he plays speeds up the tempo of play by playing a brilliant long ball over the top to the player completely open in space — Fabregas.

Fabregas Now Free in Space Receives Long Ball Over the Top from Mascherano

In the still shot above, look at how much space Fabregas has found.  The perfectly weighted long ball over the top from Mascherano (he is an outstanding long ball passer over the top — perhaps the best on the entire team) cuts out all of the clustered Madrid defense in the middle.  But it’s Fabergas’ open positioning that allows Mascherano the target to circumvent the defenders.

Fabregas' Movement and Positional Intelligence Create a 2 vs. 1 Advantage for Barca

Fabregas controls the ball with fantastic first touch to start the final attacking maneuver, and here’s what’s so remarkable about this entire sequence tactically:  Fabregas started this play being double marked by the Madrid defense.  Through his positional intelligence he has now turned that initial double marking into a 2 vs. 1 situation for Barça out on the flank against Marcelo.  Not only that — he has created a 2 vs. 1 where the defender is isolated alone in space.  That is brilliant football.  The epitome of what the fluid interplay of tika taka is supposed to create.

Marcelo is forced to defend four things.  Fabregas, Adriano, the space behind him toward goal and the space lateral to him.   He cannot hope to defend even two of the four never mind all four.  Fabregas has multiple choices in how to exploit the situation.

And here’s where Fabregas’ training from La Masia comes into play.  Normally at this stage in the game it would make sense to use a 2 vs. 1 situation to attack the goal directly.  And Fabregas starts to do this.

Fabregas Forces Marcelo to Commit Leaving Adriano Open in Space

Fabregas doesn’t quickly one touch the ball away.  He shows Marcelo the ball.  He uses it to draw out the defender. He makes two slight feints toward goal, and in the end he achieves his goal.  In the still shot above notice how he’s forced Marcelo to commit to him.  This leaves Adriano alone in space.  But rather than playing the ball to the nearest open man, Fabregas further exploits the positional advantage by threading the ball unexpectedly to Messi who has found space between the lines (Adriano does a fantastic job letting the pass go right by him — that’s a great example of the small things players have to learn in the Barça system.  A year ago he think the pass is for him and traps the ball.)

Suddenly the tempo of play accelerates.  Messi rapidly one touches the ball to Adriano who has started a delayed run.  Marcelo is completely out of position because Fabregas forced him to commit.  Messi’s one touch pass perfectly plays Adriano back into open space.

Adriano Free in Space Delivers Cross into Box Messi Timing His Run

Adriano then delivers a perfect cross into Messi who executes a volley of staggering quality.

What’s amazing about this entire sequence is that Madrid really haven’t made any defensive mistakes at all.  In the still shot above notice how Coentrao has done an excellent job of tracking Messi’s run to goal.  Messi is marked in the box.  And he still scores.

At this point, I feel compelled to say something about Messi.  But what is there possible to say.  His genius is unfathomable at times.  His vision, intelligence, positioning, strength, balance, touch and ability to finish are beyond belief.  You can watch. It no longer surprises.  But it’s still difficult to believe it’s real.

The End:

To start off the season Guardiola wins his 11th trophy equaling Cruyff’s club record.  It is an almost outlandish level of achievement.  But what truly mattered here wasn’t this trophy — the SuperCopa is after all only a pre-season tie (one that is nice to win but not indicative of play in the real season).  What mattered was how this team won.

Barcelona proved robust in the face of tremendous difficulty.  This was a squad that prevailed yet again despite the fact that they were not even close to full form and fitness.  While Madrid was also in pre-season shape it is now clear how much they focused and prepared to win this trophy.  They were far ahead of Barça in terms of readiness to play.  And despite all that Barcelona produced a devastating result through a combinations of systems based discipline, tactical intelligence, skill and heart.  What Pep did to get this team through these two brutal matches was astonishing.

There is of course another story to this match — an ugly, unfortunate one.  But there will be plenty of time for that later.

Right now is a time to appreciate how fortunate we are to be able to witness this spectacle.  We will probably never see this again.  So we should always feel fortunate to have had the chance.  It will be up to us to explain to others years from now the wonder.  The determined heart.  The light and heat of this beautiful blaugrana fire.

How long can it last?

Man of the match?  I’d pick Guardiola.  But he wouldn’t want me to.  So instead I’ll select who I think he’d tell me to.

The team.

One of the hallmarks of contemporary football is that it’s become a systems based sport.  Individual effort and talent are fundamental – but their ultimate impact and value depends on an underlying foundation for how play is organized and functions.  Individuals can be resilient – up to a limit.  But it’s systems of play that allow teams to become robust and fend off all of the various challenges that need to be overcome to win at the highest levels in multiple competitions over a grueling season.

This was one of the most remarkable parts of Barça’s 2010-2011 campaign – how robust it proved to be.  Despite the back line being decimated by injuries and accumulating  fatigue across an undersized squad causing significant drop off in individual player performance – the whole system remained relatively intact and functioned at the level needed to win the double.

There’s only so much one can learn from a pre-season match, even one that’s played for a trophy.  It’s simply far too early to draw specific conclusions.  However, often the best opportunity to understand how a system normally functions is by examining what happens when parts of it break and stop working.

From the Barcelona perspective, what was so interesting about the first leg of the Super Copa was how it demonstrated key limits to how robust the Barça system can be.  As such it clarified characteristics of play that the team readily cannot do without.  At the same time it also demonstrated other dimensions of play which the team usually does not need to depend on to compete – but that they can turn to in moments of need.  The game showed both the limits to how robust the Barcelona system is but also how diverse the system is when placed under stress.

From the Madrid perspective, what was interesting was how the game demonstrated their continued transition.  Madrid continue to evolve as a squad from what they have been in the recent past – a collective dependent on and oriented around individual talent and effort – to what they are becoming now – a systems based squad in which individual talent operates in a larger, cohesive framework.

Match Summary:

Madrid came out from the start playing at a very high tempo.  The key to their approach was aggressive, physical pressing high up the pitch by their forward line.  Not only did Madrid maintain this tempo defensively – but also in attack.  They played the ball forward rapidly and executed attacking maneuvers at pace.  This combination allowed Madrid to dominate long stretches of the match.  However, this dominance of play was thwarted by limited end product.  Here Victor Valdes’ outstanding game was critical to minimizing the damage Madrid could inflict especially at the very onset of the match when the Barcelona defense was particularly porous.

In the eighth minute C. Ronaldo played an excellent cross into Benzema which the striker was able to head into the ground.  Valdes made an outstanding one handed deflection to avoid a certain goal to keep the match scoreless.  However, given how play opened it seemed as if it were only a matter of time before Madrid would find the back of the net.  Madrid execution in attack and defense put Barcelona under significant pressure for much of the match, the first half in particular.  This play set the tone for much of the match.  However, Madrid was far from fully fit and as the match progressed they clearly tired particularly in the second half.  In turn their ability to continue to press aggressively high up the pitch decreased.

Barcelona opened  with significant uncertainty in their play.  As was widely anticipated, Barcelona’s lack of recent match fitness and form and players absent from the starting line up left Barcelona with significant gaps in play.  While both teams are not close to fully match fit and have traveled widely in preseason, Barça started their match preparations as a team a week later than any other team in La Liga due to the Champions League Victory and Guardiola’s desire for his players to take time off rather than return to train early in the summer.  And the two team took different preparation pathways as well with Barcelona playing their preseason games heavily dependent on youth players from the B team while many first team regulars rested.

For a number of key Barcelona players this was their first preseason match of the season. And the effects were apparent.  For example, Messi was so lacking fitness that he vomited out on the pitch.

Key starters were missing due to the Copa America and Guardiola did not want them to return early to train.  While national team experience is match play, the systems they run are entirely different than Barcelona’s. Additionally,  due to his late signing and international duty, Alexis Sanchez only had a few practices before the match.  Barcelona’s system is highly intricate and depends extensively on timing, movement, coordination and mutual understanding.  The squad simply hadn’t spent much time playing together recently and it clearly showed.

The starting line up Guardiola chose reflected these issues with several key players out of the starting line up, most notably the Xavi and Busquets who together form the central midfield axis of the team.   The absence of those two was further heightened along the spine of the team through the absence of Pique (whose ball skills were sorely missed especially early on) and the long standing problems Puyol has had.

All that said – credit to Madrid.  They sensed weakness in Barcelona and exploited it, dictating play in this match.  They were excellent.  It was interesting to see the same 11 players who started the 5-0 match last season come together and now play an entirely different way for Madrid.

Tactical Analysis:

Average Positions Super Copa Leg 1 (Courtesy Opta Sports)

The Limits to Robustness:  What Barcelona Were Missing

In Guardiola’s interpretations of Michels and Cruyff’s total football, players are expected and trained to be all around footballers first and specific positions second.  These strategic imperative means that the team has a tremendous variety of skill sets distributed across the pitch.  Players are able to take on a diverse set of roles – not only across a season but within games and individual plays.  This fluidity and flexibility is at the heart of why the Barça system is so robust.  It’s what saw the team through to the double last season.

But in the first leg of the Super Copa we witnessed two specific tactical issues diminish that caused Barça’s entire system of play as usually practiced collapse.  First, in defense Barça did not systematically press the ball with coordination or energy as a unit.  Secondly, the team’s axis of play in the center fragmented.  This fragmentation made it difficult to maintain the usual geometry and shape Barça depend on across the pitch to maintain coherent possession and to use the ball efficiently.

The Barcelona Press

The Barcelona back line looked very unsteady throughout this match, with Eric Abidal in particular having a clumsy, pre-season game.  However, while the back line looked suspect it wasn’t the fundamental problem Barça had defensively.  In some ways the problems at the back were more a symptom than a cause.  The larger problem was the lack of the usual aggressive pressing we have come to expect from Barcelona.

As detailed in the preview one of the major open questions headed into this match was how form and fitness would impact the ability of the teams to defend.  In Barcelona’s case the question was whether the team would have the fitness and energy needed to press a highly athletic team like Madrid.  It was clear from the onset that Barcelona was not going to press with nearly the intensity they usually do, likely due to limited fitness and stamina.  This was likely a tactical adjustment by Guardiola as it was the entire team that was defending at a much lower tempo and intensity rather than a few individual players.

The lack of pressing crystalized the overall state of the squad.  Much of what makes pressing effective is under one’s own control.  It depends on coordination, positional intelligence, reading the game and perhaps above all work rate.  These are all qualities Barça has exhibited in defense over and over.  And from the start of the match what was noticeably missing was that intense work rate in defense.

Intense pressing is fundamental to the Barcelona system.  What this match demonstrated was how vital it is as a tactic.  Because without that intense, coordinated pressure across the pitch the high line Barça play in order to retain possession by staying compact gets exposed and cannot maintain cohesion.  In other words, tactically,   the Barcelona system cannot be robust against the the absence of intense pressing.  This is why fitness is such an area of focus for Guardiola.

And it was this tactical limitation which was directly involved with Barcelona conceding that first goal.

Much has been made out of the defending of Abidal, Mascherano and Keita on the goal scored by Oezil.  However, the primary defensive problem occurred far up field.  To start the you have to go back to Barcelona’s possession as the goal was scored through transition play.

Madrid Making the Field Small By Pressing - No Off the Bal Movement from Barca

In the shot above Iniesta has just passed the ball to Villa along the touchline and Messi is making a run through.  Notice how effective Madrid’s shape in pressing is.  They have four defenders in a disciplined box around two Barça attackers forming a cage around the ball.  To beat this kind of pressure requires rapid ball circulation and strong off the ball movement.  But one of Barcelona’s major problems in attack was that their off the ball movement was sluggish.  This was evident from the start.  Much like the issue of pressing off the ball movement was likely related to fitness.  This is not to say that the Madrid press wasn’t effective in it’s own right.  It’s just to say that Barça didn’t have the usual tools they would have at their disposal to counteract the defense they faced.  Above, after passing to Villa in tight space Iniesta stands outside of the box of Madrid defenders rather than making a run into open space.  With not clear outlet Villa attempts a close pass to Messi and Barça are dispossessed of the ball.

The still shot below typifies much of the game defensively for Barcelona.

