Matches between rivals are layered affairs.  Individual encounters add strata to the competitions preceding them.  Each match has an individual importance but there’s an additive effect that creates a larger history between them.

The life cycle of a rivalry is usually measured in years.  But Barcelona and Real Madrid no longer have the luxury of time.  The rivalry has taken on a frenetic quality with one match coming after another after another.  In this regard it’s difficult to interpret the result of any single match because it exists in a larger trajectory.  At the same time that trajectory itself is difficult to fully interpret because its individual episodes pass through at such a rapid rate obscuring the “larger story” developing.

In addition, while Barceolona has had a longer period of continuity, Madrid is still a team in growing into an identity.  Two narratives in particular inform this growth.

First the general notion that it’s “year two” which is the key for a Mourinho team, that it’s only in the second year under his command that a squad is fully imprinted with his tactical acumen.  Second, is a narrative that has been in development since the Copa Del Rey final last season, one which was accelerated greatly this summer headed into the Spanish Super Cup and then again headed into the first Clásico of the Liga season – Madrid are a team undergoing rapid improvement, a team that is “cutting the gap” with a Barcelona team that is taking a step back.

Indeed, if Madrid are in a rapid phase of ascension and progress within the larger trajectory linking these sides then interpreting any one match is particularly difficult.

Given these factors, what’s required is understanding each match on its own merits and connecting it with the ongoing trajectory between the sides.

The Copa Del Rey is the third most important competition of the season, one that many see as being of limited importance.  And unlike last season when Barça and Madrid met in the CDR finals, this years encounter takes place at the much earlier, less dramatic, quarterfinal stage.  Additionally, this match was only the first leg of the tie.  Given Madrid’s talent they are more than capable of recovering the advantage in the second leg and advancing.

As such, it’s possible to consider this latest Clásico as a relatively minor affair.  The series of encounters to come in La Liga and potentially in the Champions League still loom.

However, none of these matches exist in a truly independent form nor can they be wholly isolated from the series of encounters taking place both this season and in the recent past.  There’s an additive effect that each match has that interconnect them regardless of the competition they happen to transpire within.

We’ll have to wait until the second leg of the tie to fully assess where these teams are within the Copa Del Rey itself.  However, what made this match particularly interesting is that it added another data point to evaluate what these two teams are capable of and where they are in their respective evolutions.  Importantly, they provide a lens to better interpret the results of earlier encounters this season, particularly of the first Liga match at the Bernabeu, a match that was difficult to fully asses as it was the first true season meeting of these two sides.

Given the tactical advantage Guardiola created in the last meeting between these two sides, the focus of this match would be how Mourinho would respond.  For this reason, the changes Mourinho made will be a point of focus for this review.

 

Context:  The Last Clásico

In order to fully appreciate the scope of this particular Barcelona victory and where these two teams are with respect to each other it’s important to situate the match in context.  Coming into this much anticipated “year 2” under Mourinho, a narrative was constructed about how Madrid would focus its system and team identity around a muscular, direct game meticulously focused on high pressure and lightning fast transitions.  This system would not only be a pathway to victory, it would be a method that would meld the best of Mourinho tactical acumen with Madrid’s own rich history of confident, attacking football in which they are the side that proactively defines the match.

This new model was unveiled with much fanfare this summer in the Spanish Super Cup, a preseason competition in which Madrid indeed played well.  However, ultimately this model could not produce a result in that competition despite Barcelona lacking significant fitness.  As time has passed, this initial burst of attention and confidence in a Madrid that had “closed the gap” seems particularly strange because in the first Super Cup match Barça were playing without their central axis of plan as neither Xavi nor Busquets played.

Nonetheless, while Barcelona was victorious a second narrative emerged from that contest which roughly asserted that in fact despite losing Madrid had in fact “cut the gap” and was more or less even with Barcelona.  And as the season progressed this narrative gained support and credence.  Madrid played outstanding football in both La Liga and the Champions League, again building their play and perhaps even more importantly, their team identity under Mourinho around that system of intense high pressure and fast, direct attacks.

Mourinho himself seemed extremely confident of this new model of play as was evidenced by how Madrid approached the first Liga Clásico of this season.  Not only did Mourinho implement this aggressive, attack based system against Barça, he intensified it.  In the first Clásico Mourinho had Madrid press even higher and more aggressively than they have perhaps in any other match under his leadership.  Four Madrid players pressed the Barça backline and keeper.  The key player in this regard was Mesut Oezil who stepped forward from midfield to extremely high alongside the three forwards.

Unfortunately for Madrid, Pep Guardiola implemented tactical changes in that first Clásico that uncovered and amplified points of weakness in the Madrid system of high pressure.

As I’ve detailed here several times, Madrid high pressure is unusual because it is built around the pace of Madrid’s advanced players to close space through velocity.  In this system, Mourinho plays the backline more conservatively.  Rather than playing high up the pitch in proportion to the frontline, the backline stays comparatively deep to minimize the risk of getting beat in space behind them.  It’s still a “high” backline but just not as high as one would expect given how advanced the frontline pressure is.  What this means is that Madrid does not maximize how compact their defensive block plays.  This is unusual for a pressing team as pressure usually is very dependent on staying compact.

Against most teams this aggressive approach works very well and Madrid is able to steam roll over them.  However, against a team with the talent and technical skill on the ball that Barcelona have, this lack of compactness proved disastrous.  Barcelona pried open the Madrid defense by exploiting the interior space within the Madrid defensive block.

This problem was worsened by Mourinho’s specific tactics in the first Clásico.  Because Mourinho played so many players so high in defense, the Madrid block was even less compact than usual, with significant space open between the backline and midfield.  In addition, because Oezil was pressing so high Madrid effectively lost a defender in midfield.  In essence, if Barça could get by this first line of high pressure they would be able to find space inside the Madrid block and would have significant numerical superiority.

Guardiola implemented three tactical changes in that match which maximized the deficiencies in Mourinho’s tactics in that first Clásico.  First he deployed Messi as a true 10 rather than as a false 9.  This proved decisive in the first match.  It’s likely that Mourinho was planning on defending Messi in this match the way he has in the past – by having a CB step out high and follow him across the pitch.  By doing so Mourinho would be able to counteract Barça’s numerical superiority in midfield.  An extra defender would operate in the region drawn from the back.  This would help offset the loss of having a midfielder press very high up the pitch.

Mourinho’s strategy however only works if Messi is playing as a false 9.  It’s much less feasible if he’s playing as a 10.  This is why Guardiola changed Messi’s position.  Doing so seriously comprised Madrid’s ability to defend using the system they had developed since this past summer.  This touches on the second significant change Guardiola made in this match.  Guardiola played Alexis Sanchez as a lone striker up top in front of Messi.  Sanchez occupied two defenders and made it difficult for a CB to step out and mark Messi as Madrid has done in the past when pressing high.

The net result of these tactical changes was that Messi was positioned in the exact space where Madrid’s defensive block was most open and vulnerable.  The remarkable aspect of that first Clásico was that it was the match this season where Messi had perhaps the most space he’s enjoyed against any opponent.  This was exactly the kind of thing Mourinho was brought in to stop from happening.  And Madrid never made an appropriate defensive adjustment.  As such, though he didn’t score, Messi enjoyed significant freedom and became the hub of the Madrid attack.

Indeed, the net effect of Mourinho’s tactics in that first Clásico was the following.  Through high pressure he successfully forced Xavi, Busquets and Fabregas to have to drop deep to build play.  This drew them away from goal (or in Fabregas’s case forced him to run long distances to get to goal-which he ironically did to crushing effect on that third goal).  Getting Xavi away from goal is always a kind of tactical victory.  However, doing so came at an enormous price for Mourinho.  Because by adopting these tactics he left far too much interior room for Messi and Iniesta to exploit.  And it was ultimately those two players who dictated the match.

Against a lesser side this approach may have worked.  A lesser team may have had much more difficulty getting the ball out of their own third.  But that didn’t prove to be a too much of a problem for Barça outside of that initial early mistake from Valdes.  And once the ball was past that first wave of pressure Messi and Iniesta were free to create.  It was those two players more than Xavi who controlled the dynamics. (This speaks to what a devastating talent Messi is – his skill set is so rich that he can seamlessly step in and make up for one of the greatest central midfielders in the history of the game).  In some ways, that last Clásico was as impressive as the 5-0 Manita match from over a year before.

A remarkable aspect to that first match was how passive Mourinho was – he simply watched Messi and Iniesta freely dictate the match and made few substantive tactical changes to try to stop them.  It was as if he was almost stunned by what he was watching.  This wasn’t supposed to happen.  Not this year.  Not with this new Madrid system.

Madrid – Needed Adjustments

Given the problems Madrid had in defending Barça in that last Clásico, it was clear they needed to make adjustments.  Guardiola had taken the initiative in the prior match.  Now the onus was on Mourinho to respond tactically.

The key thing that clearly had to happen was that the Madrid block needed to become much more compact.  They could not afford to allow so much interior space to develop otherwise Messi would again dictate the match from an advanced position.

Mourinho had two primary choices to make his block more compact in this second Clásico.  First, he could elect to play his backline higher.  This would close the most open space Barça exploited in the prior contest.  This would however risk Madrid getting beat at the back, particularly with Sanchez’s pace.

Alternatively, Mourinho could pull back his high pressure, drawing his first line of defenders deeper to reduce the distance between them and the backline.  The problem with this approach is that it would make tactics based on high pressure impossible.  This would be a strategic concession to Guardiola.  After all, the Madrid system this season was focused on intense high pressure.  This was a major part of the team’s identity in “year 2” under Mourinho.  This was the major advancement and area of tactical progress and it was particularly geared to beating Barça.  Mourinho had implemented that system with vigor and commitment only a few weeks prior.

Ultimately, Mourinho elected to go the more conservative route, largely turning away from the system of high pressure that was underpinning the team Madrid were becoming.  He played the front line much deeper in defense and didn’t pressure nearly as high (despite Pinto being the keeper).  Madrid played a much more compact block stationed in the middle of the pitch.

 

A Return to the Trivote

Mourinho further buttressed these changes by altering personnel.  Part of the change in players was due to injury – but much of it was due to tactics, particularly in the key region of midfield.   This was interesting as well because the changes in how compact the block played could have allowed him to maintain.  It would have been reasonable to try to play Mesut Oezil again in a more conservative formation.  Staying more compact would have covered for many of Oezil’s defensive limitations.  However, Mourinho elected to go in almost the entirely opposite direction, returning Pepe to midfield and readopting the trivote formation he used last season as well.

Madrid’s three man defensive midfield was structured zonally with Pepe playing centrally, Alonso on the right of center and Diarra on the left.  Depending on where the ball was one of the three would look to pressure the Barça player in their respective zone.

Playing the trivote, however, involved a trade off.  While it provided more “steel” in midfield, it significantly worsened Madrid’s ability to maintain any kind of quality possession.  Pepe is a extremely poor passer and Diarra is very limited as well.  That meant that all possession had to run through Alonso and that isn’t his strength as his job is to spray passes quickly rather than control a match with the ball.  In turn, this left the Madrid front line starved of service.  C. Ronaldo did a good job of dropping deep to find the ball, but Higuain and Benzema had very little influence at all in the match, Higuain in particular.

 

Before and After

To get a sense for how dramatically different Madrid organized itself compare the first two pictures below taken from the first Clásico this season to the third image taken in this latest Clásico.

 

In the first image, Madrid are pressing aggressively very high. In doing so however, they’ve left open significant space inside of their defensive block particularly between midfield and defense.  Once Abidal beats Oezil’s high pressure, Barça have enormous advantage. Additionally, Messi is unmarked. In the second image, we see how Madrid organized itself within its own half in the first match.  They are set up as a block – but notice again how much space is between their lines.  The midfielders are all sitting high to pressure the Barça midfielders.  But because Mourinho doesn’t want to leave too much space behind the backline is sitting relatively deep.  This opens up significant interior space.

In the third image below we see a radically different organization.  The Madrid block is much more compact.  The key is the positioning in midfield.  Pepe and Alonso are stationed between the lines while Diarra has advanced to pressure.  The LB Coentrao is carefully marking Messi, even if it means altering his position.  C. Ronaldo is playing much deeper than in the first match in order to more closely mark Alves.

But all of this comes at a significant cost.  Playing more compact prevented Madrid from pressing high consistently.  By not focusing on high pressure Madrid allowed Barcelona to control the ball and build a rhythm.  Preventing the opposition in general and Barcelona in particular this kind of comfort was the entire focus of the system Madrid was implementing in “year 2” under Mourinho.  In this Clásico, Madrid regressed backwards, essentially adopting the same system they utilized last season in the Champions League semi-finals.

What makes this particularly ironic is that the system Mourinho changed trajectories to go back to didn’t work the first time.  And it produced no better result this season. In fact, if anything Barcelona looked even more comfortable than they did in that CL semi-final and the match was in many ways an easier one for the Blaugrana.

To force Madrid to change tactical directions in this dramatic a fashion is a major strategic victory for Guardiola.

 

Barcelona:  Makes Madrid Pick a Different Poison

It’s interesting to compare these two Clásico’s because in some ways the matches were extremely different.  But in the end they produced similar effects.