Barcelona Fail to Press to Regain Possession

Ramos has gathered the ball.  But rather than attacking him as they usually would Messi, Iniesta and Villa largely  watch the ball.  Villa makes an effort a moment later but there’s not coordinated “hunting in a pack” which we see time and again from Barça.  In real time what’s most striking is the way that Messi simply stops the play once they lose the ball.  He stands up and starts walking.  He never does this in a real match and given him being sick on the field later this half it’s likely that he was far from fully fit.  For much of the game he looked to be conserving energy (Interestingly it was Messi who was marking Xabi Alonso on Madrid’s second goal.  He pulled off marking Alonso far too early – again very curious defensive mistakes from Messi – but the kind of thing you expect from a first pre-season match.)

Ramos then plays a very skillful ball to Di Maria – and once he does Madrid have broken defensive containment and have found space.  And this is where they are simply deadly in attack.  Adriano is isolated as a lone defender and caught in no man’s land as there is no one around him to coordinate pressing.  Di Maria then plays an outstanding through ball down the flank past the Barcelona defense for Benzema to run onto.  Again – there’s little the bara back line can do to stop any of this penetration.  The press has failed higher up the pitch and now defending is trying to control damage.  Benzema does a wonderful job using his close control of the ball to drive Abidal back while simultaneously holding up play for the midfield runner – Oezil to catch up.

Madrid was at a 2 vs. 3 numerical disadvantage with Abidal, Mascherano and Keita defending.  In theory they should not score.  But Benzema puts Abidal (who had a poor game) on his back foot which requires Mascherano to run towards the ball to back up Abidal.

And it’s at this point where the second major problem Barcelona faced – their central axis of play – becomes a major issue.  Initially Keita does what a DM is supposed to do in this situation – he tracks the midfield runner.  But seeing Abidal on his back foot and not looking up to locate the other CB, Keita leaves Oezil to assist on stopping the ball.  This isn’t really Keita’s fault per se.  It’s just an example of his limited experience at DM.  He approaches the play as if he were an advanced midfielder defending on the press.  He moves to close down the ball rather than track the runner.  With Mascherano and Keita both moving towards the ball Barcelona turn a 3 vs. 2 advantage into an open man in Oezil.  Benzema makes the play with his excellent skill on the ball – holding it up and then threading a perfect ball onto Oezil’s stronger left foot.

Barcelona’s Central Axis

The first leg of the Super Copa vividly demonstrated how dependent Barcelona is on play through the base of their formation – the central axis of play.  And for Barça this central axis is formed by the central midfielder in Xavi and the holding player in Busquets.  These positions are fundamental to everything Barcelona does.  It allows them to control possession, dictate tempo and build play up from the back.  Building play out from the back through this axis is particularly important when the team is facing the kind of physical pressing Madrid were utilizing.

This match showed how vital that central axis is to the team.  The system cannot be robust without it.  And this is likely why Guardiola was so intent on acquiring Fabregas for this season.

In this match neither Xavi nor Busquets were in the starting line up.  Instead Thiago and Keita took their place.  This was the right thing to do for Guardiola.  Not only in terms of resting Xavi and Busquets who have had recent knocks – but in terms of giving the other two midfielders experience against Madrid in controlled circumstances.  However, both Thiago and Keita struggled.  For much of the first half Thiago looked uncertain.  His touch was heavy and he misdirected several passes giving Madrid dangerous transition opportunities.  That’s not a criticism – Thiago is only 20.  Neither Xavi nor Iniesta could have controlled a game at the Bernabeau with Madrid playing as well as they were at that age.  Keita has very limited experience at DM and in this game it showed.  It’s just an enormous amount to expect for him to play in a relatively new position – a position he himself has said he does not feel comfortable in – and expect the team to operate as it would with Busquets.

These comments about Thiago and Keita aren’t criticisms.  They are more to point out the responsibilities that are involved with these two position in the Barça system and how vital they are to how it operates.  The system is not robust to loss of play along this central axis.

Barça Survive their Deficiencies:  Robustness through Brilliance

From a systems perspective, Barcelona was completely over run for much of this match.  But despite that – despite all of the fundamental tactical problems they were faced with they obtained a wonderful result in the first leg and did so in the away leg at the Bernabeu.  This match was a testament to what this squad has learned by winning all of the trophies it has.  It figured out a way to walk off the pitch with what it needed in terms of the competition itself.

But in addition, we also witnessed part of Barcelona’s “plan B.”  Much of the system Barcelona usually depends on broke down.  But the team overall was still robust – it still obtained a favorable result.  And it did so through another resource it can depend on – individual skill that is able to change the dynamics of the game.

With the midfield breaking down – the forward line wasn’t getting any service.  Despite that – it was very clear that the forward three would have to take on the responsibility of producing magic – and they did – twice.  On the other end, with the pressure defense missing and the back line disorganized, it was clear that Victor Valdes would have to save the game for Barça through his own effort – and he largely did.

From a tactical perspective what was noteworthy about the two Barcelona goals was that in both situations Barcelona were at enormous numerical disadvantage.  Not only did Barça produce goals against the run of play – they did so against the numbers as well.

Villa’s goal was simply an amazing wonder strike.  There are only a handful of players in the world who could have made that shot – fortunately Villa is one of them.  And before anyone wants to describe that as luck – that goal was very reminiscent of the one Villa scored in the Champions League final – it depended on the same curling action to the corner.

However, while that piece of skill was remarkable, the set up for Villa’s goal was brilliant and indicative of all the ways Barcelona can hurt another club.  Madrid had a 6 vs. 3 advantage in the final third on Villa’s goal.  While’s Villa’s strike was wonderful skill, what was critical for him being able to score that goal was that he found himself isolated 1 vs. 1 in enormous space against Ramos.  How does a 6 vs. 3 numerical disadvantage in the final third turn into a 1 vs. 1 situation where the defenders must cover large amounts of space?  The still shot below show how:

Messi Drawing Three Defenders Leaving Villa 1 vs. 1 With Ramos

The play starts with Messi dropping deep to receive the ball and making a run. He beats the first defender – Carvalho – and then forces both Khedira and Pepe to try to close him down.  One attacker has drawn 3 defenders.  This leaves the other two Barcelona attackers 2 vs. 3 in the final third.  And Ramos initially pinches in centrally to make up for the two CB’s who have stepped up to stop Messi.  This means that on the initial move Villa is completely unguarded.  A 6 vs. 3 disadvantage has turned into a 1 vs. 0 advantage for Barça.

This is one of the most brilliant parts of Messi’s game tactically – he has the ability to turn situations of significant numerical disadvantage for his team into numerical equivalence or even superiority on other sections of the pitch by drawing such a disproportionate number of defenders to him.  Even when Messi releases the pass – three defenders track his run.  This leaves Villa alone 1 vs. 1 with Ramos.

The other critical tactical aspect to this goal was Barcelona’s use of width.  Both Sanchez and Villa are playing near the touchlines when Messi makes his run.  By making the field as large as they have Villa and Sanchez make it difficult for Madrid full backs to receive support.  Finally, this width also forces Ramos to have to defend an enormous amount of space by himself.  Villa can go in any direction he wants on the initial move towards goal.  This is why Ramos does not attempt to close out the ball.  There is too much space around him to defend.

Barcelona’s second goal was another piece of brilliance by Messi.  His ability to maintain balance and fight off much larger defenders was remarkable.  But there’s an aspect of this play that has gone largely unnoticed that I wanted to point out – as it was the key to the goal itself.  This piece of play was created by Alexis Sanchez who had an outstanding debut game – especially given the circumstances of his first game being a Clasico away.

Here is the set up to the goal:

Sanchez Anticpating an Opportunity for Messi

Madrid have a 7 vs 3 numerical advantage in the region where the ball is (notice all of the Barcelona midfield players standing and holding their deeper positions rather than joining the play – very unusual).  Thiago has played a pass in the air at chest level in very tight space to Alexis Sanchez.  Sanchez then proceeds to make one of the most intelligent and skillful plays of the match.

Notice in the still shot that Sanchez is starting to bend deeply at this knees to receive Thiago’s pass.  The natural reaction to that kind of pass from Thiago would be to trap the ball with your chest.  But Sanchez does not want to do that.  Instead he’s trying to get under a pass which while in the air is not head height.  Why is he doing this odd maneuver when it would be so much more direct to control the chest level pass with his chest?    He’s already seeing a play develop before it happens.

Sanchez’s priority is to play the ball into the only open space available – the region between Pepe and Marcelo.  However, if he traps the ball with his chest – the play is done.  He’ll get closed out by the swarm of Madrid defenders around him.  The only way to make this play is through one touch football.  And the only way to play one touch football is to pass the ball with his head.  So that’s what Sanchez instantly decides to do.

Sanchez Collapsing to Knees to One Touch the Ball

When Sanchez executes this maneuver Messi is hardly in the play – he’s trailing and behind Thiago.  Despite that Sanchez has the vision and creativity to play the ball through for Leo to run onto – even in the absence of any immediate space around them.

Messi Freed Into Space By Sanchez Pass

And what’s so wonderful about this connection is that Messi is already starting his run.  He also see the potential for the play.  Messi’s makes these kinds of runs often – he can see something – even something that may appear impossible.  And while visionary players like Xavi and Iniesta can spring him free many others cannot.  This is especially true of players new to the team who have to learn how to play with Messi.  For Sanchez to be able to read this play and spring Messi through a sliver of space on a perfectly executed one touch pass with the head is very special – and that’s only with the two of them playing together for forty minutes.

And this is exactly why Guardiola was intent on acquiring Sanchez.  He has the skill set to remove the burden of play in advanced positions from Messi’s shoulders.  Rather than Messi opening up play for others  through his creative brilliance here is another player who can open up a game for Messi.  Sanchez sees this unlikely play.  Most other players would not – and on top of that he has the skill to perfectly execute what he envisions.

It’s remarkable to see how much better Sanchez has gotten this last year and how rapidly he’s improving.  In the past he’s had a reputation of dominating the ball too much – and he himself had stated this tendency is one of the challenges he needs to overcome in his career.  Last year in the World Cup you could see his skills – but often he was guilty of trying to do too much with the ball through dribbling.  But he blossomed this past season at Udinese.  And here he is in his first match at Barca playing perfect one touch football with Messi – a talent who is very challenging to learn how to play with.

Brilliance in the Net

Finally – Barcelona was able to obtain a result despite the system level problems they had in critical areas due to one of their most under appreciated resources – Victor Valdes.  Valdes was man of the match and again demonstrated the elite nature of his game.  VV is often criticized for not having much to do.  But this match was just the opposite.

Madrid outshot Barcelona four fold.  Were it not for Valdes’ agility and skill in the nets the game would have gotten out of hand very quickly and Barça would never have had the chance to level the match.  In addition, due to the problems in the central axis of play Valdes was under even more pressure to act as a distributor of the ball and initiate play.  Few goal keepers could have supported a shaky midfield under duress of intense pressing the way Valdes did in the first leg.  When the usual ways Barcelona uses to control play fail, the team is fortunate to have Valdes as a last line to keep them functioning at the level they need to find success.

Brother: Man, Argentina are terrible.

Me: [cringes after another defensive 'play'] Yeah. I know.

Brother: And it’s not like a ‘oh, their defense is sh*t’ terrible; they are collectively crap. And for a team that has Messi on it, that takes some doing.

Me: [cringes after another DiveMaria dive] Yeah. I know.

Brother: This is just like the Germany game, ain’t it? A bunch are attacking, and the rest are sitting back. Messi trying to link them together while also dribbling past x players and trying to score. Argentina ain’t gonna win shiznit if they keep this up.

Me: [cringes at the awfulness of it all] Yeah. I know.

Brother: You seem to know a lot of things. Care to share some of the knowledge? How exactly are Argentina gonna fix…[waves to screen] that?

Me: It’s simple, really. Just a case of the wrong tactics. They need to change their formation to a 1-2-7. [calmly sips drink]

Brother: To a what?

Me: A 1-2-7. Well, a 1-2-X-6 would be ideal, but that might be a bridge too far.

Brother: And how, pray tell, will that work?

Me: Easy. Romero’s in goal because we can’t kidnap Buffon and force him to be a naturalized Argentine, so he will have to do. Also, he cut his hair, so he gets bonus points for that.

Mascherano forms the ’1′ because really, who needs anyone else? He’ll slide tackle anyone who dares cross the halfway line, get all ball and leave a “sMasch was Here” on their calves to boot. Maybe snarl at them too.

Brother: [holds hand up] Whoa, wait a second. How can he get all ball while also leaving a mark?

Me: That’s the beauty of sMasch, bro. He gets it done.

Banega and Pastore form the ’2′ in the formation. They feed the seven forwards up top.

Brother: What about Cambiasso? Isn’t he, uh, one of the best DMs in the world? I mean, he does play for Inter and I’ve never really heard of Pastore.

Me: Hlebbed Pastore* takes a seat on the bench. We don’t need defensive midfielders, remember? That’s what sMasch is for. Pastore does whatever Hlebbed Pastore was attempting to do about a million times better.

Moving on to the forwards, Dive Maria will run towards the byline and fall. Lavezzi will hit the ball in front of him, chase after it, fail at whatever crosshot he attempts, and snarl at the referee for doing something to the ball’s trajectory. Tevez will pass to himself, lay an Apache smackdown on all defenders that come near him, before letting out a beastial roar, ripping off his jersey to reveal an “I Love Boca y Argentina” tattoo on his chest.

The crowd goes wild.

Aguero takes on defender after defender mano-a-mano before smoking a que golazo carajo past the helpless keeper. Higuian is there to tap in whatever doesn’t get done by someone else.

Diego Milito is there just because. We have seven forwards, yo. And we can so play them all.

Brother: …Okaaay. What about Messi?

Me: [blank look] Who?

Brother: [raises eyebrow] Err, Lionel Messi. The Messi you’re always fawning over?

Me: [snaps fingers ] Ohhhh. You mean XavIniestaLeo Carles Pique of Dahveed Rodriguez. He plays three positions at the same time but can also help Mascherano defend when needed. When we need width, he’s there. When we need someone to dribble, he’s there. When we need a goal, he’s there. When we need someone to fix something someone else messes up, he’s there.

XavIniestaLeo would have been the X in the 1-2-X-6, because you can’t really label him a number, but I figured Pastore and Banega would struggle a bit if someone was doing everything before them, so he’ll just have to settle being another forward.

Brother: …..

Me: Besides, if XavIniestaLeo plays behind the forwards, we wouldn’t need any more players because he’d do everything. I don’t think we’re allowed to field a team of 7 players. Well, eight, because I think I’d play Romero just because.

With this lineup, the Copa America would be Argentina! Argentina! Argentina!‘s.

How could it possibly fail?

——————————

*Credit: Ramzi for this wonderful term. Perfectly describes Cambiasso’s weird arse role. I’m calling him that from now on.

For those who want to see it, Messi vs Bolivia by the indomitable allasFCB2:

The way we won is what I’m most proud of – this is how I want to play football.

-Josep Guardiola, May 28 2011

Rome is already in the past.  But it’s hard not to think of that match right now.  Two European Championships in three years.  But that makes three in five years so it’s only natural for Paris 2006 to come to life again and start beating in the same chamber of the heart that’s racing so fast in chests of cules around the world after witnessing the joy of London 2011.

The Dream Team – is even further away.  But there’s Guardiola yelling out instructions pointing furiously to where his players should be positioned while they are up 3-1 in the Champions League final with only a minute or so to play (it’s just one minute Pep!).  There he is worried, gesticulating – thinking – to the very end of the competition just as he did when he was on the pitch as a player for those legendary Dream Team sides.  And afterwards during the press conference when he’s being asked leading question about whether this Barça is greater than that Dream Team – there’s Pep reminding us of how Cruyff’s squad were the template – how without them and what they did there is no Barça 2010/11.  There he is, the man who is tasked with carrying that oldest of burdens – keeping the flame – reminding us of how wondrous, how unlikely this beautiful FC Barcelona project has been for over one hundred years and how we should never take the joy it provides as a gift for granted.

But it’s not even that easy.  Because when you are speaking of things like three league titles in a row, two European Championships in three years, the youngest manager to ever win two finals we aren’t just speaking about one club anymore.  We aren’t even talking about club football alone anymore.  We’re not speaking about one period in time anymore.

Barça had two opponents in the 2011 Champions League finals.  Manchester United.  And history.  Saturday, they beat the first.  And  they formally took their place within the second.

The beautiful game.  Why is it so?  Why can football almost become a kind of art?  One dimension central to it’s aesthetic is it’s past – how that past is woven into traditions that turn into styles of play on the pitch, that intermix and evolve to produce new ways of playing this simple game.  We watch Messi score that goal against Madrid to see Barça through to the finals and it’s hard to not think of Maradona.   Reference.  It’s a word that comes up often in football. Everything that has come before adds to how we understand these moments now.  It’s what turns isolated events and facts into the texture of living memory.

The reference.  Sacchi’s Milan.  Michels and Cruyff’s Ajax.  Brazil 1970.  Real Madrid of the 1950’s.

But let’s make it clear – until the final whistle blew to end this match all of these conversations and connections between Barcelona and those points of reference for greatness could not be solidly drawn.  Winning six trophies in one season while playing beautiful football accelerated this team’s place in the world’s imagination.  But Barça had not yet defined it’s place in history alongside the points of reference for the greatest sides in history.    The pervasiveness of media culture and the disappearance of memory pushed those claims forward prematurely.  Even taking every trophy possible for an entire season was not enough – it was only one year.  World Cup sides can achieve lasting greatness through one campaign due to the Cup being played only every four years.  But for club sides more is required.

Barça’s wonderful season in 2009/2010 furthered their claims with another league title and a record point total.  Nonetheless still more was required.

To fully take their place with the wondrous sides Barça was being compared to required success at the highest level – this season.  This season was vital.  Winning next season would have created too large a gap from the 2008/2009 team.  It would have been difficult to view this team as a coherent whole.  To build a solid foundation that would last in the annals of the game it was this season that success had to be achieved – and done so at the highest levels.

Together in Victory

Before the Club World Cup finals in 2009, Guardiola famously said, “Gentlemen, if you lose today you will continue to be the best in the world – but if you win today you will be eternal.”  Pep was right – winning that sixth consecutive trophy put that team at a level that no other club had ever achieved, a record that by sheer mathematics could not be surpassed.  But there is a difference from making a moment eternal and making a project eternal.  And even six perfect trophies could not make Guardiola’s Barça as a project ever lasting in the game.  If there wasn’t additional success – both in La Liga and in Europe – this team could not truly be compared to the greatest sides the sport has known.  AC Milan, Ajax and Real Madrid had all achieved not only brilliance – but sustained brilliance.

The hard part of beauty is making it last. You know before hand that probability is weighted against you.  That brilliance, as rare as it is, is even more infrequently sustained.  But lasting beauty at the highest levels is the true reference for greatness in football.

When Eric Abidal lifted the Champions League Cup for Barça beauty does what is so infrequently gets to.  Become part of something larger, something that will last.  It becomes part of history.  Yes Pep.  Your men – and yourself- are now truly eternal.  And you achieved that grandeur because you insisted on playing the way you believed – the way you were taught – football needed to be played.  And you should be so proud of that.  You should.  Because I know that we cules are so proud of you and your team.

Match Overview
Headed into the match the major open questions revolved around what system United would play given the range of models they’ve utilized all season.  Ultimately Alex Ferguson elected to go with the 4-4-1-1 system with Rooney and Javier Hernandez up top as the two striker formation.  This was the formation that had seen United through to the Premier League title and through to the Champions League final and he chose to stick with it.  It would only be apparent after the match started that while Ferguson was utilizing his first choice system – he would be deploying certain players in very different ways than anticipated.  The key figures who would have their roles altered were Park and Evra (more on this later).

Manchester United Formation

The major prematch surprise was on the Barça side where  Carles Puyol was not included in the starting line up due to lack of fitness.  Much of the discussion on the Barça side was whether or not Eric Abidal would be able to make his miraculous return to the game complete by starting in the Champions League finals.  Outside of it’s emotional dimensions, this was a significant tactical question due to United’s prowess on the wings.  United finished off the EPL title by beating Chelsea and in that match right winger Antonio Valencia was their key player.  Valencia simply picked apart Ashely Cole, one of the world’s best left backs, in that match.    Given that Abidal had not yet played 90 minutes since returning and had only played in a few games, it was unclear if he would be deemed match fit enough to deal with Valencia.

Given that he had played in the critical matches against Madrid, it was assumed that Puyol would be in the starting line up – either at CB or perhaps at LB if Pep didn’t feel that Abidal could go.  When the line ups were announced,  no small amount of nervousness shot through the hearts of cules. Puyol would not be playing and Macherano would have to play out of position at CB, a position he had done admirably at but had little experience playing.   And Mascherano would have to play at the back against a team that already looked like their most direct way of hurting Barça was through the air.

Midgets in the front.  Midgets in the back.  Trouble in the hearts of anxious cules.

There’s no way to minimize the loss of Puyol.  He is not only a legend but has the kind of positional intelligence, skill set (especially in the air) and experience one wants in a match of this level.  But Guardiola knew that while United’s aerial threat was very real, the key to their attack would be generated by the movement of the two man striker formation.

Hernandez is one of fastest strikers in the world.  If Feguson was going to play a two man midfield in order to get Hernandez on the pitch it was always likely that the United attack would be focused on getting Hernandez behind the Barça high back line.  Just behind Hernandez in the hole would be Rooney who is extremely intelligent in his movement and never stops running.  Barcelona could not be vulnerable at CB to movement and as such playing Puyol – as legendary as he is – was the greater risk against United.  Pushing him to play when he struggled to complete training was not a viable option.

The only other wrinkle in the starting line ups was the alignment of the Barça front three.  While it was the expected trident of Villa-Messi-Pedro, Guardiola elected to use Pedro on the left and Villa on the right.  For most of the season Villa has been deployed on his favored left side. Attacking from the left allows Villa to cut in on his right foot.  At the end of the year Guardiola used Villa more on the right however.  And in this game the decision to play Pedro on the left was likely for defensive purposes.  Pedro on the left enhances Barça’s defense on that flank.  Pedro would be able to use his work rate, pace, and defensive skill to support Abidal defensively at the left back position.  Given the threat posed by Valencia and potentially the forward runs of Fabio from RB Guardiola’s switching Pedro to the left made a great deal of sense.

Later on when the match progressed it became clearer why Guardiola wanted Pedro on the left.  Given that United were only playing a two man midfield and doing so without a true holding player there was always likely going to be space between the lines.  Pep wanted Villa to be able to play in that space so he stationed him nominally on the same side as Dani Alves.  That way Villa could ghost in centrally to link up with Messi while Alves could maintain width on the right through his runs forward.

The Key Principle:  Barça Not Only Dominate Possession but Use the Ball To Control Space on the Pitch

It is now almost given that Barça will dominate possession.  Because this the opponent must control space on the pitch.  If you do not have the ball and do not control space then you are going to get played off the pitch.  As such, the major challenge for Barça is whether or not they can utilize possession to break the opposition’s attempt to maintain shape.  And in the Champions League final Barça did this brilliantly.  This point becomes clear from Barça’s passing chart, particularly in comparison to United’s chart.

Barcelona Team Passing Chart

Manchester United Team Passing Chart

The sheer number of passes Barça completed is remarkable.  And this is heightened by where the passes are directed.  Notice the density of balls played not only in around the center circle – which is an area Barça frequently dominates – but also in the space between United’s midfield and defensive lines.  It was this region that was the key to the game and Barça exploited it masterfully.
To make this point clear here is an example of how Barça executed play between the lines to break United’s shape.

Villa and then Mess Drop Deep Into Space Between Lines to Link Play

In the still shot above not only has Messi dropped deep between the lines so has Villa.  In fact Villa starts the move by running back into space to drag Ferdinand off the back line.  Interestingly, rather than run into the open space Villa has created Messi amplified Villa’s move by repeating it.  He too drops into the space in front of the United defensive line pulling Vidic with him as well.  Seeing this Villa than makes his own run forward and Messi threads a pass onto Villa’s foot generating a dangerous opportunity:

Villa's Movement Back Forward and Messi's Through Ball Break United Shape at the Back

It was this kind of dynamic interplay combining use of the ball with intelligent, decisive movement off it that was the key to the game.

The Opening:  United Come Out Brightly

The match opened very similarly to how the last Champions League final between these two clubs did.  United played very brightly and had the better of play to start.  This was not unexpected, however.  This Barça teams greatest weakness all season has been their depth.  And for the second half of the season the team looked exhausted and in turn vulnerable.  Sealing the Liga title early was critical because it allowed Guardiola to provide full rest to his side for two weeks.  United sealed their league early as well – but given that they were the deeper squad and Ferguson had rotated players more during the season the added rest was much more important for Barça.