In the first match, Madrid pressured high and harried Barcelona’s deeper midfielder.  Anticipating this, Guardiola set up a system in which Barcelona’s more advanced attackers controlled the match by utilizing the space that opened due to Madrid pressing so high and not staying compact.   

In this second encounter, Madrid reverted from their new system.  They pulled their front line back to stay more compact and close off the interior space Messi and Iniesta dominated in the prior match.  However, this prevented them from pressuring high as effectively.  This in turn meant that Xavi and Busquets had more space and time to dictate the rhythm of the match.  This was exactly what Mourinho was focused on avoiding when Madrid continued to refashion its system this summer.

On net, together, these two contests were the “same” match in a way.  Barcelona was almost equivalently dominant in each Clásico.  They were just dominant through different means.  In this regard, these two Clásicos well demonstrated the richness of this Barcelona team and the myriad of ways they are able to exert match control and win.

Mourinho abandoned the system he focused on developing for this season.  And all it amounted to was picking a different poison to drink from.  And in doing so he ate away at a number of the substantive tactical changes that were purportedly underpinning Madrid “cutting the gap” with Barcelona this season.

All of this could very well change dramatically in the future given how many Clásico’s are remaining.  It could change dramatically next week – again this tie is far from over.  But as a measure of where these two teams are right now, when it comes to developing answers for how to beat Barça, Mourinho has proven to be tactically rudderless and has taken his squad backwards in times to approaches that were utilized last season despite not working.

 

The Numbers Game

Despite all of the changes Mourinho made in midfield through increased compact play and use of the trivote, there was a very simple tactical advantage that Guardiola continued to maintain in this match.  Barcelona had consistent numerical advantage in midfield throughout either 4 vs. 3 and at times 5 vs. 3.  This meant that Barcelona almost always had an extra outlet in midfield, most often Sergio Busquets.  This is part of why Barça dominated possession and the rhythm of the match even more than they did in the prior Clásico.

The shot below demonstrates this well:

In the shot above, Diarra has picked up Messi.  Pepe is goal of Fabregas and marking him while still staying deep to help Diarra with Messi.  Alons to the right of the circle is marking Xavi.  C. Ronaldo is marking Alves while Benzema and Higuain are nominally checking the two Barça CBs.

This means that Busquets goes unmarked in the center of the pitch.  This happened over and over and over.  Busquets was free in space and always open as an outlet.  When Madrid went to close him down it meant that a defender would have to stop marking Xavi or Fabregas leaving them free.

Marking Busquets has become a constant problem for Madrid.  In the last Clásico, they tried to have Oezil do this.  However, Mourinho also wanted Oezil to pressure high.  Through his positional intelligence Busquets would just drop station himself in the space in midfield behind Oezil.  If another midfielder picked him up Barça always had Xavi or Fabregas to build play and shunt the ball to Messi and Iniesta.

In this match, Barcelona almost always had extra players open in midfield, which not only made keeping possession relatively simple, it allowed the team to build a rhythm on the ball.

Barça was able to maintain this numerical advantage throughout often augmenting it through simple movement.

In the image above, Iniesta has pulled centrally and Fabregas has drifted leftwards.  We often talk about the importance of width with Barça but width doesn’t mean “hugging the touchline” alone.  Width is relative to the oppositions defensive block and positioning.  In the image above Fabregas has intelligently pulled wide – but not too wide. As such he essentially forced two defenders to mark him – both Altintop and Oezil (entered match as a sub) change position in response to his movement.  This means that while Pepe has picked up Iniesta and Callejon (also a sub) picked up Xavi Messi and Busquets go unmarked.

In this match, Mourinho added the proverbial “hardman” to midfield in Pepe and removed the playmaker Oezil. However, he never made an adjustment to gain numerical equivalence in midfield.  And in a sense the addition of Pepe for Oezil was counteracted by utilizing Higuain in place of Di Maria.  Higuain, like Oezil, is a mediocre defender at best.  Without the ball Higuain is a player who contributes little – and his defensive limitations are a major reason why Busquets had so much time and space on the ball.  In essence, Mourinho removed a poor central defender in Oezil but then added another poor central defender in Higuain.

Now it’s obviously true that Di Maria was injured and this significantly hampered Madrid’s frontline defending.  But it’s a manager’s responsibility to put his squad in the best position to win.  Removing Oezil only to add Higuain centrally in a game where you were going to try to stay compact and deeper was a contrary decision.  A more tactically coherent choice would have been to play Callejon on the wing and Benzema in the center.

Conversely, it would at minimum have made more sense to play Benzema centrally and Higuain wide.  Benzema is the superior athlete and is a better defender.  It’s true that Benzema is probably more comfortable as a wide attacker but Mourinho was ceding possession as it was.  Regardless, it’s Mourinho’s responsibility to work out a system for marking Barcelona’s midfielders.  To date he’s been unable to do so.

 

Alexis Sanchez and Cesc Fabregas:  Expanding Barça’s Dimensions of Attack

In aggregate when you examine the large scale changes Mourinho made in this match, they first speak poorly for how he handled the last Clásico.  To make almost no significant tactical changes in one match and then only a few weeks later to install an entirely system suggests fundamental problems in the original approach.  In that first match, Messi playing as a 10 enjoyed significant space.  Little was done to counteract that.  Now only a few weeks later, Mourinho regresses back to a system based on that trivote that is primarily designed to prevent Messi from finding space.

While this does speak poorly for the prior match management, it does also make sense.  Changes were needed – they were just made late.

However, the problem with Mourinho reverting to the system played against Barça last year is that this isn’t the same Barcelona team.  In many ways it is better.

Last season overplaying the middle and crowding the space around Messi was a tactic that could find success against Barça.  It worked well for Madrid in the Copa Del Rey final for example.  Marked tightly, Messi continued to drop deeper and deeper until not only was he too far from goal, but Barça lost all of its attacking threat in the advanced central position.  But this season Barcelona has added weapons to counteract that kind of strategy, weapons that add a new directness to how the blaugrana can play in the final third.

Alexis Sanchez has now had two absolutely outstanding matches against Madrid.  In the first Clásico, in addition to his brilliant goal, Sanchez movement in a horizontal band across the Madrid front line created numerous problems.  In this match, Sanchez continued playing as a central striker up top but played in a very different style than the last match.  Rather than playing horizontally from touchline to touchline, he played much more vertically.  He worked the channels between the FBs and CBs, sitting on the shoulder of the defenders.  His explosive pace allowed him to simply run past the Madrid backline over and over.  You can see this more and more emerging as a new tactic for Barça.  This was how the winning goal was scored against Betis in the last Liga match.

While Sanchez didn’t score against Madrid, he generated numerous dangerous chances and hit the post on a sensational attempt on goal.  Sanchez was tactically instrumental to this match because while Madrid were attempting to stay compact in order to defend Messi, Sanchez was repeatedly stretching the defense vertically with his intelligent runs and pace.  When a defense is trying to play a compact, middle block stretching it vertically is one of the best ways to disrupt it.  Last season Barça didn’t have this capability.  This is part of why the matches last season in the CDR finals and CL semis were so difficult.  Madrid packed in around Messi.  This year Barcelona have more weapons to combat that.

In addition, Sanchez was excellent at holding up the ball.  Far from a traditional “target man,” Sanchez can still serve a number of those functions.  Rather than through his size he’s able to use his technical skill on the ball, low center of gravity and balance to retain possession when alone, even when marked by two defenders.

In the vein of direct play counteracting Madrid’s attempt to play compact, Fabregas was also instrumental. Cesc has had an interesting two games versus Madrid.  In the first match he wasn’t particularly good in possession – but then scored that brilliant goal to seal the result.  In this second match, he was improved in possession – though still far from perfect (it was his giving away the ball cheaply that led to the Madrid counter on which they ultimately scored). However, where he excelled this match was in delivering penetrating final passes into dangerous goal scoring positions.  He created 3-4 wonderful chances through his crosses and chips over the top of the Madrid backline in the final third.  Again, this kind of direct play to break a compact defensive block’s shape wasn’t as much a feature of Barça’s play last season when Mourinho utilized the trivote formation against them.

The sequence in which Sanchez hit the post on his headed shot well demonstrates the impact that Sanchez and Fabregas had in the final third:

 

Above, Fabregas has the ball in a seemingly harmless space. Madrid are defending deep and are compact.  They have a 10 vs. 5 advantage in the final third and look to be in secure position.

Through his mobility Sanchez the “central striker” has isolated himself 1 vs. 1 with Coentrao.  From a stand still position he explodes into a curling run centrally around Coentrao who is surprised at the accelerated movement.  Remarkably Fabregas spots Sanchez initiation of the run instantly and immediately starts to execute a cross into the box.  For two teammates that haven’t played very many games with each other to have this kind of telepathic understanding is just phenomenal.  That only happens when both share a creative vision for the game and use of space that few players have.

From a dead stand still Sanchez has accelerated by Coentrao and beaten him for pace within only a few yards.  This kind of explosive quickness is what makes Sanchez so difficult to try to mark.  Its one thing to run past a player over 40 to 50 yards.  Its another skill to be able to flat beat a defender and gain separation over 4 to 5 steps.  Cesc in the meanwhile has already envisioned Sanchez’s run and delivered a perfect cross.  This is the kind of penetrating, direct play that these two players bring to the squad.  Ramos seeing the cross starts to run back towards goal.

Sanchez is the shortest player on the field (yes he’s shorter than Messi).  He’s locked in an aerial duel with two much larger defenders who have been pulling at him and trying to muscle him on his run.  Despite being 1 vs. 2 Sanchez holds off both defenders and wins the aerial duel,  coming close to scoring a spectacular goal that glances off the cross bar.  This kind of dynamic athleticism is something Barcelona have not had in a very long time in the squad.

 

Guardiola Innovates through the Basics

Given the numerous changes he made in the first Clásico and Mourinho’s ineffective response, Guardiola didn’t need to push forward significant change.  He made adjustments to the changes Madrid made in defense and playing the first leg of a tie.  For example, Alves played a more conservative role in this match.  He moved off the defensive line but never roamed too far up field.  In part this was because Messi was often moving right to find space and to help defend.  Guardiola also surprisingly played Puyol as the L CB in the back four which made him the CB when the defense shifted towards a three man backline.  Usually Guardiola has elected to play Puyol on the same side as C. Ronaldo.  In this match he didn’t, which may have been a response to Madrid fielding Benzema wide on the right.

However, there was one area where Guardiola changed tactics radically and it’s a change that hasn’t gotten nearly the attention it should have.

A great deal of surprise took place when Barça equalized off a corner kick.  And in many ways this was unexpected.  But if you look at the match itself this was clearly a planned strategy.  Normally, Barça takes the majority of their corners short.  This is especially true against Madrid, a much taller team.

However, in this match Barcelona repeatedly took their corners long. Prior to the goal, Barça had six corners and over and over Xavi sent the ball into the box.  There was clearly something that Guardiola saw that triggered this change because on face it makes little sense for Barça to try corners into the box repeatedly against Madrid.  It wasn’t even as if the goal scored on a surprise because prior corners were taken short.  Xavi looked to find Puyol multiple times prior.

In addition, not only did this overall strategy pay off directly in a score but created another dangerous opportunity off of a free kick.  but Barcelona took a related approach on set pieces.  Barça got a second free header later on off a free kick   that Busquets should have buried.

Madrid has recently conceded several goals off corners in matches.  It’s likely that Guardiola found a weakness and decided to try to exploit it.

Taking corners long isn’t a small decision for Barça against Madrid either.  Drawing your CBs into the final third against a team that counter attacks as fast as Madrid is not something to take lightly.  As such, there must have been a tactical weakness Guardiola identified in how Madrid defend set pieces for Barça to change tactics in this fashion.

There was also something very fitting and ironic about Puyol’s goal.  The centerpiece of Mourinho’s revamped tactics for this match in many ways was Pepe, a player Mourinho would after the match describe as indispensable to Madrid.  It was Pepe who was responsible for marking delayed runners from deep within the Madrid corner kick defensive scheme.  It was Pepe who failed to mark Puyol’s run.  It was Pepe who was caught ball watching despite the fact that Barça tried to find Puyol on corner repeatedly throughout the game.

In addition, Barca also took a similar approach to other set pieces in this match.  Xavi played a free kick long into the box that Busquets went largely unmarked on and should have buried for a goal.

If there was a weakness in Madrid’s corner kick defense that Guardiola spotted, I’d guess it was related to Pepe’s awareness and positional intelligence.

 

In the End Messi is Decisive 

As I’ve detailed here, between these two Clásico’s Mourinho scrapped months of tactical changes to revert back to a system Madrid tried to use against Barça last season.  A system that didn’t work.  The focus on this change was to try to suffocate the space around Messi.  Focusing on Messi freed space up for other players however, – Xavi and Busquets in particular, so Messi had a significant indirectly tactical influence on the game.

However, what must drive Mourinho mad, is that despite all of the changes Mourinho both made and sacrificed in order to stop Messi, the world’s best player again created the decisive blow out of almost nothing against Madrid.  This must drive Mourinho to distraction.  No matter what he does and how many resources he deploys to stop Leo it makes little difference.