However, given Barça’s intricate one touch system and the amount of minutes the players are used to getting, the risk of that rest was that the team may not be fully up to match speed and would suffer from some rust that would require time to shake off.

United played very well to open -they pressed high and circulated the ball very rapidly.  At the same time Barça were off form  and did in fact look somewhat rusty.  What marked the slow opening for Barça was uncharacteristically heavy touch and poorly weighted balls on passes.  Messi miscontrolled a few balls.  Pedro and Alves both lost possession cheaply on several occasions.  Even Xavi and Iniesta were searching to establish their own rhythm in the game.

United did well to press their advantage in those early minutes.  Their focus became very clear.  They immediately played long balls to their right flank in order to isolate Valencia and test Abidal.  They expanded that approach by doing the same with direct balls to Hernandez.

Given these dynamics it became imperative for the club to play solidly at the back, especially until the possession game became composed again.  Much had been made before the game about he importance of the first goal – especially after that first goal had turned it for Barça in Rome in 2009.  It was imperative that composure and solidity were maintained until an attacking rhythm could be created.

And it’s in these moments that Victor Valdes demonstrates again and again his brilliance and his value.  Because in the opening minutes United brought significant pressure to bear high up the pitch.  They forced mistakes and played with sharp movement.  In turn Barça didn’t look composed defensively.  The game had an unsettled character at the back.  Seven and a half minutes in, van der Sar played a long ball from his own box for the United front line to run into space for in an attempt to get behind the high Barcelona back line through direct play.  And it nearly worked.

Alves and Abidal were high up the pitch.  Pique was to the left of center and marking Hernandez.  Mascherano was positioned poorly and got turned the wrong way on the long ball from van der Sar.  Rooney gained a step on him and then accelerated away from the off balance Barça CB.  van der Sar’s distribution was on line and Rooney was clear through in space waiting to control the ball.

For a keeper this is a play where a mistake cannot be made.  Stay back and cut down the angle or come out hoping you can beat the striker to the ball?  And once again Valdez made the right decision and had the tremendous athleticism needed to get off his line and just beat Rooney to the ball.  Barça were fortunate that the ball took a high bounce and Rooney had to wait for it a split second.  But Valdes made a tremendous play hurling through the air, knowing that Rooney was barreling down right into him, and punched the ball away just before Rooney could get a touch on it.

Two minutes later Busquets made an off line pass to Messi in the center circle.  Messi controls those kinds of substandard passes all of the time.  But during these opening minutes his touch let him down and Carrick recovered the ball and played it to Giggs.  Giggs took one touch to settle and evade Busquets press and then played a perfectly weighted long pass on the ground.

The pass split the entire center of the Barça formation, past the two center backs, and into space for Hernandez to run onto.  Pique arrived on the ball first.  But in trying to out run the much faster United striker, Pique mishit the ball back towards Valdes who himself was coming off his line at a sprint to intercept the ball.  Rather than tap the ball back to Valdes, Pique wound up hitting the ball very hard.  And by that time Valdes was already out of the box and only a few meters separated the Barça players.  Based on pure quickness and reflexes Valdes  was somehow able to get a foot on the mishit back ball averting an almost certain own goal.  Few other keepers in the world would have had the foot skills and quickness to prevent that near disaster.  Danger averted.  Barely.

And then with ten unsettled, precarious minutes over – just as in Rome 2009 – the game changed.  This time it wasn’t a goal out of the blue that did it.  It was a more substantive change.  Barça started developing that rhythm with the ball that defines who they are, that marks their identity.  They started dictating tempo.  Started caring for the ball as if were precious.  That is – they became Barcelona again.

And with that – the match was functionally over.  Outside of a brief break in concentration that led to the United goal, Barcelona utterly dominated throughout.   They played football at a level few sides have every been able to play, never mind against a world class team like United in a Champions League final being played in England.

Think about the weight and pressure on the opposition facing Barça.  The blaugrana are rusty and off form.  And all you have is ten minutes to try to win the entire match.  And once that opportunity passes you will never be able to dictate the terms of the engagement again.  Ten minutes is all you have.  And for the next eighty all you can do is react as Barcelona dictates the match by executing it’s template.

Barcelona Dictates Play:  Tactical Analysis

As outlined in the tactical preview Alex Ferguson faced a significant dilemma headed into this match.  United started their season playing two different tactical systems:  a 4-4-2 wtih Berbatov as a target man up top and a 4-2-3-1 in competitions where they would need an extra midfielder to better control possession.  Ultimately, Ferguson merged advantages from both system forming a dynamic 4-4-1-1 with Rooney playing behind the pacey Javier Hernandez.

The key to this formation was Rooney’s work rate and positional intelligence, qualities which allowed him to function as a false 9 from the second striker position.  By doing so Rooney allowed United to have both a two man strike force up top, but to also diminish the impact of United only playing two midfielders.  By dropping deep Rooney could prevent United from losing midfield due to a 2 vs. 3 numerical disadvantage.

It was under this system that United played their best football the entire season.  It was this system which had won them the EPL, with a dominant performance against Chelsea late in the season and had then seen them through to the Champions League final.

While the dynamic 4-4-1-1 worked wonderfully for United it was an open question of whether the system could work against a team that circulated the ball and retained possession as well as Barça.  Two major problems arise.  First, the 4-4-1-1 asks Rooney to almost play two positions at once.  If Rooney couldn’t fall back fast enough to midfield Untied would be overwhelmed 3 vs. 2 by Barça.  This advantage would only be amplified when Messi dropped to midfield as a false 9.  Second, the 4-4-1-1 formation does not have a true holding player positioned between the lines.  And this space is one that Barcelona is particularly adept at exploiting.

Ultimately, Ferguson elected to play the formation that brought his team to it’s strongest level of play this season:  the 4-4-1-1. United had dismantled sides playing 3 man midfields for much of the entire season and it was that 4-4-1-1 formation that had carried United through to the finals in the first place.

However, Ferguson did not simply ignore the vulnerabilities of his system.  He attempted to augment his base system tactically to counter Barça’s strengths.  This is a point that has not been focused on enough since the end of the match.  Ferguson implemented several interesting tactical maneuvers to try to make up for the two major problems United were facing tactically – potential numerical disadvantage in midfield and space between the lines.  The key players in these changes were Ji-Sung Park, Antonio Valencia and Patrice Evra.

Headed into the match it was widely believed that Ferguson would use Park in his accustomed role – as a defensive left winger to track Dani Alves’ surges forward.  Ferguson significantly altered Park’s role in this match.  Park was stationed on the left wing but from that position he was constantly pinching in towards midfield to provide support in the center.  One of Park’s roles was to mark Messi when possible if the Barça false 9 dropped to midfield in the center-right region.

Ferguson also had Valencia play by pinching in to the middle as well though not to the degree that Park was.

In essence, Ferguson was hoping that Park’s tremendous work rate and stamina would allow him to almost play two positions at once – one as a right winger to slow Alves and one as an auxiliary midfielder to support Carrick and Giggs.

Ferguson also expanded the role of Patrice Evra as well.  Evra was charged with not only playing LB, but also tracking runs into the space between the lines.  From that left back position he was responsible in part to track Messi when he dropped between the lines to the center-right part of the pitch.  Fabio would act similarly at RB but not to the degree that Evra did.  Again, this was likely due to the fact that Messi operates largely in the center right position.  Like Park, Ferguson was asking Evra to almost play two positions at once to make up for the tactical weaknesses of the 4-4-1-1. Evra was not only to play LB but also almost as a holding midfielder at times.

And these two tactical changes built on top of what Ferguson was asking Rooney to do as a false 9 where he was also being asked to almost play two different positions at once as well- striker and attacking midfielder.

So in essence, to address Barcelona’s tactical strengths from a 4-4-1-1, Ferguson was asking three players on his squad to play in two different positions each through their work rate, stamina and athleticism.  As long as United could maintain a very high work rate this strategy could hold.  This is partly why United were so strong in the first ten minutes.  Park in particular covered enormous space when United opened strongly.

However, once Barcelona found their rhythm and began circulating the ball with crisp off the ball movement, Ferguson’s tactical adaptations were overwhelmed.  Rooney, Park and Evra could try to cover enormous amounts of space defensively – but Barça just moved the ball too fast for them to sustain this approach.  And in addition, once United tired even slightly, Barça forced the approach to collapse through their use of the ball.  Ferguson partially acknowledged this problem in the second half when he permanently shifted Park to the middle and Giggs to the right wing.  But by then it was too late.  The dynamics of the match had been set.

Perhaps the most surprising tactical development in this game was what Barça did not do.  Given that Park was constantly pinching to the middle Dani Alves was functionally unmarked for much of the first half.  Rarely has Alves every been left alone like that and on very few games has he had that much space to run into since coming to Barça.  It was initially very surprising that Barça did not circulate the ball and run the attack through Alves on that flank.   In the second half, it was very clear that Giggs could not track Alves’ runs.  Barça played the ball out to Alves on a few occasions and he generated several very dangerous chances.  But on the whole, even in the second half with an older Giggs on him, Alves wasn’t utilized as a weapon to the degree that he could have been.  This may have been a sub-optimal tactical approach on Barça’s part.

However, it’s likely there was another reason why the attack wasn’t directed through Alves on the right – Barça were so overwhelming in the center of the pitch that an outlet on the flanks wasn’t needed.  The attack could be directed through the middle because opportunities were being generated over and over in that region of the pitch.

The Busquets-Xavi Axis:  The Use of the Ball to Control Space
Few players in the history of football have had the influence on game play that Xavi has had.  Simply by the sheer number of touches he has on the ball and number of passes he executes he is the player who so often dictates play and defines the rhythm of the match.  Over the past several years it has been Xavi’s responsibility to take the burden of play off of his midfield partners.  Xavi is required to function in a way which allows Iniesta the freedom he needs to express himself in an advance attacking role.  At the same time Xavi has been required to support the Barça holding player by dropping deep to relieve pressure and to build play from deep when needed.

In many ways, this Champions League final was a seminal match for Barça from a tactical standpoint.  It was a match that may signal a significant alteration in the way the opposition tries to defend and the way that Barcelona structures it’s attack.  What was remarkable to watch in this match was the manner in which Sergio Busquets provided the foundation which enabled Xavi to play his game to the fullest.  Rather than Xavi forming the platform for the other midfielders it was Busquets who formed that base.  In turn this allowed Xavi to utterly dominate the match.

Xavi Hernandez is arguably the greatest player of his generation.  And in this Champions League final we had the privilege of watching one his finest performances.  For me he was clearly the man of the match.

But as with so many things in Barça, that individual brilliance was built on the context of the surrounding system.  And in this match it was Busquets – more than even Iniesta – who allowed Xavi to play to his utter best.

This is not to say that Busquets has not made an outstanding partner for Xavi in the past.  What I mean by this is the following:  in yesterday’s match United took defensive resources and concentrated them on stopping Busquets.  Usually teams will first and foremost devote all resources possible to stopping Xavi.  In turn they leave Busquets as the player in midfield with the most time and space on the ball.  A concrete example of this was the Champions League semi-finals against Real Madrid.  In that match, Xavi completed 80 passes.  Busquets completed 129.  Madrid overplayed the advanced midfield position and challenged Busquets to control that match.  They devoted intense defensive resources to stopping Xavi and chose to allow Busquets to have more time on the ball.

In the Champions League finals, Ferguson decided that he could not simply allow Busquets time and space on the ball.  He would have to mark him and mark him strongly.  Wayne Rooney focused on stopping Busquets for almost the entire match.  Rooney was United’s best defender in the middle of the pitch – and he was playing Busquets.  This also came at a real cost – because Rooney was defending Barça’s defensive midfielder, it was relatively easy for Busquets to snuff out counter attacks during fast transitions – Rooney was already close to him.

And even when Xavi took control of the game United still continued to allocate a defender to stop Busquets.  This was partly because in his false 9 role Rooney could most readily track the Barça holding player.  That said, overall, Busquets ability on the ball to dictate tempo from the back was considered such a threat that United maintained focus on him throughout.  A major tactical dynamic in the finals was the fact that United felt compelled to defend Busquets, even if it meant ceding freedom to Xavi.  This almost never happens.  Few times has there been matches where the opposition felt so strongly about Busquets that they were willing to assume risk with Xavi so that both central midfielders could be defended.