The image below is the moment prior to the goal:

Madrid have done what they were tactically instructed to do in many ways.  They’ve suffocated the space between the lines Messi operates in, closing him down with three defenders.  They’ve overplayed the middle, the region Barça as a team are naturally drawn to.  They’ve made trade offs which result in Barcelona’s least likely offensive threat having the most time and space on the pitch.  In theory that’s what you want.

This was a kind of broken play.  It developed off a throw in taken by Abidal.  Many have criticized Altintop’s central positioning. It’s true that he should have been wider.  But on that throw in it’s originally C. Ronaldo who looks like he’s going to pick up and mark Abidal.  All match long Altintop or a Madrid defender had marked Iniesta.  Altintop did the same here, though over exuberantly.

Mourinho made multiple substitutions in the second half, especially after Barça equalized.  He sent on attackers in hopes of scoring.

One of the changes he made that seemed relatively minor but proved to be decisive in the end was to switch C. Ronaldo from the left wing to the right wing.  This was likely done in part in order to relieve C. Ronaldo of some of his defensive duties.  All match long, C. Ronaldo played a disciplined defensive game against Alves. C. Ronaldo played very deep all game, almost acting as a defensive winger.  Moving him to the right against the conservative, much less threatening Abidal allowed C.Ronaldo to play much higher, to position himself to break quicker for the counter Madrid was so in need of.  By this time in the match scoring on the counter or a set piece were really Madrid’s only hope for winning.

And in the still shot above you see C. Ronaldo doing exactly all of those things.  He’s stationed as high as possible in the block.  If you re-watch this sequence you can actually see him leaning heavily forward towards his right waiting to spring towards the Barça goal at speed.  If you re-watch a few moments before the still shot above you’ll see C. Ronaldo actually glance back towards the byline and leftwards.  Originally he was the one who picked up Abidal after the throw in.  It was after that he pulled forward looking to break.  And when C.Ronaldo glances backwards he must have seen Abidal.  It would have been very hard for him to not have seen Abidal given how wide open in space the Barça player was.  His glance back looked like it was intended to locate where the Barça left back had gone.

What a strange moment of cognitive dissonance all of this must have been.

All match along C.Ronaldo had played an excellent defensive game.  His work rate and intensity were strong.  But in the moment he likely sees Abidal completely open in space wide and doesn’t mark him.  It’s plainly clear that Altintop has pulled centrally to track Iniesta. Perhaps he assumes Abidal is in an off side position, though that would be quite an assumption given his positioning.  Perhaps he sees the situation as a potential massive advantage.  Abidal playing that forward was a risk.  There is no defender in front of C. Ronaldo.  The winger has space to run into.

Perhaps it may have just seemed implausible to him that Abidal, a player with one career goal for Barça, could represent an authentic threat on goal, especially given where the ball was.  C. Ronaldo seemed to just be waiting by himself, waiting to spring with his voracious strides on the counter, waiting for the three Madrid defenders to dispossess Messi and set him free.

What makes witnessing genius so surprising after all is how unexpected it is, even when it has happened before.

 

The Ugly

I have something to say about the nasty, brutish nature of this match. I’ll save that for another post.  Make no mistake about it.  The Clásicos have become explicitly violent.  It must stop.  But unfortunately I don’t see a way that’s going to happen until a Barcelona player is seriously injured and then lamentations will be the order of the day.

One thing I will say now – it is a completely disingenuous, false equivalence to somehow argue that “diving” is somehow equivalent in nature to violence. It is completely repugnant to justify violence as a supposedly acceptable and just response to gamesmanship.

Barelona are in no way a perfect team.  No team is.  But violence belongs to another category of ills, one of much more serious consequence.

And if you feel different than you’d have to support the notion as a general principle.  You’d have to think that it would be ok for a team to risk breaking Angel Di Maria’s ankle or blowing out his knee with a cowardly scissor kick from behind just because gamesmanship is a fundamental part of his play.  You’d have to be ok with a team risking a fracture to Pepe’s hand or his clavicle because he’s constantly clutching some body part and rolling around.

In other words you would have to be ok with the game turning into a bloodbath.  Which is something it has been in the past and in certain areas.  The consequences have been awful.

 

Player Evaluation:

 

Guardiola:  The world’s best manager simply does it again.  Perhaps the best tactical mind in the game.  He has created changes and systems to completely thwart and negate almost everything Madrid tries to do – even under the much praised Mourinho.  He always keeps Barça a step ahead so Madrid is always reacting, even to the point where they’ve thrown overboard the system that was to be the central focus of their identity as a team.  Always adds an extra wrinkle that pays off because of his deep understanding of the game at large.  Today it was with corner kicks.  Unbelievable.

Pinto:  Madrid’s goal was almost entirely due to his egregious mistake.  Pique appropriately shunted C. Ronaldo to a wide angle where the attacker could really only manage to try to score along the near post or between the keepers leg.  In other words, in the two places that a goal from that distance should never score from.  After that however Pinto settled in.  Completed 25 passes – more than any other player on Madrid besides Alonso, who completed 34.  Interesting to see Madrid not try to pressure or harass Pinto, even after that terrible mistake.

Pique:  Solid game playing as the R CB in both the 4 and 3 man backline.  Often isolated against C. Ronaldo and overall did well.

Puyol:  Just when it seems that he’s done almost everything possible for the shirt. He does more.  51 straight matches undefeated.  Scored a goal off a sublimely timed run from deep.  Yes Pepe with his limited football intelligence should have picked up the run.  But Puyol is a master of that kind of delayed danger.  And watch the goal again – he sprung free – but it was still not an easy ball to get a solid header on as it was diving low.

Alves:  Played a sort of in between game in many ways.  Overall was fine – but occupied a very different role than the prior Clásico.  Not quite on the backline but not quite a winger.  Alves was more an outlet for the ball to relieve pressure.  Defended well when called upon though it was unusual to see him beaten for pace on C.Ronaldo’s score.  The one positive tactical change Mourinho did was to pinch C.Ronaldo inwards to create separation from Alves.

Abidal:  What a match.  What a player.  If Puyol represents the heart of the team, Messi its brilliance, and Xavi its intelligence, Abidal perfectly encompasses its professionalism.  Showed fantastic footballing intelligence to make that run behind the Madrid defense when he was functionally ignored.  And as good as the run was, the finish wasn’t easy given the angle.  In a game where Barça missed a number of quality opportunities on goal, Abidal finished off the match with the kind of poise that marks his game.  Defensively he was enormous.  Swallowed up Benzema and repeatedly covered for the team on the counter making several crucial intercepetions.

Busquets:  A flawless game.  Busquets plays with a machine like quality, like an engine where he just circulates, circulates, circulates.  Madrid has yet to come up with a way to stop his game.  Often the midfielder with the most time and space on the ball, Busquets used ball extremely efficiently.  Defensively was an anchor between the lines.  Would have been man of the match were it not for the sublime performance of his partner.

Xavi:  Sublime.  Make no mistake about it.  Given the tactical focus Madrid exerted on not allowing Messi to dictate play and on clogging the midfield, the challenge was thrown to Xavi to control the match.  And he was flawless.  Constantly marked and harried in midfield, Xavi as always rarely gave up possession.  When a team defends the way Madrid did, the pressure is squarely placed on the shoulders of the team’s central midfielder to exert match control. And Xavi did that masterfully again versus Madrid.

Fabregas:  Better this game versus Madrid than the last.  Still developing his way within the possession game.  That’s just going to take time.  In the final third however Fabregas is simply breathtaking.  In this game it was his passing on final balls rather than his runs to goal which were remarkable.  His scoop pass to Inesta over the Madrid defense – just brilliant.  And Fabregas also played a thankless role on the pitch doing a great deal of the dirty work for the team in his box to box role.  Ran all game long.

Iniesta:  The genius was on display on multiple occasions.  But this is was also a match where you just sit down with Iniesta, get him some much needed sun and Vitamin D and just ask him – why is it that you can pain the ball all over the pitch like a footballing DaVinci just not towards goal?  Even mediocre finishing from Don Andres would have made this match 4-1.  The hesitations in the box were particularly unfortunate.

Messi:  An entire defense was structured to stop him.  For much of the match it did.  He never truly got into the flow of the match.  But in the end when the team needed it – he didn’t only see an opportunity no one else could envision, he created it.  No matter what Madrid try to do they simply cannot stop this player from wounding them.

Alexis:  Another strong performance from a fiendishly gifted player who is getting better and better.  He add entirely new dimensions to how the team can play with his athleticism and technical play.  Often we compare his qualities to those of Henry.  And there are similarities.  But honestly, Sanchez is better on the ball.  Still not sure what his “position” will be for Barça.  But he looks outstanding in the central strikers role.

Team:  As a unit they are just scratching the surface.  Not only is Messi getting better but Alexis and Cesc expand this team’s capabilities.  They still are integrating and the team is still trying to understand how to play with them.  But it’s coming fast.  You can see it the way that the team is now starting to pick up Alexis’s runs at speed.

 

The End:

Barcelona falls behind in another match 1-0 within the opening fifteen minutes at the Bernabeu.  And once again, Madrid’s goal seems like only a temporary inconvenience.  This is a team that has seen almost everything.  That has been a bad situations and got out of them.  A few weeks ago after falling behind in the first 30 seconds it was Puyol who had to rally the team and exert leadership.  Madrid’s goal in this match – hardly required an exhortation.  Madrid scored but the goal was against the run of play – and you could just see then by their reaction and calmness that they felt that they were going to control the match.

Again, this is only the first leg of the tie.  In no way are Barça assured of advancing.  But this is a team that knows that.  They take very little for granted and fully understand that success doesn’t come from words but from actions on the pitch.

So the tie is still to be settled.  But within the context of the ongoing trajectory of matches between these two sides, this was a significant blow to Madrid.  Mourinho abandoned the core system Madrid were basing their team identity around and reverted back to a style the players and supporters never embraced.  This was a regressive move backwards by Mourinho as it took the team back to a style that they were to move away from in this second season.  And he made that backwards move after the first Clásico the team played this season.  Engineering that kind of radical change means that you must obtain a result.  Madrid did not.

And all of this is curious because the system Mourinho is reverting to did not produce the desired result last season either.  It’s unclear why it would this season, especially since Barcelona have seen Madrid play in this style before.  Playing in a deeper, confined block decreases Madrid’s ability to utilize the one area where they are clearly superior to Bara – their athleticism.

Though he wont’ admit it – much of this gets back to Guardiola.  The changes he put into place in that first Clásico precisely amplified vulnerabilities in the Madrid system that were there but latent.  Vulnerabilities lesser sides could not crack open and exploit.  To cause Madrid to give up that system even if it’s only one game is a significant strategic victory for Guardiola.  He forced Madrid back into a largely reactive mode in a year where they were supposed to exert their will on matches with Barcelona.

This very well may be a temporary retreat by Mourinho.  He may be using the CDR to experiment.  But if he is, that experimentation is not being conducted out of confidence nor is it within the spirit of the aggressive sporting project that Madrid were purportedly to grow into.  And his players will know that.  That’s not an easy knowledge.

It’s only one game.  It’s only the CDR.  Madrid could very well win the tie in the second leg.  But at this point in time, these first two Clásico’s were not only victories for Barcelona on the pitch but also strategically.

Go read Isaiah’s State of the Liga posts. Done? Okay. Liveblog is ready.

The holidays! When we Americans pepper-spray our way through the mall, occupying food courts and ruining our already-overextended credit at stores with names like “Ye Olde Crappe Shoppe”.

Our amigos across the pond have their traditions too. Instead of the mall, they go to the Corte Inglés, and instead of sitting on Santa’s lap, they sit on the lap of some kid in a bathrobe and black-face, which is not meant to offend any of the real-live Africans also walking around the Corte Inglés. Really. After a coupla copas, a Spaniard will tell you that, deep down and way back, he actually is a Moor. Or a Jew. Before 1492, that is, when all the other Spaniards kicked the Moors and Jews out (it was a busy year).

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Barcelona’s match against L’Hospitalet proved to be a near perfect ending for the first half of this season.  It wasn’t the historic 9-0 score that made the match noteworthy.  Nor was it the fact that Barça fielded a team of ten outfield players and three substitutes all of whom played in La Masia.

What made this match the culmination of the first half of this season was the quality of play.  Or more specifically-the way in which the quality of play in this leg of the L’Hospi tie book ended the poor quality of play Barça exhibited in the first leg.  The team  came full circle in this second leg.  In this regard, the tie and this match demonstrated in microcosm the story of the first half of this season.

Much has been made of Barça’s uneven play since the season started.  Dropping unexpected points.  Struggling more than expected.  The cycle was over.  The team had lost its hunger.  This was the narrative for much of the season to date.

And in some ways the nadir of Barça’s play in the first half of the season was the first leg of this tie.  Against Getafe, the team lost and dropped costly points in La Liga.  But against L’Hospi – a third division side – Barça played perhaps an even worse match in terms of quality.  Wasted possession.  Too much indirect play.  Little cutting edge.  They were only able to win based on a single moment of genius from Iniesta.  It was a disappointing struggle, particularly given the disparity in talent.

But the season changed shortly after.  The team engineered a rapid rise in quality of play starting with the brilliant match against Rayo Vallecano.  That surging quality of play continued to crest through the Clasico at the Bernabeu and the Club World Cup.           And in this second leg of a Copa Del Rey tie against a third division side they were leading 1-0 already, there was no let up by this Barcelona side.  Coming off an exhausting trip to Japan, the kind of trip they’ve often struggled to re-acclimate after and missing nearly half the first team there was no respite for the opposition.

The quality of play continued to swell, drowning the opponent in a kind of wondrous glitter that was reminiscent of the ocean at sunset.  Multi-hued, dancing with light at the surface but just beneath, dim and foreboding in its depth and scope and the various tentacled ways it can lead an opponent into losing itself inside a kind of dark wonder.

With time – clarity.  Where once the questions centered on the end of a cycle, lack of hunger and being surpassed in quality by other sides there are new questions coming into focus.  How much better can this team continue to get?  What levels will they reach this coming year?  How will Guardiola continue to drive them to expand how they can play?

 

Because with time it has now become more clear that Guardiola structured this team’s preparations so that it would start to peak later than it usually does.  The goal since summer was likely to gain momentum and cutting edge for the Clasico at the Bernabeu and Club World Cup.  To build and sustain quality for the second half of the season.

Against L’Hospi we saw this Barça squad in some ways at its purest.  The drive and will to win – the sober, serious nature of its execution.  There was a job to do.  So they would do it.

And because they had started to gain momentum in the season – because they had come so far so quickly from the performance in the first leg of the tie – there was no reason to let up and acquiesce or go through the motions.  This was a Barça team that continued to tell the world:  the cycle is hardly over – in fact, it’s December the season is just truly starting now.  This was a perfectionist side driven not only by the players standing in opposition to them – but driven by a competition against itself.

The year was ending.  The first half of the season culminating.  And Barça continued to lay the foundation for the true season to come.

 

The Negatives

Before getting into the specifics of the Barça victory, there were two negatives of note that I want to get out of the way.  First, was Iniesta’s injury.  Yet another hamstring injury.  Fortunately, it doesn’t seem to be a serious tear.  Unfortunately, it may keep him out of the upcoming match against Espanyol.  That will be a difficult match and the team cannot drop points in La Liga.

The second negative was Isaac Cuenca’s horribly embarrassing dive that led to the penalty kick for the first goal.  There’s really not a great deal to say on this.  It was just embarrassing and stained the first portion of the match.  For a player as talented as Cuenca to flagrantly dive in that fashion in order to earn a PK against a third division club is awful.  Truly awful.  Let’s hope he gets a talking to and never does that again.  That dive unfortunately diminished an otherwise brilliant game by Cuenca – which in a way made it even worse.

 

Line Up:  Inconsistently Consistent

Coming off the long trip to Japan, Guardiola gave an extended vacation to all of the South American players so that they could travel home and rest.  This heightened speculation that Barça would rest the veterans in this match and largely rely on the youth team players.

When the line up was announced however it was the exact opposite.  Guardiola not only went with what was the strongest possible CDR lineup he could field – he went as far as playing both Puyol and Xavi in the starting line up, fielding Pinto/ Puyol/ Pique/ Fontas/ Busquets/ Xavi/ Iniesta/ Thiago/ Pedro/ Cuenca.  Part of why this line up was selected was related to CDR requirements for first team players being utilized.  But there were other options Pep could have utilized to rest some players.

On face, this decision may seem very inconsistent – giving the extra time off to certain veteran players while having others start the match.  However, this line up was another example of Guardiola balancing pragmatism and principle to create the long term consistency needed to create a culture of winning in the organization.

Often supporters downplay the importance of competitions such as the Copa Del Rey or the Club World Cup.  This is simply not how Guardiola operates.  This project is not simply involved with play on the field.  Central to the project is instilling across the organization a culture of winning.

Excellence isn’t an option – it’s simply what is expected.  Guardiola expects it from himself.  He expects it from his players.  And he expects competitions to be respected.  And that respect comes from the intention to always win.  There’s little distinction made teasing out the relative importance or merit of any competition.  Consistency in expectations and purpose are critical. That’s the heart of this culture of excellence.

And part of the purpose of taking the second leg of a tie against a third division side so seriously is to instill expectations in the players-especially the younger ones.  Watching Puyol relentlessly hunt the ball in the second half of a 7-0 match creates a stark example.  It teaches players like Cuenca and Fontas and Bartra and Muniesa how critical it is to defend relentlessly regardless of score.  You put the effort in because it’s the right thing to do.  That’s how a culture of winning is created.

In this regard, while Guardiola’s use of players may have been inconsistent in the short term (giving extended vacations to some veterans and starting others) he was being strategically consistent.  This was a good example of how Barcelona is transmitting values and expectations to these younger players while still acknowledging circumstances such as the travel time for the South American players.

 

Preparing for Life Without David Villa:  Thiago on the Left

The other interesting part of the opening was how the team was set up.  When the starters were announced it seemed likely that Fabregas would play up front as a false 9 with Thiago at the tip of the midfield diamond.  Those are positions both players have occupied prior this season.  This didn’t happen.  Instead, Pedro played as a false 9 with Fabregas at the tip of the diamond.  This was noteworthy because it allowed Guardiola to play Thiago on the left wing.

This is now the second straight game Pep has used Thiago in the advanced left position.  This may reflect part of his thinking on how to compensate the loss of David Villa through the resources he depth in – midfielders.  Given Thiago’s diverse skill set, this seems like a promising route to make the best of a terrible injury.

 

Barça Wins Outside In

Ultimately, this match was won largely through the difference in quality of the players involved.  Barça are the best team in the world and L’Hospi is a third division side.  However, given the scale of victory (it had been nearly fifty years since Barça last won a match by nine goals) and the recent level of play L’Hospi demonstrated in the first leg, other issues came into play to create the size of the result.

On the whole, this match became so lopsided because Barça played in a way that it infrequently does.  Barça’s play flowed down both flanks and attacks were generated from wide positions dynamically.  Usually a middle dominant team, Barça inverted the attack, shifting its points of focus wide.

The reason why this created such a particularly large advantage in this match was due to the way L’Hospi structured its defense. L’Hospi attempted to reproduce what they did in the first leg – defend narrow in order to overplay the center.

This was the central dynamic of the match.  L’Hospi looked to defend the middle of the pitch in numbers by staying narrow.  Rather than playing through the middle, however, Barça distributed the ball wide to players who were extremely dynamic all match long and created danger over and over because they received the ball in open space consistently and were left in 1 vs. 1 situations against full backs.  From that open space those wide attackers were able to utilize the ball to beat their defenders and cause L’Hospi’s defense to break the structure it was trying to keep.

Barça of course dominated midfield – this was expected.  Barça dominated possession in midfield in the first leg at L’Hospi as well.  But in this match that dominance in midfield was coupled with danger from the flanks, the areas on the  the defense was allowing space to.  And it was that utilization of open space to generate danger that helped lead to this dramatically different result.

From those wide positions Thiago and Cuenca and then Tello and Cuenca were outstanding.   The central midfielders played them balls early.  Open in space, the wide attackers used the ball very intelligently.  Rather than simply passing the ball to circulate it, these wide players made dangerous runs at the defenders on the edge of the L’Hospi block to create destabilizing penetration.  Play off the flanks mixed skilled one touch play with direct play to create danger towards goal rather than only maintaining possession.  And in the process those three players put on a dazzling display.

What made these performances even more impressive was the age and experience of these three wide players.  In a match where Barça utilized its most senior players, it was these three young players – Thiago, Cuenca and Tello – who broke the opposition defense and allowed Barça to control the match.

Again, in these instances one sees a glimpse of the entire Barça project in full and a sense of Guardiola’s vision.  The systematic utilization of young players through their controlled incorporation alongside the veteran leaders of the team.  Placing players into different roles based on their rigorously developed skill sets rather than “positions.”  And at the same time, utilizing these new players to push the system by allowing themselves to express their games.

Think of Tello’s entry into the match.  Shortly after entering one of his first matches with the senior side, he had the confidence to make a near full pitch run with the ball and score a goal.  This wasn’t Tello being “selfish.”  It was him doing what was required by the game – utilize space efficiently.  He was never closed down on the flank on the counter as L’Hospi was clustered centrally and advanced.  Tello simply drove the ball until someone forced him to stop – and no one really did.

On this second goal he again drove the defense back with a run.  Tello had beaten the full back so often from the flank that the defender’s first reaction wasn’t to close down the ball – but to drop deeper and not get beat.  Tello sees this, knows he’s beaten the defender repeatedly before, and dummies the drive, instead using the defender to screen the keeper and ankle in a beautifully curling shot that was disguised so well it seemed to come from nowhere.  A brilliant combinations of physical skill, technique and intelligence.

Cuenca and Tello both scored braces.  But part of what made this so noteworthy was how they scored.  Both players scored with their right and left feet.  Their ability to use both feet to score again attests to their training.  But the direct nature of their play towards goal is their own sensibility.

 

The Model

We have an industrial model for La Masia at times.  Factory.  Conveyer belt.  These are the metaphors we think of it through.  But that really isn’t the case.  This isn’t commodity production.  It’s artisanship.  Yes the value of each new player is related to the standardized principles they’ve been trained in.  But that doesn’t limit the full universe of their possibilities.  Their individual expressivity defines the night time sky that one can see distant stars glimmering through.  The twinkle of the future.

And the more you see young players start to integrate into the first team under Guardiola the more apparent it becomes that the ones who will last, the ones who will stay are the ones who can enrich the “system” with their own individual qualities.

That was part of what made the L’Hospi match such a pleasure to watch.  There was Cuenca, Tello, Thiago and Sergi Roberto adding a directness in play that Barça at times can lack, that limits how they can shape a match.  But each of those players provides understands the game in that way.  That’s who they are.  That’s how they will add to the wonderful whole that is this project.

 

 

Evaluation

 

Team:

Coming off of a long international trip in which they took home silver, the squad could have coasted and taken the game lightly.  Instead they did the opposite.  They continued to maintain the phenomenal level of play they executed at over the past several weeks.  They played with a stringent commitment to excellence and to themselves.  This is a squad poised to continue to grow, develop and get better over the remainder of this season.

Guardiola:

Knows this team so well and he understands the big picture they are trying to play for.  After some uneven moments in the first half of the season, he has the team playing devastating football – some of the best we’ve seen it play under his leadership.  The goal was to make sure this team would be ready for December and the second half of the season.  Goal accomplished.

Pinto:

Professional match – as is his usual when called on to play in the Copa.  Stopped the few moments of danger he faced and overall did a solid job of distributing the ball out of the back.

Puyol:

Simply made from a different substance.  It’s easy to think of him as something sturdy and hard – like iron.  But he’s really not elemental in that way.  He’s more like an alloy – a complex mixture of qualities that produces characteristics not seen in other materials.  Unfortunately, his will be a blend that will be difficult to reforge.

It’s so interesting to see him play this season again.  It has offered a different kind of perspective on his greatness.  After not seeing him play regularly due to injuries for so long – watching him now makes you appreciate him that much more.  His drive is relentless.  Their his team is up 7-0, 8-0, 9-0 and it simply doesn’t matter.  He’s working tirelessly to close down the ball, to sacrifice his body, to never stop running regardless of the score.  He never stops anticipating where danger may spring up from and was always positioning himself to suffocate fire before it could even turn into an ember.  There is not let up.  He only knows one thing.  Being on the pitch is a privledge.  You play the game the right way every moment you are out there.  How you play is a constant responsibility.

The example he provides to the rest of the squad is invaluable.  And for the younger players to be able to watch him play that way in one of the most one sided matches in team history will teach them things about what it means to wear the shirt that they will carry for the rest of their careers.

Pique:

Operated as the central sweeper again in the back three.  Played fine overall and didn’t face too many threats.  How Pique will adapt to this position in the three man back line will be interesting to continue to watch.  For much of his career at Barça he has had another center back behind him to cover – whether that was Mascherano or Puyol.  But in the three man backline he is not well suited for the lateral center back positions.  This means that he’ll now need to be the defender who covers for the other two.

Fontas:

Rarely challenged.  In a match where Barça dominated possession so much, like Pique, his skill on the ball was particularly valuable.  Pressed very high up the pitch on the left very often which was interesting to see given the limited defensive cover behind him.

Busquets:

The oil that lubricates the machine.  To L’Hospi’s great credit they came out to try to play their game.  And this involved frequently pressing high up the pitch, even when they fell behind.  Busquet’s distribution out of the back however was so deft that he negated any pressure and created numerical advantage for Barça in the more advanced areas of the pitch.  This was another key reason why the result was so lopsided.

Xavi:

Like Puyol, played to a standard of excellence and intensity that was first and foremost about the what’s expected within a culture of winning.  Has scored goals in three straight matches!  Good to see him get some rest.

Iniesta:

There were two particularly frightening moments in this match.  The first was when Iniesta initially went down.  The second was when Ray Ray said on the broadcast, “Imagine how pale Iniesta is when he’s sitting in an ice bath.”

His injury is very unfortunate.  But again it speaks to the commitment to excellence this team adheres to.  Iniesta went in aggressively towards goal because the game still wasn’t won.

It’s extremely fortunate that the injury isn’t serious.  But again – it’s a hamstring injury and those are injuries that tend to heal slowly and can recur.  He’ll recuperate over the break so the timing isn’t as damaging as it could be.  Unfortunately, he will likely miss the coming match against Espanyol.