With this freedom behind him, Xavi was able to not only control possession but to push forward to advance positions on the pitch to force the attack.   Interestingly, Xavi almost played in as an advanced a position as Iniesta did in this match.

The diagram below summarizes Xavi’s dominance in controlling the game:

Xavi Passing Chart

From the official UEFA statistical accounts, Xavi completed 124 passes out of 136 attempts (note there are some discrepancies in the passing statistics as officially kept by UEFA and those through Opta which supplies data for the passing charts included in this post).  For contrast consider this – four United players were positioned in the midfield region either primarily or partially during this match: Giggs, Carrick, Park and Rooney.  Together those four central players completed 113 passes.  Xavi out passed United’s central attacking axis by himself.

And it wasn’t only the number of passes Xavi executed that were impressive.  It was as always the quality of the passes coupled to an attacking intent.  In the diagram notice the number of longer through balls to the front three Xavi attempted.  We’ll take a look at a specific example of the brilliance of Barça’s cerebral dictator’s in the formal tactical review of the Champions League finals (next post).

Xavi’s play was built in front of the platform that Busquets formed.  The Barça holding player played remarkable one touch football and understood the play in front of him.  He moved the ball cleanly and rapidly and did so in ways which maximized Xavi’s ability to play balls forward quickly and do so from advanced position.  Below is Busquets passing chart:

Sergio Busquets Passing Chart

From the diagram one can see how Busquets prioritized moving the ball quickly through relatively short balls forward to Xavi and Iniesta.  Busquets only completed seventy-four passes – but this was largely due to the fact that Barça were able to direct the match through Xavi.  Busquets indirect influence on this match was enormous.

In addition, Busquets made one of the single most important plays of the entire match – a play which is not receiving nearly enough attention.  It was Busquets pressing of the ball high up the pitch and dispossessing United that set up Villa’s goal.

Space Between the Lines:  Barcelona Plays Out the Match Where They are Most Dangerous

Barcelona found space between the United’s midfield and defensive line all match.  And it was play in this region of the pitch that generated one dangerous chance after another.  And ultimately, all three of Barça’s goals were generated off this region of the pitch.

United were not playing a traditional holding player in midfield – and as such they were depending on defenders moving into this space dynamically.  Carrick, Giggs, Vidic, Ferdinand, Evra and Park were all tasked with playing in this region on the pitch.  However, Barça were simply able to utilize off the ball movement and quick passing too well for these defenders to break up play in front of United’s back line.

Barça’s ability to create danger from this region of the pitch is summarized in the diagram showing where their shots on goal came from:

Barcelona Team Shooting Chart

This distribution of shots on goal is very unusual for a Barcelona team that doesn’t frequently rely on shots from outside the box.  In this match however Barça systematically looked to score from the space they found just in front of the United back four.  This is a good example of  Guardiola’s deep understanding of tactics.  It was very clear that Barça was shooting from outside of the box as a tactic.  And they did this consciously because Guardiola knew that his team would be able to find open space between the lines.  It was important for Barça to use this space because United’s CB are very strong defenders in the box.

Barça were the first team to score two goals from outside of the box in the Champions League final.  It would have been very difficult to anticipate that before the match as those kinds of long shots are simply not something the team uses frequently.  But watching the match, the danger from those shots was apparent early on.

While Busquets and Xavi dominated the central axis of the pitch, Iniesta created havoc all night, gliding between the lines.  Marked by Michael Carrick, Iniesta was able to ghost past his marker again and again.  Below is the heat map of Iniesta’s touches:

Andres Iniesta Heat Map (via ESPN)

When a player of Iniesta’s skill is able to operate in front of a back four in this fashion it becomes very difficult to maintain defensive shape.  Iniesta is so skilled on the ball that he is going to breakdown the defenses ability to control space.  Below is Iniesta’s passing chart:

Andres Iniesta Passing Chart

Notice the density of completed passes near the advanced center of the pitch.

Finally, we arrive at Messi.  What is there to say at this point.  He is simply the greatest footballer in the game – and it’s not particularly close between him and whomever one wants to pick as second.  Messi was brilliant.  And it was in the region between the lines where he generated so much of the havoc he creates.  Below is Messi’s heat map:

Lionel Messi Heat Map (via ESPN)

The sheer number of touches Messi has between the lines is remarkable.  When allowed to operate in this region Messi is going to inflict tremendous damage on a defense.  And he did not fail to do so in this match.  His strike from outside of the box was complete genius because no one was expecting it.  United was playing him for the run.  On the play, Evra watches Messi and stays beside Vidic rather than going to close out the attacker because he didn’t want to get beat on a run (notice also on that play how Park simply stops running to close down Messi out of sheer exhaustion).  Instead of running at the defenders however, Messi simply stopped in the open space he found in front of the back four and unleashed a low shot on target.

In this match Messi really didn’t need to drop deep into midfield to pick up the ball (see the heat map above).  Rather he was able to simply drop in front of the back line.  This meant that he was in goal scoring position almost every time he touched the ball.  This constant danger wore down United and made it almost inevitable that Barça would score multiple goals on the night, whether through Messi directly scoring, assisting or both.

Barcelona’s Wide Attackers: Intelligent Runs With High Work Rates

David Villa had a very difficult run up to this final match scoring only once in his past sixteen matches.  However, in the biggest match of the season Villa played a phenomenal match in all dimensions of the game.  This may have been the most complete game Villa has played in his entire career.  The match was not only encompassed Villa’s skill as one of the world’s premier strikers.  It demonstrated his willingness to learn and to grow as a footballer by expanding the dimensions to his game after arriving at Barça, particularly on defense (more on this later).

Villa opened on the right flank but darted in and out of the middle of the pitch all night long serving both as a point of reference for link up play, creating danger between the lines, and making intelligent runs behind defenders.  Coupled with his work rate Villa exemplified all match long what total football means.

Tactically, one of the most interesting things Villa did on the evening was to make it very difficult for Patric Evra to make decisions on who to mark.  Evra was tasked with not only playing left back but also marking Messi when he dropped between the lines.  Again and again in the match Villa positioned himself near or Evra to force the LB to not only mark him – but to track him as Villa would make diagonal runs off the center right position.  This was a key reason why Messi had so much room to operate in between the lines.

With his play off the left flank, P! formed the perfect mirror to Villa’s complete all around play.  That’s right – after a somewhat uneven start, Pedro fully earned back his ! . Pedro did a wonderful job of not only providing width along the left – but providing dangerous width.  The key here was the quality of his runs off the ball, particularly on diagonals.  Pedro’s finish on the goal he scored summarized so much of what makes P! such an unusual player.  He plays all out all of the time.  And he is prone to losing tactical discipline.  But for a player whose game is so dependent on energy and work rate to be so composed in front of goal is remarkable.  It’s that balance of energy and composure in finishing which make Pedro so unique.  And in this match he was dangerous throughout.

Finally, both Pedro and Villa engineered one of the best moments of the entire match.  It’s shown in the screen shot below:

Villa and Pedro Positioning Themselves to Defend as Pique and Busquets Make Forward Runs Into Box - Villa Scores a Moment Later From This Deep Position to Seal the Match

Here Barcelona has played the ball into the box through a run of Messi’s off the right flank.  There’s a scrum in the box as both sides fight for the ball.  The key issue in this moment is that both Pique and Busquets have made runs forward into the box.  Most attacking players in this situation would make a run to the ball to try to gain possession.  But neither Villa nor Pedro do this.

Instead they stay in relatively deep positions.  What they are doing is covering positionally for the two defensive players who have gone forward.  Two attackers who have scored nearly fifty goals between them this season are playing defense for a CB and holding midfielder.  That summarizes in a moment what Barça has become under Guardiola.

And all of this discipline and effort quickly became even sweeter a moment later.  Busquets of course would go on to dispossess the ball on the press.  Seeing this Villa would drop back to find space and provide an easy outlet for a Busquets.  One pass later Villa would go on to curl the ball into the top corner of the net to score Barça’s third goal to finish off the match.  That goal was built on defense, discipline, and unselfishness the entire way through.  It was a goal executed through brilliant individual skill but built on commitment to all around team play.

Barça’s Backline:  Solidity as the Foundation

Significant questions swirled around the Barça backline.  After an unsettled opening ten minutes, the backline and team defense stifled United whenever they looked to attack.

With Puyol absent someone needed to take control of the backline.  That player was Gerard Pique.  Pique had an inconsistent season for stretches but rounded back into world class form over the past two months.  In the finals, outside of a few stray mistakes, Pique was an absolute rock all match long.  Of particular importance was how Pique controlled aerial play.

Over and over Pique beat the United attackers on balls in the air.  And given that he was paired with an out of position Mascherano it was imperative that Pique control those balls in the air the way he did.  Along with Abidal, Pique made a mistake in raising his hand and playing for offside rather than playing through on United’s goal but otherwise he was tremendous.  It was interesting to see Pique make several runs forward in attack in the second half – it was clear that this was a tactical adjustment made by Pep at halftime.

Alongside Pique was Mascherano who was deputized to fill in for the Barça captain.  It took Mascherano some time to settle into the match but once he did he was as solid as one could hope for.  One of the most remarkable tactical aspects to how Barça played was the manner in which Guardiola elected to defend Hernandez.

Hernandez has been in strong form to end the season. He is one of the fastest strikers in the world.  And Guardiola trusted Mascherano – playing out of position – to mark Hernandez by himself 1 vs. 1.  In similar situations most managers would have insisted on playing both center backs against United’s most advanced striker.  Instead, Pep trusted Mascherano and played the way Barça usually play.  And Mascherano used his positional intelligence and pace to play solidly behind Pique as the cover center back.

Dani Alves had a relatively quite game.  He opened looking off form and gave the ball away cheaply a few times.  But that was the brief period when the entire team was off pace.  Afterwards Alves played a very disciplined game.  Given the space Barça was finding centrally and Villa’s effectiveness off the right Barça didn’t require their RB to bomb forward.  Alves made himself available as an outlet should it be needed.  And in the second half he made a few very dangerous runs that generated high quality chances.  And when he had the chance it was good to see Dani chut the ball after all!

And finally we arrive at the most unlikely of Champions League starters and the most warming story of the finals.  What can be said about Abidal that his actions don’t already express?  I remember seeing those pictures of him in warm ups back on the pitch with his teammates shortly after surgery.  When I saw those pictures the first thought that came to mind was that if Barça make the Champions League final Abi is going to play.  He’s lost weight and looks thin.  But he looked overjoyed to be playing again.  And Abidal returning to play in this game – play when his team was extremely short and vulnerable at the back – was just amazing.
Coming into this match it appeared that United’s best chance to score would come off the match up of Valencia vs. Abidal.  And United tested him very early.  But Abidal was having none of it.  He completely shut down Valencia and owned that flank.  And with that, United’s best opportunity heading into the the match disappeared.

The Substitutes: The Captain, The Professional and 3M
The match was well in hand by the time any substitutions were required.  But regardless – it was wonderful to see Puyol step back on the pitch and wrap that captains band around his arm.  And it said so much about this legend and about this team when Puyol unwrapped that same arm band and handed it to Abidal so that he could raise the Champions League trophy on behalf of the team.  Only one player has ever raised the European Championship trophy three times.  That player was Beckenbauer.  Puyol could have been the second if he chose to.  Instead, he chose to be a teammate – and in that moment he showed by action what leadership really means.

Keita and Afellay were the final two substitutions and though each hardly played it was a beautiful gesture for Pep to put both of them on as they each deserved it.  Keita for his tireless professionalism.  Afellay for his desire to come to this team and do everything he could to fit in.  Watching United play tonight there was little doubt that Afellay could have walked on to this United squad and moved directly into the starting line up in the midfield.  He could have done that for several top sides in Europe.  Instead he chose to join Barcelona.  We’ll likely hear stories about both Keita and Afellay being sold this summer.  Don’t believe them.  Pep sent them onto the pitch because they are part of this team.  They belong.  They stay.

A Refreshed Squad

Watching this match it became very quickly apparent how fatigued the squad has been over the second half of the season.  The two weeks off did wonders for their freshness.  We were all wondering what was going on with David Villa these past many games.  From how he played tonight it is clear that fatigue was a major part of his struggles.  With two weeks off he returned to the pitch and played a dominant game along with the rest of his teammates.  Straight away you could see that Barça were fresh and back to playing crisp football.  In this sense, the most important thing Barça did to win the Champions League was to win La Liga outright early.