Fabergas:

Barça have had a number of players who exhibit great vision with the ball.  Fabregas is such a different player because he demonstrates great vision even without the ball.  The quality of his runs and use of space are extraordinary.  The second goal was a perfect example of what Fabregas adds to the team.  On that play, Xavi has the ball at the edge of the 18 yard box.  Fabregas is deep between the lines.  L’Hospi attempts to pull the back line forward to execute the offside trap.  As they do this, all of the Barça attackers are forced to come higher up the pitch.  Space starts to contract.  It’s only then – as all of the player are moving up the pitch that Fabregas starts his run going in the opposite direction.  In a sense, Fabregas is using coordination amongst the defenders as a weapon against them.  Xavi reads Cesc’s run and delivers a perfect pass which Cesc squares to Iniesta for an open net goal.  That was the first of several assists for Fabregas from his advanced position at the tip of the diamond.  Also, it was generous of him to allow Pedro and Thiago to take the penalty kicks despite him having more experience doing so.

Pedro:

Started out the match very brightly in his false 9 role.  Pedro continues to improve his form – and that’s very good to see as the team will need him in particular with Villa’s injury.  Faded from the match some as the score line exploded and could have scored from open play on a few occasions.  But overall, another step forward.  As with Cesc, it was generous of him to allow Thiago to take that penalty kick.

Cuenca:

Let’s get it out of the way – his dive was utterly embarrassing.  I touched on that before and will let is stand there.  Onto his play.

Even for Barcelona – a fiendishly skilled player.  His combination of close control, technique, fast feet, and vision are simply outstanding.  This range of skills allows him to both operate within the system seamlessly while also expanding its capacities.  Completely destabilized the left flank of the defense by himself.  Cuenca was able to beat his man at will with the ball 1 vs. 1 and then cross the ball not only with accuracy but with intelligence.  He’s not just firing the ball into the box from a wide position – he’s directing it to where it can create danger.

This may sound strange – but in some ways Cuenca is the player managers are hoping to get when they play Iniesta on the wing.  This isn’t in anyway to say that Cuenca is the player Iniesta is.  Instead, if one considers skill sets and styles as ranges, there’s a linkage between the way Iniesta structures his game and Cuenca’s.  Iniesta has the skill set to play in an advanced wide position – but his mental framework is that of a midfielder.  Cuenca’s has the mental framework of a winger with the skill set of a midfielder.  It’s an outstanding combination to have for this Barcelona team.

An area where Cuenca didn’t play as well was on defense.  Too often Cuenca didn’t track back to defend.  This left Puyol caught 1 vs. 2 on several occasions.  Now this didn’t lead to any direct damage.  But in a game in which players like Puyol, Xavi and Iniesta are playing on principle – Cuenca needs to also.  It was as if he felt that he had Puyol behind him and the lead was enormous, so he could decrease his work rate.

Thiago:

Barça has won significant trophies this season already.  Hopefully more silver will follow and another remarkable season will transpire.  That said, when this season is complete, one of its lasting impressions will be the emergence of Thiago Alacantara.

Thiago is rapidly becoming a near complete footballer.  The range of skills and roles he played in this match were tremendous.  Starting on the left, Thiago created danger repeatedly off the flank with his dribbling and direct play.  He then moved to central midfield when Xavi left the match and directed the team with a deft hand. His orchestration of the team was excellent – he continues to develop in this critical role.

The third goal, in some ways encompassed what Thiago’s game has grown into.  Through his individual initiative he dispossessed a L’Hospi defender high up the pitch.  The keeper was still in position to cut off the angle however.  Thiago dummied a shot with quick leg action, went around the keeper and finished smoothly.

It’s defensively where Thiago has developed his game tremendously.  And it’s this dimension of his play which is going to dramatically differentiate him from other world class attacking midfielders.  For example, once JDS came in for Busquets, Thiago started dropping deeper to support Barça’s transition defense as JDS was acclimating himself to game speed as the new DM.  In that role Thiago, made a several important interventions.

A complete game moving across different roles.  Thiago impacted the match is a tremendous variety of ways while maintaining a high work rate.  For these reasons – Thiago gets my man of the match.

Tello:

Barça B has had an uneven season in some regards, struggling more than they did last season.  It’s a younger squad with a new coach so that isn’t surprising.  However, it’s been interesting to see how B team players have improved their play when called up to the first team.   This was particularly acute in both the second Bate match and in this one.  Part of this may be related to the level of competition – Bate in some ways simply gave up and L’Hospi plays in a lower level than the B team plays in.  However, this isn’t the only reason.  For example, Cuenca has played better with the first team than he has with the B team – even when facing La Liga competition.

Against, L’Hospi, Tello was the prime example of this phenomenon.  This was the best game Tello has played this season.  He took the pitch with tremendous confidence and probed the game.  He quickly figured out that the L’Hospi full back simply could not defend him.  Over and over Tello exploded past the defense creating havoc across that flank.

It’s great to see La Masia now developing talented advanced flank players like Cuenca and Tello.

Sergi Roberto:

Came in for Iniesta.  A quiet game and he looked a bit nervous at times, missing two  relatively easy goal scoring changes.  But played well.  Some nice touches.  And his direct game and runs are reminiscent of Fabregas’s in some ways.

Jonathan Dos Santos:

Very poised in possession once he came in for Busquets.  A deep position on the pitch fits him well as he initiates play well.  Worked hard defensively and did a nice job in the holding role.

 

The End

Another outstanding performance from a Barça side that is only now starting to round into optimal form.  Yes the match was against a third division side and was the second leg of a Copa Del Rey tie.  But after a long trip to Japan, this easily could have been a trick match, one defined by let up and sluggishness.  Instead, we saw the exact opposite.  We saw continued continuity in the quality of play the club demonstrated against Rayo, Madrid, and Santos.

The new year is nearly upon us.  But the season only now appears to be truly starting.

 

 

 

“Gentlemen, if you lose today you will continue to be the best in the world – but if you win today you will be eternal.”

- Pep Guardiola, prior to the Club World Cup finals in 2009

 

Think back to Pedro equalizing in the 89th minute.  Messi scoring off the club crest in the extra time.  Pep weeping with happiness and joy over the accomplishments of his players.  The team has travelled across time zone to Japan in the middle of a difficult season.  They’ve lost David Villa to injury for the season.  Winning the Club World Cup matters.

In this post I’ll briefly outline some of the tactical issues that may come into play.  Below I provide a brief summary of the Santos system.  For a more in depth review please see the excellent analyses of Santos and how they may play at Santapelota and from Tim Vickery

I’m not going to do a full tactical preview as the match is shortly upon us.  But I wanted to provide a quick summary of issues to watch for.

 

The Santos System: 

Santos play with an attacking front three, a defensive base of four players who stay relatively deep, two players who shuttle in midfield to link together the attacking trident to the defensive base and a right back who gets forward aggressively, serving as a combination attacker and defender.

Santos’s is a possession oriented team whose attack is based on their front three of Borges, Neymar and Ganso.  The goal scoring predominantly runs through Borges, who acts as central striker, and Neymar who plays in a left-center free role.  Creativity is focused on the play of Ganso, Santos’s advanced central midfielder.

Santos plays with a structured defensive base.  Henrique he holding midfielder shields the back four with the two center backs Bruno Rodrigo and Edu Dracena playing conservatively.  Santos is missing one of their top defensive forces – Adriano, their usual holding midfielder. In their semi-final match vs. Kashiwa Reysol, Santos utilized Durval, a center back, at left back.  In this regard, Santos plays with a defensive base of 3-4 deep defenders depending on how the LB position is oriented.

Regardless of formation, it’s likely Santos will play with a base of four defenders playing relatively deep.

The Santos attacking three and defensive base are linked together in midfield by Elano and Arouca, who function as carrilleros shuttling in midfield.  Arouca, a very dynamic player, is the key defensive force of the two.

An additional source of link up is Neymar who holds the ball up effectively on the flank through his dribbling skills.

At RB Danilo, an excellent footballer, gets forward energetically.  His role at Santos echoes Dani Alves’s role with Barca.  Danilo is the key to providing width and is often responsible for playing the entire right flank.  As such, while he is part of the backline, Danilo plays a complex role positionally.

Santos’s dynamic thrust almost resembles a funnel.  The defensive base is the foundation which allows the advance attackers high degrees of freedom.  From the defensive base play narrows through the shuttlers with linking play through the central midfielders Arouca and Elano.  Creativity is then highly concentrated through Ganso as the 10.  Play to goal then develops and expands through the front two, with Neymar enjoying high degrees of freedom.

The lines of width at the sides of the funnel depend on Danilo and Neymar.   Width on the right is highly dependent on Danilo who is responsible for the flank.  On the the left, with a CB playing LB, width depends on Neymar (or a wing back if a formation such as a 3-5-2 is utilized).

 

How Should Barcelona Approach the Santos System?

A key tactical battle in this match will focus on Barcelona’s ability to break the Santos formation.  As a team that organizes its attack upon the foundation of a set defensive base, Santos is prone to turning into a broken formation.

In a broken formation, the attackers and base are isolated from each other both in space and dynamics.  (Barcelona did this very effectively in the 5-0 manita against Real Madrid last year.)

Barca’s best approach to break Santos’s formation is the following:

1.  Press Ganso out of the match and Break Santos’s Formation

Ganso is a very promising young footballer.  However, an enormous amount of responsibility runs through him in the Santos set up.  In addition, Ganso plays with a relatively languid style.  His close control of the ball is good – but it is not the focal point of his game.

In the past, Barcelona has done a wonderful job of neutralizing these kinds of advanced midfielders through their dogged pressing defense (e.g. Mesut Oezil).  Busquets has been masterful in neutralizing playmakers in the past.

If Barca can press Ganso in ways which disrupt his play, Santos will lose the key link between the base of their formation and their attacking goal scorers.  This will force the two shuttlers to take on the responsibility of creating play – and this is not the strength of either Elano or Arouca.

If Barca can create a break in the Santos formation – either Borges, Neymar and Ganso will need to play deeper – or  space will open up in midfield.  Either is a major advantage for Barca.  If the attacking trident is pushed back Santos’s ability to counter will be decreased significantly.  If space opens in midfield – Barcelona will dominate this region and be able to dictate the match.

2.  Force Danilo deep to turn Santos into a narrow formation and prevent him from running into open space

Danilo composes most of the Santos’s right flank.  As a combined defender and attacker, Barcelona should force him deep into his own end to defend.  To do this the Barcelona left flank player will need to stay wide and make himself dangerous.  When combined with dominance on the ball, this will likely keep Danilo from joining play.

Alternatively, when Danilo does make runs forward, the Barca left flank player should track him up the wing defensively.  This will prevent Danilo from enjoying the open space he usually does.

Pedro (or Sanchez if healthy) would be an ideal player to play this role.

If Santos’s right flank can be neutralized, Santos will lose a key outlet.  This will make it easier for Barca’s press and ball possession game to dominate the center of the pitch.

3.  Fatigue the legs of Santos, particularly Arouca and Elano

Elano and Arouca provide key linkages in the Santos formation. If Barca can control possession they will be able to fatigue Santos, a team used to controlling possession, significantly. In particular, Barca will be able to fatigue Elano and Arouca, which could prevent them from linking together the Santos formation.  This will promote Santos’s decay into a broken formation.

4.  Fluidity – off the ball movement, rapid ball circulation and changing formations

Organizing space is fundamental to defending.  Santos have never played a team with the kind of fluidity and dynamism Barca play with.

Santos isn’t a squad that focuses on maintaining shape (like Estudiantes has for decades).  In general, defending is primarily directed by the back seven players with the front three looking to attack.  It will be very difficult to defend Barca with seven players.

Through off the ball movement, rapid ball circulation and changing formations Barca will be able to further complicated Santos’s ability to control space.  Santos can be inconsistent in their defending – particularly along the back.  Dynamism in play can uncover and amplify this limitation.

5.  Develop width

When a team focuses its defense on a defensive base like Santos, making the pitch functionally large is particularly effective.  Width is key to this.

For example, in the semi-finals, the Kashiwa Reysol Sakai right back was able to make effective runs forward because Neymar didn’t track him and the LB played very deep (it was Sakai who also scored for Kashiwa off a set piece).  Alves can be very dangerous in this role.

On the left flank – Barca can be particularly dangerous in getting behind Danilo when he looks to get forward.

6.  Defend set pieces

Santos can be very effective at set pieces with Elano the key to this aspect of their game.  Barcelona will need to limit opportunities and focus their defense in these phases of the match.

7.  Press Neymar vigorously and in numbers

Neymar is prone to dwell on the ball and can over elaborate.  He is used to being able to operate in open space on the flank and use his dribbling skills to hold up play and move across the pitch.  Barca’s hunting in packs can significantly complicate his ability to do this if they defend intelligently.

Visca Barca!

 

People talk about tactics, but when you look at it, tactics are just players. You change things so that the team can get the most out of the skills they have to offer, but you don’t go any further than that. When it comes to tactics you have to think about what the opposition does and the players who can hurt you.

What I’ve done this season is a response to the game plans our rivals are now adopting against us.  As time goes by, people get to know you better. They pose problems for you and you have to come up with solutions.

-Pep Guardiola

We had to try. In life you have to choose to be brave, or very brave.

-Pep Guardiola,

on playing the system he chose this match at the Bernabeu

 

The first part of this review for the Clásico provided an overview of the match and its context.  In this part the focus will be a detailed breakdown of the systems issues and tactical issues that influnced the match.

 

Match Analysis

As previewed here there were three primary objectives that needed to be balanced in order for Barça to win this match:

1)  Establish control of midfield despite RM focusing their defense on this region of play.

Midfield has become the most contested space in the tactical battles between Guardiola and Mourinho.  Since the Manita, Mourinho has committed greater and greater defensive resources to this zone.  Conversely, Guardiola has always made it a must to have control of midfield as that’s the foundation of Barça

Given that both managers prioritized control of this zone – who would win this region?  How would Pep try to ensure this would happen?

2)  Create width in order to space the pitch while still maintaining control of midfield.

Controlling midfield is a key aspect to controlling possession.  However, it is not the only factor.  Nearly as important is spacing the pitch.  If controlling midfield requires so many players to be stationed there that spacing is lost it may be more difficult to create quality possession.  This has been a problem for Barça this season for example when they’ve used the 3-4-3.

3) Build solidity in defense – specifically transition defense.

Real Madrid are the most dangerous team in the world in attacking at speed.  Transition defense is fundamental to playing against them.  A key to transition defense against a team with the kind of pace Madrid have is to make sure the pitch is spaced.  If it’s not then there will be large spaces for the Madrid attackers to break into.

Once more, this relates to the central problem of control of midfield.  If you devote too many players to that region and lose spacing you will potentially compromise your transition defense.  This too has been a major problem for Barça at times this season, particularly when playing in the 3-4-3.

Much of the entire debate about whether Barça could take the risk of playing three at the back at the Bernabeu specifically related to risk related to transition defense.  Madrid often break with four players.  Could you defend these breaks at speed with only three defenders?  On the flanks, it was very possible that with three at the back the Barça defenders would get caught 2 vs. 1. This was especially a concern on the right flank where the Barça defense would be facing C.Ronaldo and Marcelo.

In short, what made executing these three objectives so difficult was that improving one could damage another.  The key was developing a balance of these factors in a way that would maximize the whole.  This was the fundamental challenge Guardiola faced.

And he did this brilliantly by introducing a new structure for the team to play through, an innovative set up that allowed them to enhance their own strengths while countering those of Madrid.

 

Player Selection:

To start the match Guardiola selected: Valdes/ Alves / Puyol / Pique/ Abidal/ Busquets/ Xavi/ Fabregas/ Iniesta/ Sanchez/ Messi.   The major news in the player selection was the inclusion of Fabregas and Sanchez rather than Villa and the Puyol and Pique rather than Mascherano at CB.

This season, with that selection of players, Guardiola has arranged them in a 4-3-3 with Fabregas as a false 9 and Messi on the right.  The concern with that line up has been transition defense along the right flank.  When Messi pulls in centrally off the right, Alves is left completely alone on the right flank.  Here he would be facing a potential 1 vs. 2 with Marcelo and C.Ronaldo.

Guardiola however didn’t utilize that system.  Instead he went with an entirely new formation – one he hasn’t used before at Barça.  Why these selections were made will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.

Madrid countered with Casillas/ Coentrao/ Ramos/ Pepe/ Marcelo/ Diarra/ Alonso/ Oezil/ DiMaria/ Benzema/ C.Ronaldo.  The major notes in the Madrid line up were that Oezil would be playing rather than a three man defensive trivote.  The other major issues was Coentrao playing at RB despite usually being a LB.

 

 

Barcelona Formation(s)

Discussing Barcelona’s formations is often considered as a secondary issue.  Barça is so fluid at baseline with their movement and position switching that no formation really describes what they do.  Rather Barcelona plays an “amoeba” like arrangement.

And this is true in many ways.  Ultimately, Barcelona has evolved a system in which dynamics rather than structure are the focus.  However, all systems require structure otherwise they would become disorganized.  And for Barça this is a key point because so many of their players tend to drift to the middle.  Without an appropriate formation, Barça would wind up overly center focused  Also, because the Barcelona formation is often considered such a secondary issue, Guardiola’s work as a manager is often overlooked.

 

In this Clásico, Guardiola implemented a new system, one that had a major impact on the outcome of the match.  Barcelona played a remarkably fluid game and the formations Barcelona based their play on contributed to this fluidity.   The system is difficult to picture as it moved through phases and was dynamic so rather than try to show it through pictures I’ll describe it now and illustrate it in subsequent sections through still shots.

What made the Barcelona system for this Clásico so interesting was that Guardiola implemented three different roles which have rarely if ever been part of how Barça play during his tenure:  1) lone central striker (played by Alexis Sanchez); 2) a true 10 playing in the hole (played Messi); 3) a “box to box” midfielder (played by Fabregas).  (Please note-in identifying these three aspects of the formation I’m referring to the role – not the skill set needed to play that role.  For example, Keita is well suited to play as a box to box midfielder – however that role has not been part of the Barça system under Guardiola so Keita hasn’t assumed that role).

What makes the utilization of these three roles together in this match particularly interesting is that each is a relatively orthodox role.  They are well described positions used widely by other squads.  However, Barça has not significantly relied on these roles in the recent past.  In fact, much of the innovation that Guardiola has brought to the team has been by moving away from these three roles to push the team to play in a more fluid, possession-based game.

But by moving back towards these three orthodox roles and doing so in the same match, Guardiola created a system that together was surprising.  In a sense, Guardiola innovated by becoming more traditional.  Madrid had considerable difficulty determining how to mark and handle the three players in these roles.  This was a great example of how tactical innovation in football can be created by adopting structures that have been used in other contexts.

The Barcelona system was intended to migrate through phases.  Barça opened up playing with four at the back.

In the image above, Barcelona are playing their usual four man backline.  Notice how C.Ronaldo is clearly marking Dani Alves when Barça is playing four at the back.  This will be an important issue later on when Barça change formation.

In the image, note also how Fabregas has dropped deep in his box to box role to support build up of play and how Di Maria is forced to pick him up and mark him.  By having Fabregas play a box to box role he often acted as an “extra man” moving across different midfield zones.  Because he moved so far vertically and there was no box to box midfielder fro Madrid, Fabregas was difficult to pick and mark.  When he dropped to the Barça half, he often gave Barça numerical superiority.  This is why Angle DiMaria – a winger – has to pinch in and function as an extra midfielder himself to mark him.

During the first half Iniesta played as a left winger, though often interchanging positions and coming central.  Xavi played in central midfield – but played deeper than he usually does to facilitate build up of play in face of the Madrid pressure and due to the fact that Busquets was often playing deeper than usual.

In minute 17, however, Dani Alves moved up the pitch to a wingback position leaving three defenders on the backline.  Sergio Busquets soon dropped deeper and played as a libero, dropping to the backline CB when Barça lost possession with Puyol moving out to RB. In a sense, Barça played most of the match with 3 ½ defenders.

Overall, for most of the match the Barça formation could be considered to have migrated from a 4-3-3 to 3-1-2-3-1.

For much of the first half the Barça formation was also asymmetric, with the right side predominating.  What was interesting about the asymmetry of this formation was that it reversed the usual orientation of the Barcelona system.  Usually, Barcelona plays as a center-left squad do to the positioning of the midfield.  In their base 4-3-3, Iniesta plays on the left of center giving Barça an additional player on that side of the pitch – a player who a great deal of play is funneled through.

In this Clásico, however, Barça became a center-right team as Dani Alves became an extra midfielder on the right.  As the prior image showed, Alves was routinely open in space on the right as Madrid had difficulty marking him in that wing back position wide.  As such, more play ran through the right side of the pitch than Barcelona usually engages in.

This change in orientation to the right had important impacts on the match.  The extra attacking thrust on the right pinned back Marcelo significantly and forced the Madrid LW (C.Ronaldo in the first half) deep as well to defend (as noted in the prior image).  The left flanks is the primary focus of the Madrid attack.  Given how much of the Madrid attack is run through that left flank, forcing those two attack oriented players back by stationing Alves higher up and running the ball through that side was critical to both Barça maintaining possession and “defending with the ball” by pushing Madrid back.

These issues are all summarized in the following still shot.

 

In the image above, Barcelona has converted to a three man back line with Puyol moving out to the right center back, Abidal left center back, and Pique sweeping behind them centrally.  Busquets is slightly ahead of Pique in midfield in a libero role.

When in possession Busquets would step up into midfield to facilitate possession and ball circulation.

Dani Alves (red arrow in image) is now extremely high up the pitch.  Notice how Alves is completely unmarked in space.  This would happen again and again in the match after Barça moved to a three man backline.  Alves intelligently positioned himself between Marcelo and C.Ronaldo..  As will be discussed later, Madrid’s defensive system is based on zonal coverage with man marking.

In the image above, Alves has moved into a zone where there isn’t a defender free to mark him.  Sanchez has moved into the right channel occupying Ramos and Marcelo.  Compare this to the prior image when C.Ronaldo was actively marking him.  Alves has gotten behind C.Ronaldo who does not want to drop that deep as it would functionally position him as a LB.  Notice however, that C.Ronaldo tries to keep an eye on Alves and has dropped even deeper than Xabi Alonso to do so.  This is an example of how Barça changing attacking formations actually was a form of defense hindering the Madrid attack by driving players deep to defend.

Sanchez’s role as a striker is visible in the still shot above – he is occupying two defenders.   Messi’s is positioned as a 10, playing behind Sanchez, but free to drop deeper than a traditional 10 might.  Iniesta is playing so wide as a LW that he is not visible in the image.

Compare Fabregas’s position here to the first still shot.  Fabregas is now nearly as high up the pitch as Sanchez, the striker.  His positioning is completely different than it was in the first image where Fabregas was back in the Barça half, deeper than Xavi, and playing close to Busquets, the holding midfielder.  These two images demonstrate Fabregas’s box to box role.

Finally, in the image above, note Madrid’s defensive positioning.  Specifically, notice the large gap in space between Madrid’s lines.  Their five advance defenders are looking to pressure the ball higher up toward the half line.  Their defensive line however has dropped deep.

The only player between the lines is Diarra, but even he is in an odd position because Barça have skewed their formation rightwards.  As such there is a large gap in space between the lines where most of the Bara players are. This is an example of a critical issue in this match – Madrid was not playing as compact as they could have (more on this later in the section on the Madrid defensive system).  By not staying compact, room was open in the interior of their defensive block.

Here is a comparable shot of the backline when Busquets dropped deeper into the backline as a CB and Puyol wide as the RB.

 

In the image above, notice how Madrid has difficulty marking Busquets when he drops deep.  Usually Busquets was Ozil’s responsibility with Benzema responsible for pressuring the CBs.  Busquets has moved into a zone where there are no available Madrid defenders.  Dropping back this way allowed Busquets to move away from the defensive pressure.  In essence, he became something of a free man at the back.

The requirement to play RB and be lined up against C.Ronaldo were likely major factors in Guardiola selecting Puyol over Mascherano.  This role was fundamental to the entire Barça system – the RB/CB spot was the focal point which allowed Barça to create numerical superiority in midfield while still maintaining width (more on this later].

Guardiola would further change the Barça formation in the second half – a change in tactics which would have a decisive effect on the match.  This will also be discussed on a later section of this piece.

 

The New Traditional Roles:  Sanchez and Fabregas

While Sanchez, Messi and Fabregas played more orthodox footballing roles, the way they interpreted those roles was critical.

First, while Sanchez was stationed as a lone striker, he played a highly mobile, highly tactical role.  He didn’t simply stay in the center of the pitch up against the two CB as the lone striker traditionally does.  His job was to occupy the defenders (more on this later) but to occupy them through movement and threaten the backline by using his pace and strength to get behind the Madrid backline.  Interestingly, Sanchez played in a band moving from touchline to touchline to facilitate the attack and defense.  Tactically, his function was to add horizontal force to the Barça system.

In the image above, Sanchez has moved all the way to the far right flank in order to mark Marcelo.  This was the 10^th minute of the match – before Alves moved to right wing.  During this time, Marcelo was starting to get forward more effectively Alves was responsible for marking C.Ronaldo.  Without a true right winger at this time, Alves could have been caught 1 vs. 2 aginst C. Ronaldo and Marcelo.  Guardiola instructed Sanchez to move laterally and mark Marcelo to avoid this.  For a stretch of time in the first half, Sanchez often was positioned as a RW.

The other key role Sanchez played as a lone striker in front of Messi was to occupy defenders.  Sanchez was routinely marked by two of Madrid’s backline.  This made it difficult for them to step out and mark Messi – even between the lines.  As such, if Mourinho was planning on using a strategy such as the one he implemented in the Spanish Super Cup where the CB marked Messi, it would have been very difficult to do with Sanchez acting as a striker and Messi as a 10.

In the past, when Madrid has pressured Barça high up the pitch, it has forced Xavi and Messi to drop very deep to build play.  In order to help Messi stay higher up the pitch and maintain his free role while still giving support to Xavi, Guardiola had Fabregas drop deep in midfield.  However, Guardiola also wanted to utilize Fabregas’s goal scoring abilities and his direct runs from deep.  As such, Fabregas played a true “box to box” midfield role.  As was shown in the prior images, he routinely dropped deep when the all was in the Barça half but also regularly made runs forward, often moving to a very advanced position close or even further forward than Messi and Sanchez.