The Pep Guardiola Difference
There’s so much to say.  And to truly do justice to the accomplishments of this man would require more space than a match review allows.  But with this victory Pep can now take a place besides greats like Michels, Sachhi, Chapman and Herrera as a manger who has not only won trophies but changed the way the game is conceptualized and played at the strategic and tactical levels.  He now establishes himself as the reference against which other managers of this generation will be measured.  His accomplishments as a player and manager are enormous.

Conclusion
There has long been a belief in football that there is something that cannot be trusted about playing the game beautifully.  That inevitably one must make trade offs between the romanticism of style and the pragmatism of trophies.  And if a team plays with intense focus on style then disappointment will invariably follow.  The Netherlands 1974.  Brazil 1982.  This belief has only heightened in the modern game due to the rapid development of athleticism and physicality across the pitch.

This Barcelona team has demonstrated that none of this has to be true.

Guardiola’s Barcelona found football in a certain shape and together they said this was not the only possible world.  And that kind of longing is what makes history new all over again.

On top of this, United played a very different system last season which could be reimplemented in the Champions League finals.  Given this potential range of formations and modes of play United could implement, the major open question headed into the the final is as general a question as can be posed before a match – what system is United going to play?

One of the most interesting aspects of the coming Champions League final is the contrast between the two teams and their managers.

Alex Ferguson is the quintessential fiddler  – his approach involves prioritizing flexibility, having a range of tactical choices, and making constant adjustments to take advantage of the opponents weaknesses.  Pep Guardiola’s philosophy is to impose his system of play on the opposition, to dictate the terms of the engagement.  He has implemented a template which allows for variation in play (requires it even), but whose overall intent is to force the other side to change how it can maneuver in response to Barça’s initiatives.

To better understand how United may try to play against Barça, let’s take a look at the different systems Ferguson’s side have employed this year.

Manchester United’s Initial Formation:  4-4-2 with a Target Man

United opened the season favoring a 4-4-2 system incorporating a target man striker up top in Dimitar Berbatov.  After a poor season in 09/10 Berbatov opened this campaign in tremendous form, scoring goals at a blistering pace.  For much of the first part of the season Berbatov was at the very top of the goal scoring race in the EPL.

United 4-4-2 vs Rangers CL Group Round: Rooney Playing High Up the Pitch to Support Berbatov in the Target Role Wingers Pinched in Centrally to Make Up for Numerical Disadvantage in Midfield

White Berbatov was playing very well (and doing so at a time when Rooney was off form and Chicharito was still adjusting), United’s 4-4-2 target man formation had two distinct limitations.

First, as with any 4-4-2, it left Manchester United with numerical disadvantage in midfield – 2 vs. 3 – when facing a 4-3-3/ 4-2-3-1 formation.  For certain opponents this numerical disadvantage put United at significant threat for being over run in midfield.

The second limitation relates to Berbatov himself, or more precisely to the role of a target man in a 4-4-2 formation.  A target man type striker in a 4-4-2 requires the second striker to play close to him to form a partnership (see Rooney’s position in the diagram above).  There is no point in holding up play or knocking down balls if there is no one to link up with or to collect the ball.

As such, to make best use of a target man in Berbatov up top, Rooney is  required to play higher up the pitch.  But needing to stay in proximity to Berbatov diminishes key aspects to Rooney’s game – namely his work rate and movement (this was also a problem Rooney faced in the World Cup when teamed with Heskey).  Rooney has a strong motor and looks to drop back both to support possession and to help in defense.  But if, for example, Rooney drops to defend and United try to play a fast counter to Berbatov there will be no one for him to hold the ball up for.  Now this is not to say that Berbatov is himself a stereotypical target man (his game is more varied than that).  However, Berbatov greatest strengths are not his movement or pace and his game does take on important dimensions of the target man game.

Manchester United:  Second Formation  4-2-3-1

While United was able to play a 4-4-2 for most of its EPL and domestic cup competitions this season, for a number of matches Ferguson deemed the formation as problematic and switched to a 4-2-3-1  to maintain numerical equivalence, 3 vs. 3, against certain sides playing 4-3-3/4-2-3-1.  For most of the early Champions League matches the 4-2-3-1 formation was the one he elected to use to prevent his side from losing control of midfield.  Over his career, this has been one of the major areas of tactical “tinkering” Ferguson has engaged in – using a 3 man midfield in European competition.

Once a strong adherent to the 4-4-2, Ferguson, widened his tactical range by utilizing three man midfields when needed against teams that were either using three man midfields themselves or were strong at dominating possession (this is part of why Ferguson did not win in Europe until relatively late in his career).  Ferguson liberalizing his tactical approach to include 4-3-3/4-2-3-1 has been a key factor in United’s increased efficacy in European competitions over the years because it has allowed United to better control in possession.  And last season a 4-3-3 with Wayne Rooney as the lone striker was a primary formation used by United.

United’s CL match against Marseille earlier this season is a good example of how they could change how they play as a team by utilizing a 4-2-3-1 to create numerical equivalence in midfield:

Manchester Untied in a 4-2-3-1 vs. Marseille First Leg Round of 16 - Rooney Split Wide Left with 3 Midfielder to Create Numerical Equivalence in Center. An Attacking Winger is Removed From the PItch Compared to the 4-4-2

While the advantages of the 4-2-3-1 are clear there were significant reasons for why United did not utilize it as their base system this year.

First, unlike last season Berbatov was in much better form and Ferguson clearly wanted to get both he and Rooney on the pitch at the same time and in the area of the pitch where they are most accustomed to playing (this theme will form a central tension for Ferguson headed into the CL finals – more on this later).  To play both Berbatov (or Hernandez) and Rooney in the 4-2-3-1 required Rooney to play wide left.

Second, Rooney was injured, off form and going through off field controversy for much of the first part of the season.  As such he was not necessarily able to support United the way he did last season when he was so effective as a lone striker.

Third, United’s depth and age in midfield are significant.  The central attacking midfielder is a pivotal player in the 4-2-3-1 and United’s options in that critical position are limited.

Fourth, Manchester United’s greatest team strength this season is it’s play on the flanks.  United have outstanding wingers.  The 4-4-2 more naturally places those flank players in wide positions.

Finally, while Ferguson implements the 4-2-3-1, the 4-4-2 still seems to be the system he is most comfortable utilizing when feasible.

The Evolution of Manchester United:  Rooney Redefines his Role and the Rise of Chicharito in the Dynamic 4-4-1-1

As the season progressed, Ferguson continued to experiment with his formations.  In the process he developed an extremely interesting tactical innovation – merging key advantages of United’s 4-4-2 with those of their 4-2-3-1 in order to better take advantage of the strengths of his current squad.  To do so required two major changes:  1)  Redefining Wayne Rooney’s position by having him utilize his natural abilities to play more like a false 9 from the second striker postion;  2)  Utilizing Javier Hernandez in place of Berbatov to gain more pace and off the ball movement at the most advanced attacking position.

Manchester United in a 4-4-1-1 vs Marseille in Leg 2 of the CL Round of 16: Rooney is a Second Striker But Deep Enough to Almost be Playing as a 10 to Provide An Extra Man in MIdfield. Compare to Formation United Used in the First Leg Against Marseille in the Prior Diagram

After the first leg against Marseille in the Champions League, Ferguson revamped his approach and developed the 4-4-1-1 pictured above.  What’s critical is Rooney’s positioning.  He is playing in a hybrid role.  His average position is nearly equivalent to a traditional 10 but the average position can be a bit misleading as Rooney spends considerable time both high up the pitch and dropping very deep.  How he’s playing is probably more precisely described as a false 9 from the second striker position.

A great deal of attention has been paid to Javier Hernandez’s goal scoring this season.  And he’s been wonderful given his youth and experience.  However, the key change in United’s play hasn’t been due to Hernandez and his goal scoring prowess.  For a significant portion of the season Berbatov was at the very top of the scoring table in the EPL.  He was arguably United’s best player for the first part of the season.  Even as Berbatov lost playing time during the second half of the season, he still tied for the EPL lead in goals by the end of the campaign.  So the exchange of Berbatov for Hernandez was not a direct switch based on individual goal scoring quality.  It was a change made for systems reasons.

In many ways switching Hernandez for Berbatov was a secondary consequence of a deeper tactical change – the redefinition of Wayne Rooney’s role in order to compensate for the area where United is weakest – midfield.

Last season Ferguson had Rooney play as a lone striker.  This season he asked Rooney to completely transform how he plays once again.  It speaks volumes about Rooney’s game that he was both willing and able to make this transition.  While much has been made of Rooney’s slow start and lack of goal scoring this season compared to last, in many ways by the end of the season Rooney was playing as brilliantly this season as he was last season.  But he was doing so in almost an entirely different way, one centered on passing from deeper positions to enhance the effectiveness of the lead striker and the two wingers.

Over this season Rooney’s role evolved into a role that echoed Lionel Messi’s.  Rooney played more and more as a false 9 – but unlike Messi, Rooney did so from the second striker position of a two man formation.  In some ways one could argue that Rooney was playing almost as a 10 or as a “false 10” of sorts.

The advantage of having Rooney play this innovative, hybrid role was that it allowed United to maintain a two striker formation while also minimizing the impact of playing against 4-3-3 formations and being outnumbered in midfield.  Rooney’s work rate, movement and willingness to defend allowed him to move into deeper positions in midfield to act almost as an auxiliary midfielder, particularly in defense.

The reason why this change made United an improved squad relates to the United’s relative weakness in midfield.  United are a very strong at striker, winger, center back and full back positions.  Their midfield however has real limitations with each player requiring significant trade offs to be made when played.  This season, United have had neither an ideal attacking mid nor an in form, multi-dimensional holding player to turn to on a regular basis.  Giggs and Scholes are both still highly effective but neither is in his prime nor has great pace or stamina.  Carrick is a specialist player who is very good at his job but is not particularly strong defensively.  Fletcher has been injured for much of the season and lacking form.  Anderson is another specialist player who is relatively good in defense but not particularly strong on the ball.

Playing a three man midfield through a 4-2-3-1 as such forces Ferguson to use three of these limited players and forces him to take off the pitch a much more talented winger or striker.  The 4-2-3-1 may allow United to gain numerical equivalence but it comes at a cost of taking talent off the pitch and utilizing more players from the weakest sector of the squad.

Rather than play three midfielders, Ferguson adapted a system where he could utilize Rooney as both a support striker and a support midfielder.  Rooney was able to handle this broad set of responsibilities due to the varied nature of his skill set and talent.  And against the vast majority of clubs this dual role not only functioned well but provided them with maximum advantage.

However, to play Rooney in this kind of false 9 second striker role Ferguson needed a more mobile, pacy lead striker than Berbatov.  If Rooney was going to drop deep and have significant freedom to utilize space and the ball across the pitch, the lead striker would need to himself excel at movement and have strong pace.  For example, without those qualities the sharp diagonal passes Rooney could execute from deeper positions would have a lower probability of paying off.  Without more dynamic pressure from the lead striker, very large gaps in space would open up on the pitch when Rooney moved deeper on the pitch.  Despite his goal scoring prowess, Berbatov was simply not this player.

And after drawing 0-0 with Marseille in the first match of the CL Round of 16 in which they utilized an ineffective 4-2-3-1 formation with Berbatov in the middle and Rooney on the left, Ferguson reconfigured Rooney’s role and inserted Hernandez into the line up, radically transforming the United system in the process.

The other associated tactical change Ferguson made to the system as they shifted to the 4-4-1-1 was to often have the left winger pinch in to further support the middle of the pitch (more on this later in the potential match up of Park vs. Alves).

How Barça Should Attack Manchester United
Shifting to that dynamic 4-4-1-1, United elevated their game and starting playing some of their best football of the season.  This formation quickly became Ferguson’s first choice system of play.  Even against teams that played 4-3-3/ 4-2-3-1 formations like Marseille and Chelsea, United were able to compete in midfield because Rooney dropping back turned a potential 2 vs. 3 disadvantage in midfield into a 3 vs. 3.