Unfortunately, this box to box role also created some confusion for Barça, particularly given that Fabregas is still integrating into a ball playing midfield role.  Because Barça do not usually play this type of role, Barça players were often unsure of where Fabregas would be positioned at any one time and where his runs were headed.  Additionally, Fabregas himself often seemed somewhat unsure.  As such, his impact on the game went missing for long stretches of time.  Nonetheless, the diverse deep and attacking qualities of box to box play were brilliantly on display during Fabregas’ run and header for the third goal.  Rarely has a Barça midfielder scored that kind of goal over the past 4 seasons.

 

The Madrid Defensive System:  Foundations

To fully understand Guardiola’s player selection and the system he implemented for the match, it’s important to consider the Madrid defensive system as that conditioned the context for Guardiola’s decision making.

The Madrid defensive system has evolved to focus on pressuring high up the pitch out of a system of zonal coverage with man marking.

While there was some thought that Madrid would sit back and defend deep, this was never likely.  Madrid has been evolving a pressure defensive scheme since last season, a movement which amplified over the second half of last season and came to the fore at in the Spanish Supercup to start off this season.  This is the defensive identity they have been moving towards for over the past year.  And it’s a system that was at least in part targeted to stop Barcelona.

Many teams have now chosen to press Barcelona higher up the pitch.  The purpose of doing so is to prevent Barça from systematically building up play out of the back and to clot midfield with numbers.

Madrid’s pressure defense is a two part system.  First, pressure high up the pitch with the front three players and two to three of the midfielders.  In pressing very high up, Madrid seeks to:  1) force Barcelona’s lesser skilled players on the ball – the keeper and backline – into making a mistake high up the pitch and

2) to prevent the highly skilled midfielders from getting the ball and critically developing a rhythm that will control match tempo.

The defense is structured to allocate defenders directly against the Barça backline and to overplay the midfield directly behind.  The objective is to clot the pitch and prevent Barça from playing through the middle if Barça get the ball through the initial defensive layer.

The Madrid defensive scheme is well illustrated by this image from the first leg of the Spanish Super Cup earlier this season:

 

Notice how Madrid is pressing high – but doing so through zonal coverage and man marking.  Each Madrid defenders is marking one Barcelona player.  Benzema is applying pressure – but individually, not in a “pack.”  Behind the front three, Madrid is also matched up 3 vs. 3 with the Barça midfield.

Pressure is applied as a defender runs 1 v. 1 on the ball.  When a pass is made the next defender will start to close down the receiver of the ball (sometimes described as “through pressing.”)   The objective is to either force an error in the pass or a miscontrol in rececptin of a pass.

Madrid will seek to cluster defenders together when possible – e.g. towards the touchlines.  But the approach does not depend on this.

In this Clascio, Madrid implemented a similar defensive system, only playing their front five players even higher up the pitch.

Above, Madrid is vigorously pressing Valdes trying to force him into a second mistake.  While on the first goal of the game Valdes wasn’t being directly pressed and simply made an errant pass, he was frequently directly pressured – here with two defenders.  Benzema and Dimaria – two very athletic players are closing him down – this is an enormous challenge for any goal keeper.

Madrid not only pressed extremely high in this Clásico.  They pressed very high in numbers – even more than the Copa Del Rey and Spanish Super Cup.  As can be seen from the image above, Madrid played a four man defensive front of C.Ronaldo, Benzema, DiMaria and Ozil.

The goal was to force the Barça defenders or Valdes to turn the ball over.  And this strategy helped contribute to the Madrid goal.  However, by playing Ozil so high, Madrid functionally removed a defender from midfield.  Ozil, who has limited stamina and fatigues relatively quickly, struggled to drop back when the Barça attack got past this initial line of four advanced defenders.

 

The Madrid Defensive System:  Trade Offs – Interior Space

However, all systems require trade offs.  To press to maximum efficiency a team has to stay as compact as possible.  It can be difficult to man mark and stay compact because the defenders start to move in relationship to the attackers rather than in relationship to each other.  In the images above, notice the amount of space between the Madrid defenders both laterally and vertically.

Even more importantly, to stay compact a team has to play a high line.  This involves significant risk as so much space is left behind the backline.  Mourinho has sought to limit how high his backline plays to decrease this risk.  This is not to say that Madrid play a deep back line.  It’s that compared to how high up the advanced defenders are and how aggressively they pres, the backline player deep in comparison.  The backline does not prioritize squeezing space.  For example, in the Spanish Super Cup Madrid played roughly 50m between its front line and backline.  Barça in comparison had around 40m of space.

This issue is also noticeable when an attack breaks through the first two lines of defenders.  The reaction of the Madrid backline is often to move deeper to cover rather than moving aggressively forward to dispossess the ball.

As such, a major limitation to this system open is interior space.  Because Madrid try to limit how compact they need to be space can open up in the interior of their defense block.  This is particular true behind the more advanced lines that press higher up the pitch.

These issues are illustrated in the sequence below:

Above, Madrid are pressuring out of their based zonal cover, man marking system.  All five defenders are directly marking a Barça player with Oezil running at Abidal to close him down.

Note however that there is one player with no marker – Messi.  As will be discussed later, due to Messi playing as a true 10 rather than as a false 9, Madrid had no direct player available to mark him when he dropped deep because all of the Madrid advanced defenders were already marking Barça players 1 vs. 1.  Over and over Messi was able to drop deep and find open space.  In fact, this match was one in which Messi was able to find more space than most he’s played in this season.  This would prove decisive in this match.

One of the most direct ways to beat this kind of defense is by using the ball.  The Madrid pressure defense is set up to shut down Barça’s short passing game.  If however a player can beat his marker with the dribble, this type of defensive system can collapse.  This is exactly what Abidal does.

Rather than passing to an open Busquets, Abidal holds the ball, allows Oezil to overrun the play and beats the defender with the dribble.  Once Abidal is past Oezil notice how much space he has to run into.  This is a good example of Madrid not staying compact and interior space opening up within their block.  Also notice how Iniesta has dropped deep off his LW position and is completely unmarked in this open space.

Abidal is still in open space and not closed down.  Alonso is trying to recover and close him down – but Alonso has very limited pace and doesn’t  hinder Abidal.  In the image above you can just see part of Marcelo’s arm.  Again, this demonstrates how much space there was between Madrid’s frontline and backline.

Tellingly, Diarra is signaling Abidal’s run to the backline.  Diarra doesn’t move to close down Abidal.  Instead his tactical role is to defend deep – in front of the back four.  Again, this leaves open interior space because it prevents compactness.  And the focus of the backline is to start to drop deeper – not to close space and press – even though the Barça run is being made by a defender who is not even to the midfield line.

Finally, notice how out of shape the Madrid backline is.  Sanchez has dropped deep and forced Coentrao, the right back, to track him into the middle of the pitch. Coentrao is unclear on whether he should track Sanchez or close down Abidal.  Diarra is signaling for him to mark Sanchez but Coentrao is edging towards Abidal.  Remarkably, Messi is still completely open in space – and intelligently making a vertical run directly into the space Coentrao has vacated.

Exploiting these internal open spaces through off the ball movement, rapid ball circulation and the dribbling were the central reasons why Barcelona was able to control midfield and control this match.  This was fundamental to Barcelona winning.  Again and again Barça was able to create and exploit space within the Madrid block by patiently playing the ball past the initial line of four defenders who were very high up the pitch.

Dribbling was critical to winning this match due to the reasons shown in the images above.  I wanted to show the images from Abidal’s run because they demonstrated how effective this tactics could be.  Abidal is a defender – he is very good on the ball for a backline player but hardly a force.  Despite that, making the front line defense miss ripped open the Madrid defense.

When the Barceona attackers used the ball to find that kind of space the effects where devastating.  Messi’s freedom to find space coupled with his ability to dribble and make defenders miss within that open space repeatedly forced the Madrid defense to break its shape.  In the second half, Iniesta functionally took over the match through his ability on the ball carving open interior space by ghosting past defenders.

One of Guardiola’s fundamental tactical accomplishments in this Clásico was to develop a structure that facilitated Barcelona exploiting these open interior spaces.

The Madrid Defensive System: Trade Offs – Fatigue

The key to Madrid’s press is their athleticism and pace.  This is why they can defend so effectively on the press without staying as compact as other pressing teams need to.  Each defender pressing high is assigned to cover a zone and man mark a defender in that zone.  Pressure doesn’t depend on “hunting in packs.”  Instead it’s primarily created through the work rate and pace of the defenders.  Advanced defender are responsible for marking opposition players 1 vs. 1 across much of the pitch.  Space is suffocated through velocity, allowing the backline and defensive midfielders to play deeper than they otherwise would.

This brings up another major limitation of this system however – fatigue.  Defenders are frequently required to chase the ball 1 vs. 1 over distance to close down space.  In general, it is difficult for teams to press aggressively for 90 minutes – especially when they face a Barça team that will control 60-75% of possession.  To press for 90 minues with the Madrid model is especially difficult.

And as the match wore on and Barça retained possession Madrid visibly fatigued.  This decreased the effectiveness of their pressure significantly in the second half.  This was another major structural advantage.

 

Battle for Midfield

Over the past series of Clásicos Guardiola and Mourinho have been locked in a battle over control of midfield.  Mourinho understands that this is the life blood of the Barcelona attack.  As such he’s focused defensive resources to this region by increasing defensive shape, including more defensively oriented players in the zone (e.g. trivote), and increasing the sheer number of players in the region (e.g. high pressure).

Guardiola has responded to these tactics by Mourinho by stationing more players in midfield in order to maintain numerical advantage.

For example, in the CL last season Guardiola had his full backs play in line with the holding midfielder to provide outlets in the middle third instead of sending them high up the pitch.  This gave Barça six players in midfield.

One of the key open questions headed into this match was how many players Guardiola would commit to midfield in order to maintain numerical advantage.  In turn, how many could he commit without having so many players in the center that Barça would lose spacing, become too narrow and become easier to defend.  This was particularly important because if Barça lost spacing of the pitch they could be exposed on the counter in their transition defense.

 

The Battle Over Midfield:  What to do with Messi?

Much of the crux of the midfield battle between Guardiola and Mourinho tactically has revolved around Messi.  As a false 9, Messi theoretically gives Barça an extra man in midfield.  He gives Barça direct numerical advantage if allowed to do so unencumbered.

In order to prevent this, Mourinho has used multiple strategies since the Manita.  He’s had Pepe play as a DM and man mark Messi.  This worked reasonably well –but requires Madrid to play deep and defend and also have surplus CB to utilize.

Mourinho had his center backs step out aggressively to mark Messi. This is partly why Mourinho can’t afford to play his whole backline too high – there’s too much risk doing that while CB are stepping out on Messi.

Madrid has gone so far as to use CB to step out and even man mark Messi across the pitch.  For example, in the Super Copa Clásico’s Carvalho was assigned to man mark Messi across his defensive zone -even following him laterally to the touchlines when needed.

This specific strategy however met with mixed success at best as Messi’s dragged Carvalho out of shape engineering key Barça scores.

Perhaps the match where Madrid handled Messi best was in the Copa Del Rey.  And in that match they defended him indirectly.  That was the first match where they tried to pressure Barça.  Madrid played in a block, pressured higher up, and overplayed the middle.  In order to retain possession under pressure, Messi had to drop extremely deep to search for the ball and support the midfield three.  He dropped so deep however that Barça essentially lost him as a goal threat.  And in addition, no other player to filled in the space he vacated.  So in essence, by pressuring high up, Madrid not only disrupted Barça’s possession – but also nullified Barça’s best threat on goal.  They turned Messi as a false 9 striker into a full time midfielder with no striker in front of him.

Making sure this didn’t happen again – Messi dropping so deep to support possession that Barça completely loses its focal point in attack – was a priority for Guardiola and a key driver for the formation he implemented.

 

Leo Messi Comes Full Circle at the Bernabeu

The first time Guardiola fielded Messi at the false 9 position was during the historic 2-6 Barcelona victory at the Bernabeu.  In that match, playing Messi centrally and having him drop deep created anarchy in the Madrid defense.  While the false 9 has since garnered significant attention – at the time it was largely a forgotten tactic and Madrid didn’t know how to respond (which happened again to Manchester United in the CL finals).

Since then, of course the competition has responded.  And as touched on prior, Mourinho has developed several defensive approaches geared towards dealing with Messi in the false 9 position.

So on this trip to the Bernabeu, Guardiola shuffled the deck once again – and once more the move had a major impact on the match.

Messi didn’t play as a false 9 in this match.  He played in the hole behind the striker – close to how one would expect a 10 to play (though dropping much deeper into midfield than the traditional 10).  This is the position in the hole is the one that is most revered in Argentina.  There the position is described as the “enganche” – which literally mean hook.  The notion is that the enganche should be the creative player who connects midfield to the striker.  This match was one in which Messi again came very close to occupying the same position Maradona made his own.

One of the great tactical ironies of this match is that Messi played one of the more orthodox roles he’s ever played at Barcelona – and by playing him in a more orthodox position, Guardiola again created confusion and difficulty for Madrid at the Bernabeu by utilizing a strategy from the “past.”

The image below demonstrates several of these factors:

Messi has the ball in the space between the Madrid lines.  He has an frontline attacker in front of him – Sanchez – as a point of reference.  Because of Sanchez’s pace and ability to get behind the defense, it is not simple for the CB to aggressively step out on Messi as they have in the past when he was a false 9.

Xabi Alonso is forced to mark Alves – who is now playing as a winger.  Madrid never made a suitable adjustment to Alves playing higher up the pitch.  C.Ronaldo continues to mark Puyol as Puyol was the player in his zone he was assigned to mark and press.  Once the ball got past that line, C.Ronaldo did not want to track back that deeply as it would have limited his ability to attack on the counter.

This image above also shows how strong an effect Barça’s asymmetric formation had in the match tactically.  The entire defense has shifted to the Barça right flank.  Messi is 1 vs. 1 with Diarra.  Remarkably, both Iniesta and Fabregas are completely unmarked and making runs from deep into space.

The key here is the way Barcelona have spaced the pitch.  Unlike other matches where they’ve used extra midfielders – in this match Barça maintained width which spaced the pitch.

Iniesta in the first half did a wonderful job of staying disciplined and maintaining width.  The drawback to this was that he was often isolated and uninvolved.  But he stretched the pitch wide left.  Because Abidal doesn’t get forward, the Barça LW is often going to be isolated (a problem that Villa runs into over and over).  Nonetheless, stretching the pitch made it very large and hard for Madrid to defend.

On the right side, Alves did a wonderful job of staying wide and tirelessly ran up and down the flank to both attack and support Puyol in defense.

This width and spacing of the pitch, was fundamental to opening up the weaknesses in the Madrid defensive system.  They cracked open that internal space – especially for Messi and also forced the Madrid defense to have to run more and become fatigued.

 

Spacing the Pitch Pays Off

The plays I’ve focused on until now didn’t turn into scores or even necessarily into real opportunities.  I wanted to show them however to demonstrate the pattern that emerged once Barça stabilized themselves in the game and switched to a three man backline.

There is only so long you can continue to give Barça this much open space – especially to Messi.  And ultimately, this is what led to two of the three goals.

In the image above Messi receives a pass in midfield.  Notice how neither Messi nor Xavi are being marked.  The reason for this is that Oezila and Benzema were marking the two CBs Pique and Busquets as they were supposed to be.  C.Ronaldo’s responsibility is the lateral zone so he does not want to collapse into the middle – doing so will break Madrid’s shape.  Diarra is again playing deep rather than compact and also needs to keep an track of Iniesta how has ghosted in behind him (not shown in this image).  Alonso has marked Fabregas who has run into the area in his box to box role.

In a sense – all of the Madrid defenders are doing exactly what they are supposed to do in their defensive system.  But it leads to catastrophe for them.

Ozil makes great effort not only to close down Messi – but to tactically foul him.  As Oezil pressures notice the response of the Madrid defense – Diarra, Alonso, and Marcelo’s reaction to Messi’s run is to start to drop deep.  Ramos decides to step up into space.

Messi’s balance and strength allow him to easily ride Oezil’s tackle.  Once he’s broken free of that front line defender with the dribble the Madrid defense collapses shape.  Alonso looks to close down Messi and Lass tries to retreat.  The problem is because Messi had space initially – he’s already accelerated.

Messi splits the defenders and blows by Alonso.  Notice Marcelo’s positioning here.  Because Alves is staying so wide Marcelo marks him rather than collapsing into the middle to defend.  This would prove decisive in the goal.

In the image above, Ramos has stepped up strongly with Lass closing down from behind and trying to muscle Messi off the ball.

Prior when Messi was playing the false 9 – this type of defending may have been effective.  Messi received the ball so deep and has so many walls of deeper defenders to beat.  But in this game because he’s playing as a 10 rather than as a false 9 Messi has a point of reference in front of him in Sanchez.  And Sanchez is a point of reference striker who has explosive pace and can get behind CBs with relative ease.  As such above Messi only has to ride so many tackles – he releases the ball for the pass as he’s cut down by Diarra.

 

Sanchez is able to accelerate past Pepe and Coentrao and get behind them.  Then as Pepe tries to tackle him Sanchez still has the strength and balance needed to stay on his feet.

 

The Second Half: Iniesta Leaves His Mark

While the first half ended level and Barça had turned the match – it was still not the usual composed Barcelona.  They had more possession but had to struggle for it and that possession wasn’t as coherent as it ideally should be.

The major reason for this of course as the Madrid pressure defense.

But another reason was the absence of Iniesta in midfield.  Pulling Iniesta out to the wing provided Barcelona with needed tactical width.  But it removed one of the world’s great players with the ball at his feet from the region where he’s most dangerous.

While Fabregas’s role was sound in terms of formations and structure – the way he executed it wasn’t.  Fabregas is still learning how to integrate himself into the Barça possession game.  Right now he still plays “too slowly” often trying to play direct balls that just aren’t available because that’s not the style of the surrounding players.  And in this match he struggled to enter the flow of midfield play.  This was complicated by his new box to box role – one he hadn’t played before this season and one his teammates weren’ t certain how to link up with.

Iniesta playing on the wing was directly related to being able to play Fabregas in the match.  Pep essentially decided that Iniesta is better wide than Fabregas would be.  This made Fabregas’s performance in terms of build up and possession particularly costly as it removed Iniesta’s presence and replaced it with lower level midfield play.  At the same time – Iniesta was isolated on LW and struggled to fully join the dynamics of the match as well.

Guardiola saw this and changed it at half time.  Iniesta pinched in to midfield and Barça played without a designated LW.  Instead, Fabregas would often swith out wide when play needed to be stretched.

Moving Iniesta back to midfield transformed the match as it redefined how Barça was able to control possession.  Iniesta in the second half was the best player on the pitch. He generated opportunity after opportunity.  And against a tiring Madrid defense was able to ghost through those open internal spaces within the Madrid defense over and over.

Iniesta receives the ball in the Barça half above from Fabregas.  Iniesta turns quickly at the onrushing Coentrao.  For most of the game Coentrao played very deeply.  But once Iniesta moved centreally Madrid had no one to directly mark him.  Ironically, the one thing Mourinho had tried to avoid since the Manita had happened – Barça had completely overrun the Madrid defensive midfield.  Barça now had a numerical advantage in midfield of up to 5-6 to 3.  At the same time because Alves stayed, Sanchez would pull horizontally between flanks, and Fabregas would move left when Iniesta came very central, Barça still had width.

In this regard, it was very curious that Mourinho didn’t substitute in more central midfielders or pull DiMaria permanently off the flank into midfield.  Instead he continued to have Madrid play their zonal cover man marking pressure system.  The problem was Barça had too much movement and interplay from multi-skilled players for this system of 1 vs. 1 marking to work-especially as the defenders tired.

This is well demonstrated in the image above.  Notice how Messi is once again completely open and unmarked in space.  Messi had as much space in this match as he’s had for quite some time.  It seems like the Madrid plan may have been similar to the Copa Del Rey.  Allow Messi to collect the ball deep to draw him away from goal and then defend him deep with the CBs if he breaks containment.  However, Messi was no longer playing as a false 9.  He was playing as a 10 with Sanchez in front of him and Alves always wide of him in the right.  Even if intentional the Copa Del Rey defensive strategy wasn’t going to work.

Iniesta beats Coentrao and then Alonso off the dribble in transition and once he does the whole pitch opens up.  Coentrao is so angry at getting beat, he stops and flails his arm in the middle of the pitch.

Again, note how remarkably wide open Messi is in space.  This is again one of those images that when you just see it – you know it is going to end badly for the opposition.  Iniesta with the ball.  Messi open with large space to run into.

Khedira falls back to close down Messi.  Despite Khedira being so much larger than him, Messi rides out the tackle.

In the images above Messi has broke Khedira’s tackle.  This causes the entire defense to collapse on him.  Notice how open Alves is because he has maintained disciplined tactical width. These are the kinds of transition breaks at speed that Madrid themselves have become so known for.  Also notice that Fabregas has come into the image on the run along with Coentrao.

Alves fires in an amazing cross.  It’s a beautiful piece of skill especially given how complicated it is to time that cross when Fabregas is making such a long run.  But the key to Alves being able to make a cross of that quality is Messi.  Because Messi has forced the defense to collapse with his run Alves is completely unmarked and has no defenders even running towards him.  As shown below, Marcelo the LB actually has his back turned to Alves – that’s how open he is.

 

Solidity in Transition Defense:  Carles Puyol – The Key to Guardiola’s Tactics

While I’ve discussed the Bardca formation and attack in detail – none of it would be possible without Carles Puyol.  He along with Busquets were the tactical foundations for Guardiola’s thinking.  And it was Puyol who had to absorb the greatest responsibility on the team.

Barça was simultaneously able to gain numerical advantage in midfield while also spacing the pitch through width primarily because they played three at the back with Busquets in support.  This is what Pep meant when he said that the team had the choice to be brave or very brave in the match at the Bernabeu.

The trade off one makes is that with three at the back the lateral center halves are extremely exposed down the flanks.  They are at risk for getting caught  1 vs. 2 against the oppositions winger and FB.  This is what happened to Mascherano again and again in the opening of the Valencia match.

To play three at the back meant trusting that the lateral CB could at minimum handle the Madrid wingers 1 vs. 1 in space.  While Busquets could join as a fourth defender – the problem would really occur in transition defense.  In those situations there would likely not be enough time for Busquets to drop and for the backline to spread wide.  Given that Madrid runs its offense down the flanks and is the best squad in the world at breaking at speed – this tactical approach was enormously risky.  To implement it meant that Guardiola had to have complete faith in his backline – but especially in the lateral center halves.

And the key player in making all of this work was the right center half who would have to double as a right FB.  Madrid’s offense is structure down its left flank.  The combination of Marcelo in support of C.Ronalso along with Ozil and Xabi spraying balls wide into space is the foundation of their offense.  In addition, with Benzema’s resurgence – he too often plays out on the left flank looking to link up with C.Ronaldo and create moves from wider positions.

And in a game where Coentrao, a left footed player, was acting as a make shift RB – the left flank was even more critical for Madrid.

Everything I’ve discussed – none of it would be possible or could work if Guardiola didn’t believe his right center back could carry this immense responsibility.  If he couldn’t – then no Fabregas in a box to box role.  No Alves on the wing.  No Sanchez as a lone striker playing in a horizontal band.  None of it worked unless Guardiola believed that a single player could neutralize C.Ronaldo 1 vs. 1 and stop breaks involving Marcelo and C.Ronaldo linking together.

Guardiola fortunately did have that player.  The Captain was just immense.  He had the most responsibility on the team this match.  He gave Pep the flexibility to balance the three objectives – control of midfield / width along with transition defense.  Abidal also had a terrific match playing well against DiMaria.

But as expected the Madrid attack was significantly weighted to their left flank during the crucial part of the match.  And Puyol completely shut down the Madrid attack time and time again.  Alves was critical because he occupied Marcelo and prevented him from getting forward.  But seeing that Benzema came left frequently to support C.Ronaldo.

So effective was Puyol in neutralizing C.Ronaldo pace based attacks on the left flank, that Mourinho moved C.Ronaldo to the right flank.  Not only is this C.Ronaldo’s weaker side but Coentrao wasn’t getting forward at all so C.Ronaldo as functionally on his own in wide positions.

It’s for these reasons that Puyol was man of the match.

 

The End

For much of this season Guardiola has been criticized for experimenting too much.  Too many line ups.  Too many formations.  To few defenders and far too many midfielders.

What made this Clásico so special – was that it was the culmination of all that experimentation, risk taking, hard work and complete belief in his players.

Without that prior experimentation – Barcelona could not have won this match the way they did.  In fact, without Guardiola continuing to push tactical boundaries with the Barça system and forcing it to evolve – it’s possible that Barça wouldn’t have won.

Mourinho set his team up to face a Barça team that played a fluid 4-3-3 with Messi dropping deep as the primary source of numerical advantage in midfield.  But that wasn’t’ the system Guardiola played at all.  And that just amplified how many shadows the Madrid team had to chase once Barcelona settled down from that disastrous start.

Ultimately, it was the team’s talent, mental strength, calm and championship experience that saw them through after that disastrous start where they conceded within thirty seconds of the match starting.  But it was the way the system was constructed that allowed the players to translate the inner resources they possessed into execution on the pitch and do so as a brilliant, collective whole.  That’s what tactics are always about.

This was a historic match in so many ways.  Tactically it was one of the most noteworthy in Barcelona’s history given how innovative Guardiola was and the circumstances.  He continues to develop approaches to the game that are breathtaking to watch and analyze.

In my preview to the match I wrote that given how talented these two sides are and how multi-dimensional the players are, the tactical battle would be won by the manager who put into place the structure that maximized the players flexibility and their ability to respond dynamically to the events that transpired within match play.

In this match and in the Rayo Vallecano match Guardiola is exporing the dimensions for how that kind of flexibility can be created.

At the start of this season many thought that incorporating the 3-4-3 into the base system was Guardiola’s next project for the team.  And many wondered if it was too radical a shift to work.

It turned out everyone was wrong.  Guardiola is trying to move in a far more visionary direction.