But this in turn raises a major tactical question Ferguson needs to answer going into the CL final.  His first choice system this season functionally requires Rooney to almost play two positions at once.  While this may work against the vast majority of teams will it work against Barça given the blaugrana’s rapid ball circulation and off the ball movement?  Or will playing Rooney in this hybrid role leave him between spaces while making United even more vulnerable to being outplayed in the middle because they will be at a 2 vs. 3 disadvantage in terms of formal midfielders?

To gain some insight into this question let’s take a look at the recent Arsenal’s recent 1-0 victory over vs. Manchester United as a model.

Arsenal vs. Manchester United at the Emirates:  Insight into How Barcelona Can Attack

The screen shot below illustrates the problem that United’s 4-4-1-1 can have against a 4-3-3 executed by a team that understands passing and ball possession.

United Trying to Defend Arsenal's Triangles with a Flat Line of Defenders

United is not only outnumbered in midfield but they are also in poor defensive shape to challenge what Arsenal is doing in attack.  Notice how Arsenal has not only formed one triangle in attack – but two.  United is attempting to defend those two triangles with a straight line of defenders.  In order for United to regain shape Rooney must not only exert tremendous work but position himself with great anticipation and precision.  If he doesn’t do all of those things United can be left exposed in midfield.  The next screen shot illustrates how Arsenal made Rooney’s job as a defensive false 9 very difficult through intelligent movement:

Song Dragging Rooney Out of Position While Ramsey Finds Space By Position Switching

The screen shot above provides key insight into how the Champions League final may unfold if United utilize their 4-4-1-1.  Notice how deep Rooney is on the pitch.  He’s a striker who is defending deeper than either of his midfielders.  Rooney’s responsibility in this match was to mark Arsenal’s holding player Alex Song.

Second strikers are often tasked with marking the opposition’s holding player.  What’s interesting about the dynamics above however is that Rooney’s responsibility as a striker isn’t simply to mark Song higher up the pitch. His responsibility is to mark Song and track him across the pitch regardless of where he goes.  Rooney has to do this because Carrick and Anderson are already responsible for marking Ramsey and Wilshere.

If Rooney doesn’t track Song Arsenal will have a free attacker in midfield.  As such, functionally Rooney is acting as a midfielder now.  Rooney will likely play a similar role against Busquets in the CL finals.

But Song is making Rooney’s job as an unconventional false 9 defender very difficult through his intelligent forward run towards the flank.  Song’s goal here is to drag Rooney out of position.  In essence what has happened is that Song and Aaron Ramsey have interchanged positions.  And in doing so they have created confusion for United.   Rooney has done his job – he has tracked Arsenal’s holding player.  But then Ramsey drops deep as does Wilshere.  Carrick and Anderson cannot afford to chase the two Arsenal midfielders because they are trying to maintain defensive position.  If Anderson closes down Ramsey on the ball an enormous gap in space will open up.

Cesc Fabregas is often projected as Xavi’s heir apparent.  But Fabregas and Xavi don’t play the same tactically.  Fabregas plays in a much more advanced position.  Ramsey however in many ways makes a much better proxy for how Xavi tends to play because Ramsey also plays in a deeper position.  By staying deeper as the holding player drags Rooney forward, not only is Ramsey able to find time and space on the ball he forces United to open up space between their lines.  Notice the space that has opened up between the two midfielders and the backline despite Anderson and Carrick trying to not lose compactness.   We see the results in the next screen shot:

Van Persie As a False 9 Finds Space Between the Lines

Robin Van Persie in his role as a false 9 has dropped deep into the space between United lines that have cracked open.  Ramsey has no problem sending the ball to feet because Anderson was unwilling to move forward. In addition, Nasri has also moved into this open space by moving centrally off his original wide position.  Nasri is open and unmarked in this space.

The problem here is that even with Rooney dropping deep to create a 3 vs. 3 in midfield United do not have a true defensive holding player positioned between the lines in front of the back four.  Rooney job isn’t to maintain shape or play space – it is to track Song.  And Song has dragged Rooney into a position where he is irrelevant to the team defense.  Song is essentially acting as a decoy.  United’s second problem is their susceptibility to the false 9 dropping between the lines.  They don’t have a player in that space to mark that player.

If Rooney plays the same way, Busquets will be able to drag him out of position with simple runs where he changes positions with Xavi as well.  And  Messi in turn should be able to find space between the lines as Van Persie has. Both Villa and Pedro should be able to exploit that same space between the lines that Nasri has and allow them to link up play with Messi.  Finally, in this situation Carrick is left 1 vs. 1 with Wilshere.  Carrick is a good possession midfielder but he is not a strong defender.  And against Barça he will be left trying to mark Iniesta and do so without another midfielder behind him.  This is an enormous advantage for Barça.

This is a central tactical problem for United.  Rooney dropping deep may solve the issues of numerical advantage in midfield of a 4-4-1-1 vs. a 4-3-3.  However, solving the numerical problem does not solve the problem of position and open space.  And Rooney’s innovative role and work rate cannot provide a response to Messi’s false 9 role.  This is potentially disastrous for United because there is no team in the world that can exploit space between the lines like Barça can.  Vidic and Ferdinand while both strong defenders in the box and facing up attackers aren’t particularly mobile or pacy.  Neither turns very well.  They could be forced to step up to stop runs started between the United lines which not only exposes them to be being beat on through balls and acceleration but also exposes them to picking up cards.
The other area where United’s defense will have a tactical challenge is along the wing due to Dani Alves.  The screen shot below illustrates a few important issues Barça can exploit:

Rooney Trying to Mark Two Attackers with Park Trying to Support by Pinching In

Ramsey has once again dropped deep to receive the ball and build play.  Xavi is the best in the world at this.  Rooney is once again doing his job – he is marking Arsenal’s deep midfielder.  But United is faced with another problem here.  Song has  also maintained a deep position in the center circle – this is an area where Busquets regularly positions himself.  Neither Anderson nor Carrick want to come forward to defend him because if they do United will lose compactness and open up space between their lines.  As such Rooney is essentially responsible in his false 9 second striker role not only to defend vigorously, but to defend two men at once.

Here we can see that a support striker with a high work rate who is willing to track runs and defend deep may make up for numbers in defense but that does not mean that he can necessarily create a sound defensive shape.  Ultimately marking players does not mean you are controlling space.

The second thing to notice is Park and his positioning.  Moving to the 4-4-1-1, Ferguson had Park not only play as a defensive winger to mark the opposition right back, but to pinch inwards to assist in defending in the middle.  Here Park is trying to support Rooney in containing Ramsey who has significant space on the ball.  But there is only so much support Park can provide because he too is tasked with playing in two regions of the pitch.  If he pinches in too much – the RB will have acres of space to run into.  Against Dani Alves there is no way Park can pinch in to any significant degree.  Given this, Park will not be able to assist in defending the middle as he usually does.  Just by staying in a wide position, Alves will be hindering Park’s ability to contribute to United total team defense.

Finally, notice where Chicharito is positioned. He stays high up the pitch to try to position himself in a dangerous area to attack on a quick transition counter.  But this positioning comes at a real cost because Hernandez is not in a position where he can contribute defensively.  This is the very real cost of playing a two striker formation against a team that is strong in ball possession.  Even if the second striker drops deep to defend, the striker at the top will often be positioned in areas where he becomes a redundant defender.

Barça in Defense:  Guarding Against the Flanks

The area where Barça will encounter the most danger from United is along the flanks.  United has very strong wingers – Valencia is in outstanding form since returning from injury.  His pace, play on the ball and crossing make him very dangerous. Given that he lines up against the area where Barça is theoretically weakest given lack of players being match fit – left back – Valencia is likely to be United’s most dangerous player.  The danger along the right flank is further heightened by Fabio’s ability to attack from RB and Rooney’s ability to send strong diagonal balls through the channel between the CB and FB.

In a similar fashion, Barça will also need to be cognizant of Chicharito given his pace, intelligent runs and understanding of space.  Chicarito staying high up the pitch represents a critical trade off for United.  His positioning makes it difficult for him to defend in the areas where Rooney and United need support.  But it may also represent United’s best chance to score a goal.

Conclusion:
United have become a better, more dangerous team as the season has progressed. They are strong across the pitch but have vulnerabilities in midfield.  And it’s very difficult to beat Barcelona if you are exposed in that region of the pitch as space between the lines is something that you cannot leave open for Messi and Iniesta to exploit.  Villa and Pedro should stay in wide positions and make delayed runs to move diagonally for when the United back line loses shape as they are forced to close down the ball when it is in between the lines.

Ferguson has a real dilemma entering this match.  The tactical system that has produced his team’s finest level of play this season may be particularly vulnerable to breaking down against Barça’s own style.   Does he keep that system or switch to another system which he used prior but then discarded as the season progressed?  What does a manager who needs to tinker do?

¡Visca Barça!

In the first leg of the Barcelona – Madrid Champion’s League tie tactics were at the forefront.  But not in the way we are accustomed to thinking of them.  Tactical nous is most often associated with defensively oriented football, on issues such maintaining shape, holding lines, and marking.  In fact, the term tactics itself is frequently used as a synonym for defense.  Football based on attack and possession is often considered a function of “style.”

Messi Delivers Magic and There's Nothing to do But Watch

Such distinctions are of course gross over simplifications and rarely hold out on the pitch.  This was sharply illustrated in the last Clásico.  Jose Mourinho is widely considered to be the quintessential tactically oriented manager in the contemporary game.  And prior to this series of four Clásico’s Mourinho’s tactical acumen was considered to be a significant advantage for Madrid by many observers.

However, in the first leg of the Champion’s League tie it was Pep Guardiola who introduced the tactical adjustments and innovations that set the parameters for the match, defining the dynamics for how play unfolded.  How these dynamics come to fruition in the second leg will have significant influence over who will advance to the Champions League finals.

Tactical Parameters

Five overarching factors set the context for the last Clásico from the Barcelona perspective:

1) Barcelona was required to play a makeshift backline without a true left full back.  In addition Carles Puyol would be required to play an integral role at the back despite lack of form and fitness and a recent injury suffered in the Copa Del Rey finals.

2) Barcelona played a very narrow formation in the Copa Del Rey final.  This lack of width made the pitch very small, especially in the middle.  In turn, this made the Madrid press more effective than it otherwise would have been.

3)  Since the first Clásico, Real Madrid had adopted a defensively oriented approach that focused significantly on maintaining shape, clotting the space between the lines and playing on the counter attack.

4)  In the Copa Del Rey final, Messi was forced to drop extremely deep into midfield to support possession and collect the ball.  Because Madrid had stationed so many defenders in the middle of the pitch when Messi dropped deep he was not dragging Madrid out of shape – they simply passed Messi onto other lines of defense in the center.

5) The match was the first leg of the Champions League tie and was being played away at the Bernabéu

Several other factors were in play such as the absence of Andres Iniesta.  However, those five factors were critical tactically.

Restructuring the Backline While Enhancing Width

This season Guardiola has significantly changed the way the full backs function in the Barcelona system.  Rather than acting as traditional full back – even ones that make bombing runs forward – Guardiola has redefined the position in the Barça system into more of a hybrid wing back/full back.  This was done in order to expand Barcelona’s width in the advanced portions of the pitch as teams defended deep.  Lack of width was a significant problem in last season’s Barça team.

The single biggest adjustment in tactics Guardiola made for the first Champion’s League Clásico was to alter how the full backs played.  Rather than stationing themselves high up the pitch as he had been doing all season, Guardiola repositioned the full backs and had them play much deeper often staying close to the midline.

Given how high up the pitch the Barça full backs have been playing all season, this was a radical realignment in formation and was central to how Barça functioned in the last Clásico.  This difference is well illustrated by the average positional diagram below:

Barca Formation - Average Position (Courtesy of UEFA - Note Pedro Rodriguez not Diagramed Above)

In no match this season has the Barça backline played according to this formation.  The two full backs are only slightly advanced of the two center backs and are roughly playing along the same line as Busquet’s, the holding player.  Dani Alves’ positioning in particular is striking given how advanced he has played this entire year.

At first glance it may seem that this restructuring of the backline formation was due to a more conservative defensive orientation.  A way of mitigating risk from the Madrid counter given the makeshift nature of Barça defense and its potential vulnerabilities.

While this was likely part of Guardiola’s thinking, the major reason for  adjusting the formation in this way was to allow Barcelona to regain numerical superiority across the middle zone of the pitch and to reestablish width in the center – the region where Madrid had clustered it’s defense.

The still shot below illustrates this principle well:

A few points to note in the picture above that will be expanded on below.  First, both full backs are staying just deep of the midline and level with the holding player Busquets.  Second, they are playing very wide – both are wide of their markers.  Third (and most important), is geometry.  This arrangement of the full backs allows Barça to form four intricate triangles across the entire breadth of the middle of the pitch.

Note the four triangles in the shot: 1)  Alves-Busquets-Mascherano; 2) Puyol, Busquets and Pique (notice how symmetric these first two triangles are – the efficiency of spacing the pitch is remarkable)  3) Alves-Busquets-Messi; 4) Puyol- Busquets-Xavi.

Normally the Barça full backs would make runs forward in order to build play.  In the still shot above, both are maintaining their positions just deep of the midline.  Rarely has Dani Alves positioned himself level with the Barça holding player.  Here Alves, Busquets and Puyol are roughly playing along the same line.

The Barça formation is highly dynamic and as such difficult to characterize. But for much of this match Barça functionally played a 2-3-3-2/4-3-1-2 formation.

The key to those formations is where the full backs are stationed.  Notice how both Puyol and Alves are spread on the pitch towards each touchline and are wide of their markers.  Guardiola had the full backs remain deep in order to provide width in the region of the pitch where Madrid had focused their defense.  This width is well demonstrated in the overhead still shot below as well:

Barca Formation - Full Backs Are Wide Available As Outlets to Retain Possession Away from Madrid's Defenders Clustered in the Center

In the still shot above Madrid has a 5 vs. 3 numerical advantage in the midfield circle.  However, the key here are the full backs – the Barça midfielders always had an available outlet wide through the full backs.  This nullified the numerical advantage in the circle Madrid had.

In the prior two Clásicos Madrid played in a solid block with three holding players and varied the way they pressed.  Their goal was to clot the middle of the pitch.

In those matches, when the Barça full backs went up field, maintaining possession largely fell to the central midfielders and the two full backs.  That created a major problem however – Barça could not generate numerical superiority in midfield through those four players unless they dropped very deep into their own half.  Madrid simply had too many defenders in that region.  This is why Messi was continuously dropping deep in the Copa final – to provide an additional player in midfield.

At the same time, Madrid could defend those players four to five Barcelona players easily because they were all clustered around the midfield circle.  This facilitated Mardid’s ability to stay compact, defend narrowly and make the pitch small.

By positioning the full backs higher up the Guardiola achieved several key objectives.  The array of triangles gave Barça a way to not only maintain possession but to do so in a composed fashion.

One of Barça’s major problems in the Copa was lack of patience – in face of the Madrid pressure they often one touched the ball in a rushed fashion.  This was largely due to their lack of players wide in that critical region of the pitch.  With the full backs wide and level with the holding player Barça was able to form triangles and make the pitch much larger in the middle.  This allowed for more composed possession.

Keeping the full backs deep also thwarted one of the key tactics Mourinho had implemented.  Both Madrid wingers were playing largely defensive roles.  When the Barça full backs made runs forward the Madrid wingers would track their runs.  This was particularly true of Angle Di Maria who primary function was to mark Alves wherever he was.

The wingers tracking the full back runs in turn created defensive congestion in advanced portions of the pitch.  So when Messi tried to work off the right flank not only was Marcelo and a holding player in that space so was Di Maria.  In the first still shot in this post notice how high up the pitch Di Maria is defending – this opened up space for Villa to operate on the right flank 1 vs. 1 on Marcelo (more on this below).

The Barça Wingers Stay Wide

One of the issues with playing a formations of the 2-3-3-2/4-3-1-2 type is that they can become very narrow in advanced positions on the field.  The only width comes from the full backs.  This is one of the major tactical limitations of the “Christmas Tree” formation.

Guardiola’s next major tactical adjustment was to further augment the width on the pitch by having the two advanced wingers – Villa and Pedro – stay very wide in advanced positions.  The following screen shot shows this well:

Villa Hugs the Touchline Creating a 1 vs 1 With the Defense

There are five Madrid defenders forming a wall around the midfield circle.  The focus here is to stop Xavi and Messi.  In addition to the full backs staying wide around midfield to act as outlets, notice David Villa’s position up the pitch.  Rather than drifting centrally to link up play with Messi as he often does, Villa is hugging the touchline.

Normally, Villa positioning himself in that space would be problematic because he has no support on the flank.  This is the trade off Guardiola had to make to keep the full backs closer to the midfielders.

However, because Di Maria is assigned to mark Alves and the holding players are all prioritizing the middle of the pitch Villa is left 1 vs. 1 against Marcelo. Villa was able to make himself dangerous coming off the edges when he could get the ball in these situations.

Additionally, staying wide while the Madrid defenders stayed central allowed the Barça wingers to act as outlets up the pitch – once again facilitating possession. Finally what this width did was to provide Messi with more space to operate.

Ultimately it was this use of width that led to Barça’s first goal.  While a great deal has been made out of Pepe’s sending off – and it undoubtedly had a significant impact on the match – the fact remains that both Barça goals were scored in regions of the pitch where Madrid had significant numerical advantage.  Afellay stayed wide on that goal while Alves stayed deep.  The holding players as they had all game stayed centrally.  This left Afellay 1 vs. 1 against Marcelo off the edge and once Afellay got a step on Marcello the goal unfolded.

Madrid Look to Play on the Counter while Playing at Home

In the prior two Clásico’s Madrid prioritized maintaining defensive shape and clotting the middle through the trivote formation.  The trade off they had to make was to reduce the dimensions of their own attack.  In particular, with Pepe and Diarra in midfield, Madrid couldn’t retain possession or build creative play.

Additionally, it was relatively easy for the Barça press to regain the ball as none of the three Madrid midfielders were particularly adept at maintaining possession through close control or by quickly circulating the ball (even Alonso needs time and space on the ball to deliver his long passes).  As such Madrid’s offensive thrust has largely focused on the counter and set plays.

In the Champion’s League, it is incumbent on the team that plays the first leg at home to obtain a desired result.  This is particularly true when both teams have significant advantage in their own stadiums.

Ultimately, the tactical changes that Guardiola implemented were designed to support one primary end – thwart Madrid’s ability to score on the counter.  By keeping his full backs deeper and his wingers wide Guardiola made the pitch very large.  This greatly diminished Madrid’s ability to pressure the ball.  In turn, Barça could not only maintain possession, but maintain composed possession, dictate tempo and reduce the risk of making costly turnovers or conceding set pieces.

At the same time through this controlled possession, Barça was able to probe the Madrid defense and look to see where openings might lay.  If none could be found they could be confident of retaining possession and restarting the attack from a different direction.

In a sense, the prior Clásico was a stark example of the principle that the best way to defend is to keep the ball.  Barça’s method of retaining the ball patiently across the middle created a kind of attack that was extreme in it’s control and cautious probing for vulnerabilities.  So much so that it left Madrid with nothing viable to counter.   Madrid’s passing chart from the game shows how much they were reduced to trying to play balls longs and doing so with poor rates of success (blue represents completed passes, red incomplete):

Madrid Passing Chart (From the TotalFootball App)

Barça’s use of the ball to defend, probe the defense and attack in a controlled fashion is demonstrated by it’s passing chart

Barcelona Passing Chart (From the TotalFootball App)

Outside of the sheer number of passes Barça has accurately completed, what is most remarkable about the diagram above is the density of passes completed around the midfield circle and from there out to wide positions.

This type of pass oriented play was dismissed by many as simply “knocking the ball around the back.”  But this approach to the game is exactly the kind of  pragmatic, tactical nous that attack oriented managers are frequently criticized for not demonstrating.  It’s not that Barça is not attacking – it’s that Guardiola has them attacking in a different manner and doing so by using the ball differently to control the game.

The fact is, Barça were vulnerable this game, especially at the back line given that they were not playing at home.  And what Guardiola did brilliantly was to minimize all of those vulnerabilities through use of the ball.

Commenter’s who argue that Barça just “kicked the ball around” are largely missing these points.  This was not a Barça team at full strength and they were playing at the Bernabéu .  Despite that Barça dictated the tempo and rhythm of the game.  That is an enormous tactical accomplishment, the kind that defensively oriented managers are routinely praised for as signs of their tactical sophistication.

In order for Madrid to regain possession Guardiola was forcing them to have to extend themselves.  To do so meant that they would either have to play as a block higher up the pitch or lose their compact shape.  Either way would have forced them into a shape that they did not want to play.  In turn their entire offensive approach on the counter attack crumbled.  Dictating play in this fashion is the essence of tactics.  And Guariola did this brilliantly in the first leg.

Mourinho Lack of Adjustments

I want to get onto detailing what Barça needs to do to win the second leg. But briefly a few words on Madrid’s tactics.  Mourinho managed a puzzling game.  In a Champion’s League tie every minute at home is critical as it represents your team’s best chance to score.  Mourinho made no significant adjustments the entire first half and simply let Barça dictate play at the Bernabéu .

Carles Puyol who has hardly played this season, was manning a position he has limited experience at  and was coming off another recent injury.  Madrid has one of the world’s top pace attackers in C. Ronaldo.  Rather than test Puyol Mourinho allowed time to simply dwindle away with Ronaldo playing out of position.

Similarly, Mascherano has limited experience playing at CB.  A pacy striker who can make intelligent runs to try to split Mascherano and Pique by dragging them out of position would have been a powerful weapon to use.  Higuain and Benzema are exactly those kinds of players.  For most of the game Madrid played without a true striker who could test the Barça CB pairing.  And when Mourinho put one in it was a target man who wound up playing isolated up top by himself.  When Adebayor did knock balls down there was no one around him to collect.

Finally, the most startling aspect of the last match tactically was Mourinho’s complete lack of adjustments after he went down to 10 men.  A 0-0 result would have been a very positive one for Madrid at that point.  But Mourinho did nothing to bolster his team’s capacity to defend.  Adebayor is a poor defender and at that point in the game was contributing little.  Alonso is not a particularly good defender either.  Nor is C. Ronaldo.

Mourinho still had Granero on the bench and he was a natural choice to bolster the space between the lines.   If Diarra and Alonso were as tired after that match as Mourinho was stating this week not bolstering midfield defense was an even worse move.  Additionally, he could have put on another center back but elected not to.

In the end while the sending off changed the game, Barça still scored both its goals when Madrid had significant numerical advantage.  On both goals the Madrid defenders far outnumbered the Barça attackers (this was not only the case with Messi’s second goal – it was also with the first).  Sending off or not, it is inexcusable to concede when you have numbers in defense.

Keys to the Second Leg at Camp Nou

At this point in time, both sides have shown their major cards.  Madrid find themselves in exactly the position they didn’t want to be in – needing to score multiple goals at Camp Nou.

While Madrid will need to attack far more effectively than they did the first match, they still have a major problem in that they cannot concede either.  Even one Barça goal likely finishes the tie.

For the second leg, Barça needs to blend the approaches they’ve used against Madrid all season.  They must maintain width.  In the two matches Barcelona has utilized width they’ve controlled play.  Madrid will likely press higher up the pitch.  Using width will make the field larger and harder to play.  If Madrid again tries to congest the middle, this may require the full backs to play deep but the tradeoff will be worth it.

Patience in possession will also be important.  In the Copa finals Barça rushed their possession rather than systematically probing weaknesses in the defense.   Barça need to utilize the ball to force Madrid to come out and lose their shape.

Given that Madrid need to attack more, it is likely that space will open up between their lines, especially with Pepe not playing.  This is the area of the pitch Messi exploited to brilliant effect in the first Clásico of the season.  By keeping attackers wide Barça opens up space for Messi to play through in the middle of the pitch between the lines.  If coupled with dynamic movement this will be Barça’s most promising rout to scoring.  But this is another key for Barcelona – off the ball movement is critical. And Barca’s off the ball movement even in the first leg was not as strong as it needed to be.

The challenge tomorrow will once again be along the backline.  In possession the Barça left back won’t likely offer much support on the left flank.  For this reason in particular, Iniesta (or Keita) must look to generate play wide on the left and support the left winger.

In defense, Barça needs to press very aggressively high up the pitch when they lose to ball to slow Madrid’s ability to counter.  This will be critical to protecting the back line against Madrid’s pace. Though Madrid need to score they cannot afford to concede.  Given this they very well may look to play on the counter for stretches of the game tomorrow.

It’s almost over.  Thank goodness.

Visca Barça!